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 Note on Spelling and 
Personal Names 
 Names in this book, with certain exceptions, are spelled using the post-1972 sys-
tem (Ejaan yang Disempurnakan). Exceptions include those that appear in quota-
tions from other sources and names of authors in the notes who use the old spelling. 
With the new system, the name of Indonesia’s fi rst president, for example, is spelled 
“Sukarno” instead of “Soekarno,” “Soesanto Pudjomartono” becomes “Susanto 
Pujomartono,” and “Akbar Tandjung” becomes “Akbar Tanjung.” Also, as Western 
news sources frequently point out, many Indonesians, such as the former president 
Suharto, go by only one name. These cases are indicated in brackets [one name] in the 
fi rst reference to the person. 
 For Indonesians with multiple names, there is no standard practice for short-
ened references. Instead, use of the first, middle, or last part of their full names, or 
a nickname, varies by individual. For example, the former minister of information, 
Muhammad Yunus Yosfiah, is called “Pak [Mr.] Yunus,” while the former director 
general of press and graphics, H. Dailami, is called “Pak Dailami,” and the former 
head of  Kompas , Jakob Oetama, is called “Pak Jakob.” For the sake of simplicity, after 
the first reference to an individual by his or her full name, subsequent references 
use the last component of the person’s name, which in the United States would be 
called the surname. For example, the Golkar leader Akbar Tanjung is commonly called 
“Akbar” or “Pak Akbar,” but in this book I refer to him as “Tanjung” after the first ref-
erence. Notable exceptions include the former president Megawati Sukarnoputri, who 
is referred to in short references as “Megawati” or “President Megawati.” 






 While democracy in the long run is the most stable form of government, in the 
short run, it is among the most fragile. 
 —Madeleine Albright, speech delivered at the conference “Towards a 
Community of Democracies,” Warsaw, June 26, 2000 
 In May 1998, as the Indonesian capital of Jakarta smoldered from days of rioting, 
arson, and gunfire, the aging autocrat President Suharto resigned after more than 
three decades in power. With the nation slipping toward bankruptcy and separatist 
revolts simmering in remote provinces, his vice president, Bacharuddin Jusuf (B. J.) 
Habibie, took office, named a new cabinet, and promised democratic reforms. Less 
than two weeks later, sixty supporters of the once-outlawed Alliance of Independent 
Journalists (Aliansi Jurnalis Independen, AJI) gathered to discuss preventing a return 
of authoritarian media controls, a defining issue not only for these journalists but for 
the entire reform movement. 
 In marked contrast to the secrecy once required to avoid police raids, organizers of 
this gathering invited television crews to film their proceedings, and a top official from 
the once-feared Ministry of Information served as a speaker. In another sign of a new 
era, when these journalists later marched from the ministry to the state-sponsored 
Indonesian Journalists Association, instead of arresting them, the police led the way. 
 While the mood of this forum reflected the euphoria sweeping the country, many 
were still wary. The editor of the English-language  Jakarta Post , Susanto Pujomar-
tono, posed a critical question: Had the movement for press freedom triumphed just 
because Suharto was no longer president? He reminded his audience of the dashed 
expectations of 1966, when General Suharto, after deposing his autocratic predeces-
sor, had lavished special attention on the media before shifting to the repression that 
marked most of his tenure. The lesson, Pujomartono said, was that though Indonesia 
was once again entering a new era, the media could rely on neither laws nor the gov-
ernment’s “pity” to safeguard their future. Journalists, moreover, were still haunted 
by the ghosts of long repression and deference to the fallen regime. 1 
 The head of AJI, Lukas Luwarso, echoed these concerns, pointing out that news 
outlets in this heady climate were behaving just as they had three decades earlier, 
openly rebuking the outgoing regime. Yet history had shown the Indonesian press to 
be no sturdier as a pillar of democracy than a pile of wood tossing about in the ocean. 
Given its freedom, he said, changing metaphors, the press bellows abusively before 
silently bowing in the face of pressure. Citing yet another metaphor favored by the 
publisher Jakob Oetama, he compared the press to a crab who quickly retreats when 
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pelted with stones. 2 At some point during their struggle for survival under Suharto, 
members of the press had lost their nerve and, in turn, had taught this fear to the 
Indonesian people—perpetuating, consciously or not, the power of the regime. 3 
 Now, after so many years of accommodating New Order dictates, Luwarso said 
he was not surprised that many in both media and government feared that removing 
restraints would lead to chaos. This was natural, he said, just as it is natural for one 
who has been in the dark for a long time to be afraid of the light. But if the mentality 
of the nation’s leaders did not change, and if the press itself did not demand com-
prehensive legal reforms, “this era animated by the spirit of reform will become an 
absurd repetition of the past.” 4 
 The views expressed in this forum offer a snapshot of the challenges the Indo-
nesian media would face during the country’s transition to democracy, revealing the 
burden of Indonesia’s authoritarian past as well as the promise of its democratic 
future. As eyewitnesses to the nation’s turbulent history, many of these journalists 
had already seen the overthrow of an earlier dictatorship give way to Suharto’s thirty 
years of authoritarian rule, thus lending gravity to Luwarso’s warning that the current 
spirit of reform could be “an absurd repetition of the past.” Suharto’s New Order had 
lasted two full generations by embedding itself in constitution, law, and bureaucracy, 
while inserting itself into the language, media, and mentality of ordinary citizens and 
educated elites, journalists included. The pervasiveness of authoritarian values within 
Indonesian society, moreover, meant that democratic reform would require not only 
regime change but also a transformation of the country’s political culture—thus lend-
ing particular significance to the work of the media. 
 Global Context 
 Though their focus was Indonesia, these journalists were addressing the chief 
problem facing similar democratic transitions worldwide: an inherent tendency to 
revert to authoritarian rule. Over the past quarter century, as crowds have toppled 
dozens of dictatorial regimes from Manila to Berlin, from Warsaw to Cairo, we have 
learned a simple lesson: democratic uprisings are relatively easy, almost common-
place, but successful transitions to enduring democracies are diffi  cult and rare. 
 The moment of regime change sparks tremendous hope among both participants 
and international observers who anticipate the emergence of a more open, democratic 
society. Yet once a dictator has fallen, the most difficult question remains: How will the 
newly democratizing nation avoid reversing course, reverting to authoritarian solu-
tions for the daunting problems brought by the transition? In Eastern Europe, central 
Asia, and much of the Middle East, this question has gained increasing salience as 
one democratic transition after another has given way to renewed authoritarian rule. 
Indeed, the tendency toward reversal is evident in any environment where the condi-
tions that enabled authoritarianism are still in place. In Indonesia’s transition, such 
conditions included judicial corruption, electoral fraud, a politicized military, elite 
rent seeking, and executive machinations to retain power. Rather than fleeing into 
exile, moreover, Suharto ceded power to a handpicked successor and retired to his 
luxurious compound in Central Jakarta to enjoy his grandchildren, his pet tiger, and 
access to an estimated $40 billion in accrued assets. 5 
 Though tainted by the regime’s corruption, Suharto’s political machine had not 
lost power. Instead, with his loyal protégé at the helm, Suharto’s long-ruling Golkar 
party retained control of both the executive and the legislature, providing a ready path 
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to reversal as the country struggled to launch democratic reforms. The roots of the 
New Order’s authoritarianism, moreover, ran deep, and most of the mechanisms that 
had enabled the executive to concentrate political and economic power were still in 
place—mechanisms that for decades had restricted media freedom, checked opposing 
centers of power, and thereby blocked the circulation of leadership. In retrospect, the 
country’s democratic transition was far more precarious than many realized. 
 Despite these inauspicious beginnings, Indonesia’s democratization has per-
sisted, twice passing Samuel Huntington’s benchmark of two consecutive elections 
for assessing a transition’s long-term viability. 6 After two fitful decades of change, 
Indonesia now offers some lessons, as the world’s largest Muslim-majority nation, 
for more recent democratic transitions, notably the Arab Spring of 2011–13. While 
myriad forces can promote or impede democratization, Indonesia’s experience indi-
cates that a transition’s consolidation or reversal depends, to a surprising extent, on 
the role of the media—a set of actors whose freedom is widely recognized as a defining 
attribute of modern democracies but whose centrality in checking reversal remains 
only partly understood. 
 Actors versus Factors 
 Following the succession of transitions starting in the 1970s that Samuel Hun-
tington terms democratization’s “third wave,” a vast literature has emerged address-
ing the question of why some democratic transitions succeed and others founder, why 
some lead to “democratic consolidation” while others either fail outright or settle into 
a state of pseudodemocracy that often masks an atavistic authoritarianism. 7 Within 
this literature, studies of transitions tend to focus on two broad themes: actors and 
factors. 
 Taking the latter approach, analysts such as Huntington and Robert Dahl have 
sought to explain the origins and outcomes of transitions with a series of factors 
of varying complexity, including global economic trends, levels of modernization, or 
geopolitical forces. 8 Without discounting their value, others, such as Juan Linz, have 
critiqued factor-based analyses as overly static, focusing on the “social, economic, and 
cultural correlates of stable regimes in a given moment of time, [rather] than on the 
dynamic processes of crisis, breakdown, and re-equilibration of existing regimes or 
the consolidation of new ones.” 9 Such studies also tend toward an almost teleological 
portrayal of democratization as a phenomenon that, once in motion, will continue of 
its own accord unless blocked by hostile forces or unfavorable circumstances. 
 Those who focus on actors, by contrast, look at the interplay of political leaders 
and social sectors in a process that leads to either reversal or consolidation, depend-
ing on the resources and strategies these actors employ. In the aftermath of the Cold 
War, residual elements from authoritarian regimes, whether military or civilian, have 
been persistent sources of resistance to democratization. Similarly, in Indonesia after 
Suharto, reversal was not an abstraction but a process promoted by actors determined 
to avoid accounting for past derelictions and to preserve privileges, whether political 
office, government contracts, or protected markets. These actors formed a disparate 
alliance of regime cronies, incumbent officials, and military leaders who coalesced 
around the Golkar party, which had dominated parliament under Suharto and pre-
served much of its influence after his fall. 
 Within this democratization literature, the military, as the sole actor with the raw 
coercive power to lead a reversal, merits the close attention it has received. Indeed, 
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in the latter half of the twentieth century, militaries in developing societies tended 
to be vehicles for the establishment of, or reversion to, authoritarianism. Yet when 
atavistic forces are so entrenched that the inevitable tendency is toward reversal, the 
primary concern is not who has the power to lead a return to authoritarian rule, but 
rather who has the means and motivation to resist. Those who do are often identified 
as reformists, democratic actors, or simply democrats. They might include journalists 
as well as students, intellectuals, nongovernmental organizations, opposition political 
parties, or even members of the military. Among these many actors, however, mem-
bers of the news media are uniquely positioned to counter the forces of reversal and 
further democratic consolidation. Such was the case in Indonesia, although there the 
synergy between media actors and civil society has been, and likely will continue to 
be, the critical force in deciding democracy’s future. 
 Democratization and the Media 
 From the earliest democratization scholarship, there has been general agreement 
that freedom of the press, or the media more broadly, is necessary to building a mod-
ern democracy, primarily through promoting government accountability and serving 
as a key vehicle in citizens’ communication of political preferences. Much of this older 
literature, however, tends to treat such freedom in the binary terms of presence versus 
absence. In the 1990s, scholars began examining the media as a more dynamic force 
but generally focused on their role in regime change. 10 
 While this book addresses the media’s influence in Suharto’s downfall, its empha-
sis is on the critical consolidation phase during democratization. In this second phase, 
the main concern is not the cessation of authoritarian rule but rather the reversibility 
of democratization and challenges in building democratic institutions. 11 Numerous 
scholars have examined the post-1999 wave of democratization. Many of these have 
focused on the conditions conducive to media support for democratization. Some have 
taken a primarily empirical approach, and others have been predominantly prescrip-
tive, outlining what news outlets  should do to strengthen democracy while critiquing 
media failings in specific political contexts. 12 By contrast, this volume examines what 
media outlets actually do, or are inherently inclined to do, that helps ward off reversal 
in practice. 
 The News Media’s Unique Role 
 In their diurnal responsibilities, members of the media diff er little from other 
professionals. But the news outlets they serve stand apart from other sectors, in part 
because the services they provide are distinctive. In producing and disseminating 
news and commentary on public aff airs, they are the only sector whose primary job is 
to observe, record, and analyze the actions of other players and so inform the public. 
Media actors in democracies may not cut deals and form coalitions to the same extent 
as others, but individually and collectively, intentionally and haphazardly, they shape 
the environment in which other actors make decisions and forge alliances, aff ecting in 
multiple ways the calculations of contending forces. Moreover, simply by reporting on 
key players and unfolding events, the media help impose transparency on both, alert-
ing the public to developments aff ecting power relations and general welfare. 
 But as Indonesia’s democratic transition illustrates, in shaping this decision-
making environment, the media’s most critical function may be their contribution 
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to what the political theorist Adam Przeworski has described as the institutionaliza-
tion of uncertainty—a process that serves as both a force for democratization and a 
critical deterrent to reversal. 13 In most societal contexts, the word “uncertainty” car-
ries a host of negative connotations. In Indonesia, for decades Suharto’s relentless 
campaign against suspected Communists created a climate of fearful uncertainty 
among ordinary people ever vulnerable to charges of subversion. Throughout the 
New Order, the regime itself faced what Andreas Schedler calls the “twin uncer-
tainty” of authoritarian rule—the “institutional insecurity” all autocrats face in 
maintaining power and “informational uncertainty” exacerbated by the repression 
of civil liberties. 14 In Suharto’s last years, uncertainty over who would succeed him 
hung like a cloud over much public discourse. Following Przeworski, my analysis 
treats uncertainty not as a general state or a type of absence but as a central element 
in ruled-based, yet open, democratic contestation that yields outcomes unknowable 
in advance. 
 At the start of democratization, myriad changes introduce far more uncertainty 
into the political arena than could have been tolerated under authoritarianism. The 
emancipation of the public sphere exposes everyone—reformers as well as the old 
guard—to new forms of criticism. The democratic process itself, for all its promises 
of fairness and inclusion, offers no guarantees that outcomes will satisfy all partici-
pants. In the face of democratization’s heightened uncertainty, even those committed 
to reform in principle may lose the courage to allow democratic outcomes in practice. 
The challenge for reformers in any postauthoritarian society is managing the insecu-
rity felt by those with the power to derail the transition without allowing reform itself 
to founder. 
 Przeworski addresses this problem by arguing that democratization should be 
understood as the institutionalization of continuous conflicts and, simultaneously, 
“the process of institutionalizing uncertainty” inherent in democratic contestation. 
He compares this uncertainty to the certainty that characterizes authoritarian rule, in 
which some groups (often the military) have the power to manipulate the resolution 
of conflicts to protect their interests. While those outside the ruling circle may face 
considerable uncertainty, he continues, those close to the regime “have a high degree 
of control . . . in the sense that they are not forced to accept undesirable outcomes.” 
In a democracy, by contrast, “no group is able to intervene when outcomes of conflicts 
violate their self-perceived interests.” 15 Democracy, in sum, is a form of governance 
that subjects all players to uncertainty. 
 Paradoxically, what lends stability to democracy’s continuous churn of contesta-
tion is that outcomes of individual contests are always, to some degree, indetermi-
nate. “In a democracy,” Przeworski explains, “no one can win for once and for all: even 
if successful at one time, victors immediately face the prospect of having to struggle 
in the future.” 16 By the same logic, this indeterminacy also guarantees that no defeat 
is ever final and there will be a chance to play again. 
 Under authoritarianism, there is a strikingly symmetrical inversion of these 
principles. Indeed, authoritarianism is generally marked by an obsessive pursuit of 
security through predetermined outcomes—whether in elections, the distribution of 
government contracts, or court cases. Once established, authoritarian regimes survive 
by affording this freedom from uncertainty to collaborating elites. In addition, as long 
as a regime can control the outcomes of most contests, there is little reason to main-
tain the mechanisms of indeterminacy that promise future open rounds. Only when 
an authoritarian grip weakens and a country’s political situation is in flux does the 
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need arise to build, or rebuild, a society that combines a critical component of uncer-
tainty with the complementary promise of indeterminacy. 
 At the start of democratic transition, when electoral outcomes are no longer pre-
ordained, new players have a chance to compete. But fears that the first open contest 
might also be the last can trigger a frenzy of power grabbing that can lead right back 
to authoritarianism. Conversely, faith in the indeterminacy of current rounds—that 
is, assurance that there will always be another chance to compete—can stave off this 
inclination to reversal. 
 Even without a downward spiral of power grabbing, the fear that there will not be a 
chance to play again may seem to justify the impulse to cheat and weaken commitments 
to the norms of fair play. Cheating in the first round is likely to distort the electoral pro-
cess in future rounds. By contrast, belief that there will be future open contests encour-
ages players to focus not simply on winning but on guarding the process to improve 
their odds in the next round should they lose the first. In short, the promise of ongoing 
rounds gives players reason to invest in the integrity of the process—specifically, the 
practices and rules of the game that will maintain a level playing field for future con-
tests. Through building this faith in indeterminacy and increasing investment in a fair 
process, the uncertainty of democratic contestation becomes institutionalized. 
 More broadly, the institutionalization of uncertainty is the process by which the 
unpredictability of democratic contests comes to be tolerated and eventually expected 
by a polity accustomed to outcomes decided in advance by political patronage or exec-
utive caprice. As Indonesia’s experience demonstrates, a nation’s media can play a 
critical role—first, as actors self-consciously promoting reforms, transparency, and 
democratic values (including the norms of fair play) and second, as vehicles for the 
display of uncertainty, that is, democracy’s inherent unpredictability and the facts, 
opinions, and partisan battles that sustain it. These are the battles that play out in 
the secondary contests between elections: political, as well as economic and judicial. 
 When we apply Przeworski’s concept to actual democratic transitions, the abstrac-
tion of uncertainty needs to be integrated into an unfolding political process. Viewed 
at the moment of authoritarianism’s collapse, amid the tumult of mass demonstra-
tions and fallen dictators, democratic change seems primarily a conjuncture of regime 
incapacity and mass mobilization. Yet viewed analytically, a political transition and the 
subsequent struggle to prevent authoritarian reversal require mechanisms to break 
up elite collusion and promote the free interplay of competing forces whose sum is 
uncertainty. By both providing information and, at times, promoting political scandal, 
the media engender division among competing elites, delegitimate collusive pacts, 
and inspire public mobilization that can maintain a process that moves forward, by 
fits and starts, toward democratic consolidation. 
 Not only does Przeworski’s conceptual model effectively encompass Indonesia’s 
two-decade struggle for democracy, it also illuminates key aspects of parallel pro-
cesses that have roiled four continents since the end of the Cold War. Its application 
to the progression of specific democratic transitions produces a paradigm that places 
the media at the fulcrum of change. Most of the regime changes that mark democ-
ratization’s “third wave” were pacted transitions that left large elements of the old 
authoritarian coalition in place. 17 Among such elements, members of the media, even 
those once allied with the old order, are potentially leading actors uniquely equipped 
to promote the transparency and competitive contestation central to democracy and 
thereby ward off authoritarian reversal. 
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 Media in the Institutionalization of Uncertainty 
 In any transition, momentum for change produces broad expectations, including 
the belief that democratization will lead not just to fair elections but to more sweep-
ing changes, from better governance to social equity. As a transition takes off , Silvio 
Waisbord notes, “High hopes are placed on the democratic press.” 18 Observers have 
identifi ed numerous ways in which the news media could—and should—promote 
democratization, including informing and educating the public, fostering coopera-
tion and civic culture, acting as watchdogs, providing accessible forums for public 
debate, giving voice to the marginalized, fortifying democratic institutions, promoting 
reforms, easing confl ict, and facilitating reconciliation. 19 
 While recognizing the importance of these standards in evaluating media 
performance in furthering transitions, this book sets them aside to assess the 
media’s role in a specific process, institutionalizing uncertainty, that checks rever-
sal and promotes democratic consolidation. This seemingly narrow definition of 
democratization, moreover, has surprisingly broad application when examining 
the media. 
 At a basic level, Przeworski’s frame allows us to see political opening itself from 
a new perspective, as a process in which the media shift from a subordinate role that 
reinforces the certainties of authoritarianism to a provocative, often contentious one 
that involves highlighting, even amplifying, the uncertainties of democratic contesta-
tion among rival individuals and groups. Ultimately, this interpretation also helps 
illuminate what makes democratization “self-enforcing” (and thereby consolidated), 
beyond favorable conditions and good intentions. 20 
 To understand the critical role of the media in transitions, we need to combine 
consideration of this sector’s inclination toward transparency, unique among the 
major political forces, with a narrative of media actors. The latter, whether publish-
ers, producers, editors, or reporters, often take enormous personal risks to translate 
this inclination into concrete actions that together create and revitalize the free com-
munication that is the oxygen of democracy, frustrate the rigging of contestation, and 
thereby counter reversion to authoritarianism. 
 Equally important, however, is a finding that seems at first glance counter-
intuitive: among the chief mechanisms for preventing reversal are precisely the 
elements of media coverage that tend to attract the most criticism in stable 
democracies, particularly focus on scandal, contest frames, and partisan conflict. 
The findings that emerge from this close study of Indonesia’s two-decades-long 
democratic transition resonate with comparable cases in Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America discussed in the  concluding chapter . While the combined dynamics at 
work in these countries are uncommon among the many nations emerging from 
the authoritarianism of the Cold War, it is in these few cases that democratization 
seems to be taking hold. 
 The chapters that follow probe Indonesia’s ongoing democratic transition to 
tease out the dynamics that either drive or curb the media in imposing transpar-
ency and fostering the institutionalization of uncertainty, and to explore the complex 
motivations—both self-serving and civic-minded—that can make the media central to 
democratization’s success. The analysis offers both an interrogation of Indonesia’s 
transition, its progress and limitations, and a model for understanding similar demo-
cratic transitions worldwide. 
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 Phases of Transition 
 In the aftermath of authoritarian rule, a nation’s media—whether print, broadcast, 
or digital—can contribute to institutionalizing both uncertainty and indeterminacy in 
democratic contestation in ways that vary as a transition moves through diff erent 
stages. For the purposes of this analysis, democratic transitions, Indonesia’s included, 
can be broken roughly into three phases: (1) delegitimation and collapse of the rul-
ing regime; (2) a trial period of institutional change when confi dence develops in the 
rules, institutions, and indeterminacy of democratic contestation; and (3) a long-term 
process of consolidation pulled between the reversibility of democratization and the 
durability of democratic institutions. In Przeworski’s model, democratization moves 
toward this end state of consolidation when political players, anticipating future con-
tests, invest not only in winning individual rounds but also in ensuring fairness in the 
democratic process over the long term. 21 
 Delegitimation and Collapse 
 As opposition forces organize in response to the excesses of authoritarian rule, 
they spark, in the fi rst phase, a burgeoning of discontent that precedes protest, agita-
tion, and action. The many possible channels for disseminating critiques and organiz-
ing for action include the samizdat circulation of documents, as in the Soviet bloc, 
and latter-day incarnations on social media, as in Egypt, or through the emergence 
of an independent media, as in the Philippines under the dictator Ferdinand Marcos. 
Regardless of medium, such communication can help precipitate a transformation, 
unsettling the staid predictability of the authoritarian status quo. 
 As Vicky Randall notes, when elements of the media, especially those considered 
“alternative,” are able to foster a critical stance toward the regime, they help under-
mine its legitimacy. 22 When waning legitimacy destabilizes the coalitions that have 
sustained the ruling order, the bolder of mainstream media outlets may also begin 
airing dissenting views or revelations damaging to the regime. For some, this com-
munication may also provide authorization or affirmation for action. At a minimum, 
whether through critical reporting or simply covering unfolding events, the media as 
a whole highlight, and often encourage, new contestation over the right to rule. 
 In Indonesia during this phase, discussed in  chapter 3 , all the major news outlets 
eventually reported the economic crisis and consequent protests that hit the country in 
1997. Alternative channels, such as nascent computer networks, also disseminated rev-
elations damaging to the regime and facilitated coordination among activists. 23 While 
the media’s part in the regime’s collapse was complex and sometimes contradictory, in 
the end, few outlets could avoid the crisis and demonstrations. Even coverage support-
ive of Suharto heightened awareness of new uncertainty emerging from changing power 
relations among elites. While this uncertainty was not yet the “ruled open-endedness” 
or “organized uncertainty” of Przeworski’s model, the media were still highlighting, 
even normalizing, a departure from the predictability of an unchallenged regime. 24 
 Trial Phase 
 In the second phase, political uncertainty tends to revolve around whether lead-
ers will support fair and open elections. There is a danger that media outlets might 
be captured by actors with sectarian agendas, triggering a downward spiral into 
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competing propaganda and fostering fears of once-and-for-all victories that will pre-
clude future competition, thereby reducing faith in the indeterminacy of democratic 
contestation. But to the extent that the media, on balance, give voice to all competi-
tors, they help maintain uncertainty over which group will prevail in the end—a state 
essential, in Przeworski’s model, to democratization before and during the start of 
offi  cial campaigns. 
 During this trial phase, the media play a supplemental role in institutionalizing 
the uncertainty of democratic elections when imposing transparency on the electoral 
process, whether through a daily drumbeat of campaign reporting, critical coverage 
of decision-making, or investigations into electoral fraud. Such scrutiny discourages 
fraud but also maintains the focus on fairness that all players must sustain to prevent 
a return to the distorted outcomes of authoritarianism. 
 In Indonesia, the trial phase included the first post-Suharto elections of June 1999, 
when the country faced its most critical challenges in warding off reversion to fixed 
outcomes. Wary of setting off clashes and still inhibited by taboos against reporting 
on religion, race, ethnicity, or class, the majority of media, as described in  chapters 
4 to  6 , avoided a slide into sectarian agendas, even during the violent interreligious 
conflict that erupted in the eastern islands. Moreover, in election coverage of the same 
period, a surprisingly wide range of opposition voices was able to gain media atten-
tion, an outcome that also helped level the playing field for competitive contestation. 
 Yet from rule writing through tabulation, the performance of Indonesia’s media 
in imposing scrutiny on the parliamentary elections was decidedly mixed—at times 
aggressively promoting fairness and transparency, while at other times compromised 
by partisan biases and fears of inciting violence. In their compromises, the media 
responded to ruling-party machinations and opposition complacency in ways that, 
if we apply Przeworski’s model, left the country poised for reversal via a return to 
rigged elections orchestrated by colluding elites. Surprisingly, however, this threat-
ened reversal was later halted, in effect, by the same media’s collective pursuit of a 
campaign finance scandal that finally broke the ruling party’s grip on power, derailing 
its maneuvers to keep Suharto’s protégé, B. J. Habibie, in the presidency. 
 Democratic Consolidation 
 The media can play an equally critical role in the fi nal consolidation phase. Fol-
lowing Przeworski, this phase involves (1) the normalization of regular, open-ended 
contestation that produces meaningful shifts in the balance of power, (2) strengthen-
ing faith that there will be future fair chances to compete, and (3) development of a 
political culture that resists a return to predetermined outcomes. 
 Reversals that block consolidation often begin not with the restoration of the old 
dictator but with the emergence of a pseudodemocratic regime with an indefinite lien 
on power—a trend extending from Alexander Lukashenko in Belarus to Abdel Fat-
tah el-Sisi in Egypt, the Aliyevs of Azerbaijan, Nursultan Nazarbayev in Kazakhstan, 
Islam Karimov in Uzbekistan, and Hun Sen in Cambodia. A recurring dynamic in such 
reversal is the formation of an ad hoc coalition of old and new actors around a party 
and leader who together manipulate democratic forms for a protracted hold on power, 
producing collusive pacts and engineered outcomes in elections as well as in sec-
ondary contests for government contracts, favorable court rulings, and advantageous 
economic regulations. Competitive media can play a key role in disrupting collusive 
coalitions, even late in the transition, by imposing scrutiny on actors and providing a 
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vehicle for actors to impose scrutiny on each other (whether out of civic duty, partisan 
maneuvering, or personal revenge). 
 In Indonesia’s tempestuous transition, we can mark a major milestone in this 
phase with the election in October 1999 of a new president, Abdurrahman Wahid 
(Gus Dur), which denied the long-reigning Golkar party a continued lock on the 
executive. Though much of the media ignored the fraud that had compromised the 
parliamentary elections just three months earlier, relentless postelection coverage of 
a campaign finance scandal known as “Baligate” irreparably damaged Golkar’s can-
didate, President Habibie, in the presidential race and for the first time in decades 
forced an incumbent president and his party to accept an unfavorable outcome. In ret-
rospect, Baligate was the start of an era of politics by scandal in Indonesia that made 
the media a lead player in a volatile pattern of intraelite conflict and marked a turning 
point in the country’s democratic transition. 
 The long-term change lay in the transformation of the public sphere, no longer 
controllable by any one party. Now freed from New Order restrictions, media expo-
sés and political scandal began to play a central yet unpredictable role in mediat-
ing intraelite conflict, as warring factions used the media to maneuver against each 
other and news outlets weighed in independently. Most significantly, elite collusive 
pacts were now less viable, weakened by the use of scandal as a political weapon and 
ensuing cycles of revenge. During five critical years of this transition, 1999 to 2004, 
Indonesia saw a relentless cycle of elite attack and counterattack through a succession 
of media-driven scandals—Buloggate I, Buloggate II, Taperumgate, Bruneigate, and 
Banpresgate. 
 Through a process described in  chapter 7 , the carefully negotiated, ritual resolu-
tions of the Suharto era were now breaking down, weakened by the politics of public 
revenge and the new transparency that the media were imposing upon events and 
elite rivalries. This factional infighting, played out in the media, was central to the 
ultimate endurance of democratization. By fostering intraelite conflict and making 
alliances ever more fluid and unpredictable, this new politics by scandal moved Indo-
nesia away from authoritarian stasis and closer to the institutionalized uncertainty of 
democracy. Though advanced democracies may view such cycles as a degraded form 
of politics, in this postauthoritarian setting, they were critical in derailing the political 
collusion and electoral manipulation that threatened to end the country’s democratic 
transition. 
 Reconsidering Scandal 
 Examining the intersection between the media and democratic uncertainty high-
lights the potential emergent role in democratization of tendencies for which news 
outlets are often faulted—namely, preoccupation with scandal, partisan confl ict, and 
contest frames, particularly horse-race election coverage. Critics have condemned 
these tendencies for “hollowing out” democracy, fostering divisive politics rather 
than informed debate, and perhaps most insidiously, promoting apathy and cyni-
cism. 25 Some disparage horse-race coverage for reducing election reporting to sports 
metaphors and strategy analysis, trivializing the political process while crowding out 
substantive issues and wider perspectives. 26 Others hold the media responsible for 
“undermining” democracy by failing to convey the signifi cance of news stories within 
a larger context. 27 
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 The media’s recurring fixation on scandal and partisan conflict, manifest in sen-
sationalized reporting on personal peccadilloes and political vendetta, has inspired 
equally trenchant critiques. “‘Gotcha’ politics,” Lanny Davis argues, is “about parti-
sanship, not about uncovering genuine corruption.” He adds, “It is about revenge and 
payback, not about due process and investigations in search of the truth.” Ultimately, 
he concludes, “it is about personal and political destruction, not winning in the mar-
ketplace of ideas.” 28 Studying the newly democratic Republic of Benin, Chris Allen 
has faulted the media for “indulging in cynicism, propagating rumors, or, at worst, 
simply fabricating scandal for payment,” while failing to report more serious issues. 29 
Veven Wardhana has dismissed scandal reporting in Indonesia as “exploitative info-
tainment.” 30 Similarly, Howard Tumber and Silvio Waisbord argue that “democracies 
are inherently prone to be regularly shaken by scandals,” but the media, particularly 
in mature democracies, are notorious for “short-lived attention” that “makes scandals 
prone to have a brief existence,” inducing a “numb public opinion” and little real 
change. 31 
 While such criticism is often warranted in both new and established democra-
cies, horse-race coverage, partisan vendetta, and above all, scandal, can also play an 
important emergent function in democratic transitions. Indeed, there is some frag-
mentary yet compelling historical evidence from the past four centuries indicating 
that, in times of regime change, scandal over matters substantial or sordid can serve 
as a discursive lever for widening the public sphere, discrediting the old regime, and 
contributing to democratization. In his study of the Overby scandal that roiled the 
court of James I of Great Britain, Alastair Bellany argues that sensational accounts of 
murder by poison and sexual intrigue contributed to a changing “news culture” that 
culminated, through a complex causality, in the English revolution of the 1640s. 32 A 
century later in France, a succession of salacious courtroom dramas, exemplified by 
the “diamond necklace affair” that stigmatized Marie Antoinette, sparked public fas-
cination. Print runs of up to ten thousand each for legal briefs “carried afar interest 
and scandal,” exposing the corruptions of France’s absolutist monarchy and hastening 
the French Revolution. 33 
 In America’s postrevolutionary decade of the 1790s, partisan scandal aided demo-
cratic consolidation as journalists led by Noah Webster, founder of New York’s first 
daily newspaper, set aside civility to become “peddlers of scurrility.” In this brawl, 
America’s early press challenged the Federalists’ dominance over government and 
public debate, ultimately helping to usher in the more democratic Jacksonian era. 34 
Similarly, in Wilhelmine Germany, the Social Democratic Party resisted repression via 
exposés of financial scandals involving the kaiser’s government, undermining the aris-
tocratic order’s legitimacy and contributing to the regime’s collapse in 1918, thereby 
launching a decade of democratic governance. 35 
 Examining more recent events, Chappell Lawson has found that media lib-
eralization was the “primary cause of the devastating scandals that rocked Mexi-
can politics” in the 1990s, delegitimating the ruling party and facilitating political 
change. Simultaneously, the scandals “signaled to elites that the rules of the political 
game were changing,” thus making media coverage of once-forbidden topics a major 
force behind Mexico’s successful democratic transition. 36 Similarly, Miklós Sükösd 
observes that news coverage of the Danubegate scandal “helped dislodge” Hunga-
ry’s ex-Communist government. 37 While the role of Indonesia’s media in Suharto’s 
downfall in 1998 was mixed, scandalous revelations, particularly concerned with the 
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president’s staggering accumulation of wealth, severely damaged his legitimacy and 
hastened his fall. 38 
 Framing issues in relation to ongoing contests may contribute little to solving 
problems or forming ideal policy. But understanding democratization involves exam-
ining transitional dynamics apart from the anticipation that the process will lead to 
good governance. Beyond opening political space and unsettling entrenched regimes, 
media focus on scandal, partisan battles, and even elections as horse races can also 
contribute to the second (trial) and third (consolidation) phases of postauthoritarian 
transition outlined above, in part by increasing the public’s familiarity with and inter-
est in one of the most essential components of democracy—recurring open-ended 
contests. 39 
 In the trial phase, particularly in societies accustomed to the suppression of 
participation, fostering interest in political contests serves at least two functions: 
habituation to key democratic norms and education for the exercise of vigilance. 
As Larry Diamond argues, building support for democracy, including the elusive 
development of “trust,” takes place largely through successful experience with 
democracy. 40 Gaining such experience involves deepening familiarity with demo-
cratic elections. But as Benedict Anderson notes, “the representative mechanism 
[elections] is a rare and moveable feast,” and the “generation of the impersonal 
[collective] will is . . . better sought in the diurnal regularities of the imagining 
life.” 41 Media exposure is one of those diurnal regularities; consuming a daily bar-
rage of news filtered through contest frames is, quite possibly, a more penetrating 
form of experience with democracy than even the most faithful participation in 
more episodic elections. 
 At a minimum, representations of politics as a series of ongoing contests can rein-
force the values, such as commitment to fair play and intolerance of fixed outcomes, 
that we associate with other open contests (e.g., sports and legal disputes)—leading 
to the second function of contest frames: educating people for vigilance, specifically in 
monitoring the way the democratic game is played. Reporting on scandals, even at the 
expense of more substantive coverage, can help normalize the imposition of transpar-
ency as an expected part of media performance and establish openness as an expected 
component of democracy. 
 Secondary Contests 
 In the third phase of consolidation, the role of scandal and partisan attack goes 
beyond the electoral process to highlight the centrality of the infi nite series of smaller 
contests played out between elections, from factional scuffl  es to bruising battles 
of revenge that often wield a decisive impact on elections themselves. It is in the 
responses of diff erent actors to these smaller contests that consolidation often moves 
forward or falters. 
 In any transition, media coverage that publicizes these smaller contests, though 
often sensationalist, can further consolidation in several ways. It can alter the bal-
ance of power among likely contenders in future elections, precipitating possible 
turnover in leadership while helping acclimate a citizenry to democracy’s inherent 
unpredictability. Though revelations ideally come from journalists or others acting 
out of nonpartisan civic responsibility, scandal motivated by revenge or partisanship 
can help sustain flux in the balance of power. In either case, the media help normalize 
the unpredictability of politics in a democratic system where reputation and public 
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opinion, more than patronage or electoral manipulation, decide the fate of political 
careers. 
 Admittedly, scandals can erupt from false accusations or other misinformation 
often exacerbated by partisan motivations. They may be particularly dangerous in the 
fragile early days of a democratic transition. In Egypt after the Arab Spring of 2011, 
contending forces responded to biased voices by trying to silence oppositional media. 42 
A key difference in Indonesia’s transition, detailed in  chapter 4 , was the commitment 
by journalists’ associations to establish professional standards, averting crackdowns 
and quelling anger at critical coverage. 
 The potential for backlash against unwelcome aspects of media freedom returns 
us to Przeworski’s element of indeterminacy, that is, the promise that there will be 
future opportunities to compete. Using his model, I argue that democratic consolida-
tion requires that contenders develop faith in this indeterminacy not only of elec-
tions but also of the smaller, intervening contests that play out in the court of public 
opinion—faith that a media nightmare for one faction one week could just as easily 
be followed by a triumph the next. More broadly, confidence in the indeterminacy of 
media-influenced shifts in the balance of power can mitigate fears of the unpredict-
able effects of a free media. The alternative to contest- and scandal-oriented media, 
moreover, is not necessarily a better-informed citizenry. It may instead be a depoliti-
cized, disenfranchised public that simply watches politicians act—perhaps with deco-
rum but also, as many an authoritarian regime has shown, with little transparency 
and even less accountability. Another alternative could be the devolution of a nation’s 
public sphere into praetorianism, a development that, at least in China, appears to be 
compatible with continued authoritarianism. 43 
 In its own transition, Indonesia’s experience indicates that the media are criti-
cal in institutionalizing the uncertainty of democratic contestation not in spite of 
their preoccupation with horse-race coverage, conflict, and scandal, but in many ways 
because of it, particularly in breaking up collusion and the concentration of power. 
Within the country’s newly constituted public sphere, the right to report freely on 
stories of scandal and partisan conflict that influence the secondary contests between 
elections transformed the print and electronic media into a parallel arena of electoral 
politics. From 1999 to 2004, as recounted in  chapters 6 and  7 , candidates rose and fell 
and rose again in often spectacular dramas played out on a public stage. The inability 
of individual players or parties to control these battles constituted a significant depar-
ture from the past. 
 Over the following decade, 2004 to 2014, intraelite contestation produced a con-
tinuing cycle of revenge via revelation that served to constrain the forces of authoritar-
ian reversal. During this period under the presidency of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
discussed in  chapter 8 , a succession of megascandals showed the ability of the media, 
in collaboration with civil society forces, to challenge the ruling party, block elite 
collusion, and facilitate yet another change of government. In the 2014 presidential 
election, a full fifteen years after Suharto’s fall, the forces of reversal coalesced around 
his son-in-law and regime enforcer, Lieutenant General (Ret.) Prabowo Subianto, in 
an explicit antidemocracy campaign, playing upon nostalgia for the New Order in a 
desperate, determined effort to defeat a populist candidate. Through an alliance of 
media and civil society activists, the opposition blocked this bid for authoritarian 
reversal and elected the country’s first nonelite president, illustrating the paramount 
importance of such synergies between media and public in maintaining momentum 
toward democratic consolidation. 
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 In sum, when reconsidering media practices often viewed as degrading to democ-
racy and exploring their role in checking democratization’s reversal, Indonesia’s recent 
history is rich in lessons for pragmatic reformers and insights for academic analysts. 
Perhaps most critically, examining the media in Indonesia’s transition reveals its cen-
tral role in maintaining the uncertainty of democracy’s ongoing contests, thereby pro-
moting the critical elements of accountability, competition, transparency, and above 





 Chapter One 
 Origins of Media Controls 
 There is no power holder who dares to use his power if there is not a people 
excessively afraid of that power. 
 —Ignas Kleden, “The Fear of Fighting Fear” 
 In 1945, sixty-eight of Indonesia’s political leaders met in Jakarta to draft a consti-
tution casting off three centuries of Dutch colonial rule and drawing the archipelago’s 
seventeen thousand islands and seventy million inhabitants into a unified nation. 1 
Amid contentious debates threatening to divide the delegates over the choice between 
secular and Islamic principles, Sukarno [one name], a spellbinding speaker who later 
became Indonesia’s first president, rose to address the assembly. 
 Meticulously attired in a white colonial suit and black Muslim cap, Sukarno pre-
sented a vision bridging the growing rift, offering “a unifying philosophical foun-
dation” they could all accept. “First and foremost,” he asked, with words to defuse 
demands for an Islamic state, “are we seeking to establish a nation . . . [that is called] 
Free Indonesia, but in reality is only for elevating one person, for giving power to 
one wealthy group, for giving power [only] to the aristocracy? Is this our intention?” 
Answering this question, he said, “It is clear it is not! . . . We seek to establish a 
nation of ‘all for all.’ Not for one person, not for one . . . ethnic group or group that is 
wealthy—but ‘all for all.’” 2 
 In an early condemnation of partisan politics, Sukarno warned that this new 
nation should not espouse Western notions of freedom: “If we create freedom . . . 
based on philosophies as promoted by American and European nations . . . be assured 
that our hearts will be filled with conflict.” He offered instead a vision centered on 
indigenous decision-making with Islamic roots, explaining that “the crucial require-
ment for the strength of the Indonesian state is mutual deliberation [ musyawarah ].” 
It is this, he said, “that gives life, namely political-economic democracy that can bring 
about social justice!” 3 
 Embedded in these impassioned statements was not only a unifying rejection 
of Western democratic precepts but also the espousal of a distinctively Indonesian 
form of democracy aspiring to a consensual model of governance. In little more than 
a decade, however, these same constitutional principles would help facilitate a shift 
from a functioning democracy—with free speech, open elections, and contentious par-
liamentary debate—to an authoritarian state headed by just two powerful leaders, 
President Sukarno and his successor, Suharto, for over forty years. 
 When authoritarian rule began to unravel in Indonesia during the 1997 economic 
crisis, President Suharto quickly became the target of the country’s burgeoning demo-
cratic opposition. Once seen as a welcome change from the unstable and increas-
ingly dictatorial rule of his predecessor, Suharto was now, after thirty-two years in 
power, the personification of the corruption and authoritarianism that marked his 
own regime. 
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 But even as the prodemocracy movement railed against him, reformers realized 
that a true break with the past would require not only his removal but also the more 
daunting task of dismantling his entrenched New Order regime. Further complicat-
ing the challenge, the authoritarian controls that defined the New Order were not a 
simple manifestation of one ruler’s managerial style. Their roots, institutional and 
ideological, reached back to the origins of the Indonesian republic and were part of 
a complex structure that had evolved from Dutch rule through the Sukarno era into 
Suharto’s New Order. Fully assembled by the late 1980s, this structure rested on a 
foundation of both colonial law and Indonesian political theory inspired by a corporat-
ist, or “integralist,” vision of the relationship between the state and society. It formed 
an institutional base through multiple bureaucracies overseeing a maze of regula-
tions, licensing, and tightening controls over ownership. 
 For reformers, the system underlying Indonesia’s authoritarianism was thus elab-
orate and deeply rooted, requiring bureaucratic change as well as transformation of 
a larger political culture. Exploring this layered historical legacy, dating back to the 
country’s first constitutional debates, reveals the weight of the past that confronted 
the media during the democratic transition over forty years later. 
 Origins of Authoritarian Controls 
 The ideological foundations of these corporatist political principles can be traced 
to counter-Enlightenment concepts fi rst articulated by German philosophers in the 
early nineteenth century. Their embrace by Dutch colonial scholars of the early twen-
tieth century, in turn, strongly infl uenced the thinking of the Indonesian nationalists 
who framed the country’s 1945 constitution. 4 
 On the eve of independence, the sense among Indonesia’s young leaders emerg-
ing from centuries of colonial rule was that Western liberalism and its accompanying 
materialism tended to produce greed and exploitation, and they sought an alternative 
model for their new nation. Their democracy would be based not on an adversarial 
process, but on governance through consensus and cooperation. 
 During Indonesia’s constitutional debates, Raden Supomo, a former colonial 
judge, laid out a frame for this form of governance, calling it “integralism” and invok-
ing the philosophies of Benedict de Spinoza and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel. 5 As 
scholars of this period have noted, Supomo’s integralism was a form of corporatism—
a statist ideology casting society and government as an integrated whole, whether a 
living organism or a vast family governed by a father figure who embodies the spirit of 
the people and therefore can divine their greater interests. 6 In Indonesia, the ideology 
would incorporate all citizens on the principle of jus soli (right of the soil) and cast 
the national community as both a body bounded by geography and a vast, harmonious 
family (a construction dubbed  kekeluargaan , or “family-ism”). 7 
 Most importantly, in Supomo’s words, an integralist state is one “that is united 
with the whole of the people, transcending all groups in all sectors.” 8 Such a state 
does not stand outside the people but  is the people, led by a head of state who is 
also one with the people and therefore attuned to their aspirations. In short, unlike 
Western democracies, filled with discord and self-interest, Supomo’s vision was of a 
unitary state governed through consensual deliberation free of political conflict. Offer-
ing evidence that Indonesia could establish such a democracy, fellow framer Muham-
mad Yamin invoked a golden era of village-centered collectivism traced back to the 
Majapahit era. Sukarno’s model of decision-making—inclusive mutual consultation 
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( musyawarah ) leading to a consensus ( mufakat ) articulated by a wise leader—was cen-
tral to this imagined past. 9 
 Three days later, in a riveting address to the assembly, Sukarno made his own 
contribution to Indonesian political theory with his formulation of the Pancasila, a 
doctrine that would become the defining principle of the Indonesian state. Its five 
“pillars” were (1) belief in one supreme God, (2) justice and civility among peoples, 
(3) the unity of Indonesia, (4) democracy through deliberation and consensus among 
representatives, and (5) social justice for all. 10 With deliberations deadlocked, Sukar-
no’s Pancasila appealed to all factions, encompassing and subordinating their compet-
ing visions of the state. The word “integralism” never entered the constitution, and 
the five pillars did not necessarily preordain the rise of any particular political system. 
But over time the Pancasila doctrine came to be seen, in the words of Adam Schwarz, 
as “synonymous with and justification for an integralist view of the state”—ultimately 
serving as the ideological foundation of Suharto’s authoritarian order. 11 
 How did Sukarno’s diffuse doctrine, seemingly compatible with a working democ-
racy, later justify integralist views and facilitate authoritarianism? And how did it 
legitimate the accretion of controls that stunted the development of a democratic 
media? The answer lies partly in the third pillar’s focus on “unity,” a term easily 
invoked to justify suppression of dissent. But the regime also reinterpreted Pancasila’s 
fourth pillar to further the concentration of power by focusing overwhelmingly on 
consensus. While the pillar itself seems to promise an inclusive and egalitarian form 
of democracy—mandating mutual deliberation to reach unanimous consensus—in 
Suharto’s Pancasila democracy, the ideal of  musyawarah untuk mufakat was replaced in 
practice by a premium on closure, with consensus redefined as acquiescence rather 
than agreement. 
 Articles within the 1945 constitution also stipulated that decisions be made 
through consensus-oriented mutual deliberation—more specifically, through consul-
tation between the head of state, envisioned in these debates as a “just king” (Ratu 
Adil), and members of a quasilegislative body representing all sectors of society. Sig-
nificantly, the framers named this supreme body the People’s Consultative Assembly 
(Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR), underlining its advisory character in ways 
that predicted the limited role it would later play. 
 The more proximate reason that this plenary parliament and one of its two cham-
bers, the People’s Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), became 
rubber stamps for executive policy rather than constituting an independent legisla-
ture is that the 1945 constitution lacked provisions for the separation of powers. It 
instead stipulated that different branches of the national government would share 
responsibilities and engage in mutual support and consultation, miming the imagined 
cooperation of Indonesia’s village councils. In practice, this fluid sharing of functions, 
particularly through provisions empowering the president to legislate, led to unilat-
eral decision-making and executive concentration of power. 
 Though Supomo’s vision, emphasizing consensus and repudiation of individual 
rights, had strong proponents in the assembly, several framers expressed concern over 
its potential to justify the abuse of power. Notably, the future vice president Moham-
mad Hatta, backed by Muhammad Yamin, fought for provisions protecting civil rights, 
particularly freedom of speech. But both Sukarno and Supomo argued that such indi-
vidual protections would go against  kekeluargaan and lead to conflict sparked by greed 
and self-interest. Hatta countered that without free speech, “the shape of the nation 
may become . . . one we cannot agree with.” Hatta supported a state of corporatist 
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leadership ( negara pengurus ) but argued such power must be checked by “an article 
[ensuring] that every citizen will not be afraid to express an opinion . . . [and guaran-
teeing] the right to assemble, to convene, to write.” 12 
 Supomo and Sukarno ultimately did concede to Article 28, which appeared to pro-
tect free speech through a statement that the freedom “to express thoughts orally and 
in writing and so forth shall be determined by legislation.” Yet by granting govern-
ment the power to determine the boundaries of free speech without delineating such 
boundaries, Article 28 effectively affirmed the opposite: to comply with the impera-
tives of the constitution, the state  will make laws that regulate speech, potentially 
circumscribing it. Ironically, through this apparent concession to individual rights, 
the framers created a constitutional clause formalizing the state’s authority to abridge 
rights, including freedom of speech, and thereby limit society’s ability to check the 
abuse of power. 
 Guided Democracy and a Guided Press 
 Following four years of armed struggle against the Dutch, Indonesia’s revolution-
aries won formal independence in 1949. They ratifi ed the original 1945 constitution 
but soon replaced it with two interim documents that created a more autonomous 
parliament and stronger protections for civil rights, including freedom of speech. In 
1954, leaders of the new republic demonstrated further commitment to press free-
dom by nullifying a regulation identifi ed with Dutch repression called the Persbre-
idel Ordonnantie, or the Press Muzzling Ordinance, that allowed the government to 
ban publications viewed as threats to public order. 13 With this nullifi cation and the 
more liberal interim charters, Indonesia enjoyed a decade of parliamentary democracy 
under its fi rst president, Sukarno, marked by competitive multiparty elections and 
a print press that was, by most accounts, outspoken and critical of the government. 
 Yet the new government also retained several other laws giving the state broad 
discretion to punish speech. By force of legal continuity, the sections of the crimi-
nal code known as the lèse majesté articles that had protected Dutch colonials from 
disrespect survived independence to outlaw any speech that might offend the new 
republic’s president, vice president, or other officials. 14 Another Dutch legacy, the 
 haatzai artikelen , or “hate-sowing articles,” criminalized spreading animosity in society 
or contempt toward the government and remained part of Indonesia’s legal code for 
the next half century. 15 
 Thus even in this democratic era, we see the foundations for the later suppres-
sion of speech under Suharto. Tolerance among the nation’s first leaders for Jakarta’s 
vociferous print press was also surprisingly brief. By 1953, the Ministry of Infor-
mation was threatening to sanction any media outlet giving a “false picture” of the 
nation’s affairs. Soon after, the attorney general ordered the media to refrain from any 
reporting on government matters that might be inflammatory or highlight disagree-
ments. 16 In 1956, the army’s chief of staff issued a new, more draconian regulation 
to prohibit virtually all speech critical, degrading, or suspicious of public officials. 
Borrowing almost verbatim from the Dutch  haatzai artikelen , the new regulation also 
outlawed writings that could give rise to “expressions of antagonism, hatred, or con-
tempt” among or toward societal groups, or that contained information able to pro-
duce a public sensation. 17 Although protests soon forced the government to revoke 
this regulation, within a year, the imposition of martial law to suppress revolts in the 
outer islands allowed even more severe strictures on news outlets. That same year, 
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Sukarno declared an official state of emergency as he stepped up the campaign against 
these secessionist movements, leaving news outlets with little recourse. 18 Protections 
for the media were overridden by government imperatives, and further reforms that 
might have eradicated the Dutch legacy were repeatedly preempted by fears over the 
perceived fragility of the new republic. 
 In 1959, as political divisions deepened and negotiations over a permanent con-
stitution became deadlocked, Sukarno dissolved the constitutional assembly and 
declared Indonesia’s democracy a failure. He then discarded the provisional constitu-
tion of 1950 and reinstated the 1945 charter, removing checks on executive authority, 
and transferred patronage power from political parties to the president. 
 This constitutional crisis marked the beginning of Sukarno’s “Guided Democracy” 
that was, as Schwarz observed, “a return to a system of personal rule more reminiscent 
of Javanese feudalism than the chaotic democratic experiment of the 1950s.” 19 For the 
first time, the 1945 constitution became a living document for realizing Sukarno and 
Supomo’s original corporatist vision. 20 Consistent with this ideology, Sukarno origi-
nally conceived Guided Democracy as a government in which the opposition would 
“disappear.” There would still be “differences of opinion” in government, but they 
“will bring us to progress” because “deliberation, musyawarah, will go hand in hand 
with the family principle.” 21 But when legislators refused to pass his budget in 1960, 
Sukarno replaced them with an appointed parliament, a body beholden to him that 
preserved the veneer of decision-making by mutual consultation. 22 
 Guided Democracy also meant a guided press. The new regime was nominally 
committed to media freedom but imposed restrictions aimed at upholding the public 
interest, the nation’s character, and respect for one God. New regulations from the 
military added to these restraints. Publishing bans became regular occurrences as 
regulations multiplied, each enumerating in greater detail not only restrictions but 
also the media’s responsibilities as an “instrument of national struggle.” 23 
 In addition to regulations and decrees, the Sukarno administration introduced 
licensing to control the media, the signature mechanism of the later Suharto period. 
In 1958, the regional military command began using licensing in Jakarta to eliminate 
publications that were considered sensational or dangerous to morality. One historian 
emphasized the significance of this development by noting that even the Dutch had 
never used this form of media control. 24 A 1963 presidential decree then elevated 
licensing to national policy. 25 
 Sukarno also established the agencies that Suharto would later use to discipline 
the media, including the Ministry of Information and the National Press Council, 
charged with controlling financial subsidies and monitoring publications for dissi-
dence. Finally, government interference in the internal affairs of the Association of 
Indonesian Journalists (Persatuan Wartawan Indonesia, PWI), also began long before 
Suharto took power, making the organization a key means of drawing the media under 
state control and banishing independent journalists from the profession. 26 
 The Sukarno era also left a memory, carefully cultivated by Suharto’s New Order, 
of democracy as a failed experiment—a form of government ill-suited to Indonesian 
society. The initial weakness of Indonesia’s political institutions, compounded by con-
fusion over what kind of state it should be, exacerbated the instability of the repub-
lic’s first years. Benedict Anderson has characterized the political environment of the 
1950s as “a kind of round-the-clock politics in which mass organizations competed 
with each other at every conceivable . . . level without there being any real resolu-
tion.” 27 Similarly, Robert Cribb and Colin Brown describe political parties as sliding 
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“between fluid, self-serving factionalism and rigid ideological polarisation.” 28 Even 
after the 1955 election, widely regarded as free and fair, faith in the parliamentary 
system was faltering. As the economy deteriorated, public tolerance for the unpredict-
ability of the democratic process declined. 29 
 The extent of liberal democracy’s “failure” in Indonesia during the 1950s is still 
a matter of debate. 30 Whether elites abandoned democracy because it had failed or it 
failed because elites saw their interests better served by authoritarianism, Sukarno 
and then Suharto cultivated the impression that liberal democracy had been a disas-
ter—in part to preempt calls for its return and in part to justify suppression of demo-
cratic rights, including freedom of speech. 31 
 Rise of the New Order 
 In tandem with growing repression, Indonesia’s economy fell into disarray under 
Sukarno. The country reeled from soaring infl ation, and food shortages were imminent; 
international tensions increased as the president nationalized foreign fi rms, rejected 
US aid, and provoked a confrontation with Malaysia. Concurrently, the Communist 
movement, now more closely allied with Sukarno, pushed hard for land reform, rais-
ing tensions with Muslims and the military, and pressured artists and journalists to 
adhere to the guidelines of its People’s Cultural Institute. Strained by these confl icts, 
President Sukarno’s political coalition became increasingly untenable. In a fi nal bid 
for stability in 1963, parliament elected him president for life. 32 
 In 1965, an alleged Communist coup and a military countercoup set in motion 
events that effectively stripped Sukarno of power and allowed the little-known Gen-
eral Suharto to seize control and launch his New Order. Suharto’s subsequent crack-
down on what he called a “counterrevolutionary movement” set off a brutal, army-led 
purge of suspected Communists that left up to a million dead. “In terms of numbers 
killed,” the CIA reported, “the anti-PKI [Indonesian Communist Party] massacres in 
Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century.” 33 
 Thus, Suharto’s regime rose to power on a wave of terror that left an indelible 
mark on the nation’s consciousness, creating a formidable legacy for future democracy 
advocates to overcome. Promotion of regime propaganda by surviving media and the 
absence of public debate on the killings deepened their impact. As the regime held 
public trials of suspected Communists, Suharto asserted his version of events, arguing 
that liberal democracy—with its contentious pluralism, partisan press, and confron-
tational politics—had produced the deep divisions responsible for the 1965–66 mas-
sacre. With this portrayal shaping the country’s collective memory, Suharto recast the 
bloody military-led campaign that brought him to power as a spontaneous eruption of 
mass violence. 34 This reconstruction reinforced a larger, two-pronged point: Indone-
sia’s short period of democracy had led to the societal disintegration of the 1960s, and 
strict political controls, including restrictions on speech, were necessary to prevent 
the recurrence of violence. 
 Early Political Journalism 
 President Suharto began his reign in the spirit of reform, liberating the print press 
from controls imposed by his predecessor. Over the next decade, however, he would 
employ and expand Sukarno’s entire arsenal. The resulting apparatus restricted media 
outlets through a web of laws and regulations. Increasing control over ownership, 
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corporatist norms, and the carrot of a protected market all cultivated a culture of 
compliance. 
 In the regime’s early days, despite ongoing bloodshed in the name of restoring 
order and the relentless pursuit of suspected members of the Indonesian Communist 
Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), there was relief among many journalists and 
intellectuals at being liberated from Sukarno’s Guided Democracy. There was, more-
over, optimism over new reforms. Although one of Suharto’s first acts was to shut 
down forty-six newspapers associated with the PKI, many previously banned publica-
tions were revived, including Mochtar Lubis’s  Indonesia Raya . 35 
 In late 1966, the new parliament passed the long-awaited Basic Press Law, con-
taining twenty-one sections covering nearly every aspect of media functions, from 
journalists’ duties to the composition of the National Press Council. The law protected 
news outlets from outright bans and promised abolition of the notorious press license 
system once the transition to the New Order was complete. 36 As David Hill notes, 
during Suharto’s first years, “those newspapers which had supported [the regime’s] 
emergence . . . enjoyed opportunities for often robust debate.” 37 One cabinet minister 
compared this period to 1968’s Prague Spring. 38 
 In the new regime’s early years, Jakarta’s surviving newspapers were instrumen-
tal in imposing transparency on the government—particularly its management of the 
government oil monopoly, Pertamina. Scandal, fed by leaks, was the primary mecha-
nism. What was arguably the most famous scandal broke in November 1969, when 
 Indonesia Raya published a scathing critique of Pertamina’s management. 39 The article 
featured a photograph of the company’s director, the Suharto crony Ibnu Sutowo, next 
to his new Rolls Royce and accused his organization of “waste, inefficiency, and all 
kinds of irregularities and unjustifiable expenditures.” 40 It backed these charges with 
leaked data documenting nepotism and payoffs as well as the purchase of assets at far 
above market value. 41 
 The controversy that followed saw the beginnings of the logic that would stigma-
tize political journalism and legitimate the proliferation of media controls. Disregard-
ing the value of investigative reporting in helping avert economic disaster, the regime 
and several newspapers accused  Indonesia Raya of adopting a “crusading” style of jour-
nalism and began treating it as a threat. After raising suspicions about the paper’s 
motives, the regime began to condemn such journalism as fostering what editor and 
scholar Daniel Dhakidae calls “the politics of negation.” 42 
 Despite its unwelcome reception,  Indonesia Raya ’s exposé prompted the govern-
ment to appoint a special investigative group, the Commission of Four. The commis-
sion’s findings were damning, confirming the paper’s allegations and uncovering tax 
evasion so egregious that it nearly drove the state into bankruptcy. The 1970 leak of 
this official report by another major daily,  Sinar Harapan , kept public attention focused 
on Pertamina, forcing enactment of a 1971 law increasing the company’s payments 
to the state. 43 
 This controversy demonstrated the media’s vital role as an early warning system 
for economic mismanagement. As the government scrambled to cover Pertamina’s 
payments and save it from a bankruptcy likely to bring down the New Order, each 
revelation was a reminder of the costs of the failed oversight of this most valuable 
state enterprise. But the revelations also showed scandal’s potential to weaken the 
regime’s legitimacy. 44 Even after vowing to clean up the corruption, President Suharto 
condemned the media’s reporting as “excessively mean” and “confusing [to] the 
society.” 45 
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 Sinar Harapan ’s leak added insult to injury by usurping the president’s authority to 
present the commission’s report in his own way. Lacking any legal basis for sanctions, 
Suharto pressured the PWI to do what the courts could not—“discipline” the paper 
for leaking a “state secret.” 46 However, the conditions that would eventually make the 
PWI the “long arm” of the regime were not yet in place. 
 Little came of this pressure on the PWI. Yet Suharto continued where Sukarno 
had left off in subordinating other sectors to the presidency. Rather than stifling 
political activity through raw coercion, he co-opted competing centers of power and 
reconfigured government institutions, including the parliament. In 1967, he claimed 
the right to appoint one-third of the full parliament, or MPR, responsible for choosing 
the president, and more than one-fifth of its lower house, the DPR. Explains Schwarz, 
“[T]he idea was to restructure the political system in such a way that it could no lon-
ger compete with the executive office for power.” 47 
 The new configuration allowed the regime to engineer elections to insulate itself 
from political challenge. Testing the system’s efficacy, the country held its first post-
Sukarno elections in 1971. The new government party, Golkar, won a crushing 63 
percent of the vote after the regime rigged the process, requiring all civil servants to 
vote for Golkar, giving village and district leaders vote quotas, and promising develop-
ment funding to pro-Golkar districts. 48 New official “rules of conduct,” which came to 
be known as the “Twelve Commandments,” advantaged the ruling party further with 
severe restrictions on public speech during the campaign, barring candidates and the 
media from criticizing the state ideology, the constitution, and anyone in government. 
Any speech that might provoke religious, ethnic, or racial antagonisms and glorify 
either Sukarno’s Old Order or the Communist party was also strictly forbidden. 49 
 In the election’s aftermath, the regime concentrated power further by dissolving 
all opposition parties to create two new, substantially weaker ones that were barred 
from representing specific social sectors, thereby reducing representation of the coun-
try’s extraordinary diversity to just three political parties. While Suharto claimed that 
he was preventing a return to the divisive politics of the past, the system produced 
the pliant parliament he sought and turned elections into vehicles for the affirmation 
of his agenda. “With one and only one road already mapped out,” he reasoned, “why 
should we then have nine different cars?” 50 
 Yet civil society remained unsubdued, leaving Suharto’s system incomplete. In 
1973,  Sinar Harapan leaked another government report. This time, Suharto found a 
legal basis to suspend the paper’s license, charging it with “contempt of Parliament.” 51 
But he refrained from banning the paper outright because, notes Dhakidae, civil soci-
ety, through both the media and university students, could still unite to check execu-
tive power. 52 
 The Malari Incident 
 The events that ultimately reversed this power relationship began in 1974 with 
demonstrations culminating in what became known as the Malari incident. During 
the months leading to these protests, students, intellectuals, and military factions 
had been growing restive over continued corruption, particularly among senior army 
offi  cers, certain ethnic Chinese entrepreneurs, and Suharto’s wife, Ibu Tien. At the 
same time, the government was courting foreign investors, especially the Japanese, 
with incentives to establish capital-intensive factories that were putting indigenous 
companies out of business, provoking angry protests from displaced workers and 
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sympathetic students. During a visit by the Japanese prime minister, Kakuei Tanaka, 
in January 1974, thousands of students protested the rising cost of living, corruption, 
predatory foreign investment, and cronyism. Called the “Disaster of 15 January,” or 
“Malari,” the demonstrations became riots that destroyed hundreds of buildings and 
left at least eleven people dead. 53 
 The regime’s subsequent repression began a step-by-step depoliticization of civil 
society, largely through measures that closed off or co-opted the available channels 
for criticism. Early in his honeymoon period, Suharto had moved preemptively, resur-
recting the Sukarno-era Anti-Subversion Law that defined subversion as any “action 
[that] could distort, undermine or deviate from the ideology of Pancasila or the Broad 
Outlines of State Policy, or otherwise destroy or undermine the power or the author-
ity of the lawful government or the machinery of the State, or disseminate feelings of 
hostility or arouse hostility, disturbances or anxiety among the population.” 54 Such 
broad strictures effectively criminalized all critical reporting and most public debate. 
Following Malari, the regime dismissed officials accused of inciting the students and 
filed criminal charges against hundreds of civilians. 
 Suharto also punished the print press by closing twelve news publications, includ-
ing  Indonesia Raya . 55 While several newspapers had been critical of corruption and 
government policy, their gravest transgression in the Malari incident was exposing 
intraelite divisions. Suharto responded by preventing such divisions from reaching 
the public in the future. 56 With the 1974 media crackdown, John Bresnan notes, the 
country lost “a valuable source of information that helped the government to track the 
outcomes of its policies and articulated and projected elite opinion during a period in 
which no other institutions were doing so.” 57 
 In 1975, Suharto continued to depoliticize society while further weakening oppo-
sition parties by introducing a “floating mass” policy restricting subregional party 
activity and limiting the rural population’s role in politics to just voting. The logic, 
Cribb and Brown explain, was to protect people from becoming “distracted from the 
tasks of national development . . . so that they would be fully responsive to govern-
ment instruction and advice.” 58 A.S. Hikam adds that the policy also aimed to “protect 
the people from political manipulation by competing parties” and a return to Sukarno-
era divisiveness. 59 
 By requiring permits for gatherings of over five people, the regime made political 
rallies outside state control virtually impossible. The government further restricted 
political parties by limiting issues they could raise and appointing an electoral com-
mission to review campaign materials. Finally, parties had to submit candidate lists to 
the commission for approval. 60 
 Even before this forced depoliticization, elements of the media felt that respon-
sibility for representing citizens had shifted to them. As the daily  Harian Kami put it, 
“[W]hat is expected from the press is to function as a ‘parliament outside the parlia-
ment.’” 61 Dhakidae takes this further, explaining that print press efforts to expose 
state corruption in Suharto’s first years “represented a last ditch defence of the society 
in a self-imposed task of redefining the interest of a nation in the absence of political 
parties.” 62 In other words, as the legislature lost its ability to check the executive and 
opposition parties lost the ability to compete fairly in elections, the media became the 
last institutional vehicle of political contestation. 
 For four years following Malari, surviving news outlets, though more cautious, 
managed to retain a critical perspective through favorable coverage of protests by 
students who were angered by economic mismanagement and fraud in Suharto’s 
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reelection in 1977. Student criticism of the president and his family became “the daily 
menu” of many newspapers. 63 Though the regime was now shielded from serious elec-
toral competition, the print press, giving voice to the students, could still challenge 
this claim to uncontested power. 
 In January 1978, however, student protests culminated in a new crackdown when 
the government’s internal security agency, Kopkamtib, disbanded all student councils 
and ordered temporary closure of seven campus newspapers and seven Jakarta dailies. 
The interim minister of information, Sudharmono [one name], justified the news-
paper closures, explaining that coverage supporting the students threatened to shat-
ter the nation’s stability. The military then occupied universities and arrested more 
than two hundred undergraduates. To depoliticize the students for good, the Ministry 
of Education introduced a policy called the Normalization of Campus Life, which 
severely restricted their rights to engage in political activity and placed all campus 
publications under official control. 64 
 To depoliticize the media permanently, Kopkamtib told anxious editors awaiting 
word on when they could resume publication that they should “just continue to pray.” 
During the crackdown’s third week, the agency summoned chief editors individually 
to participate in what Dhakidae calls “a ritual submission to annihilate any remain-
ing pride by forcing them to wait for a turn.” 65 Their submission was cemented with 
signatures on a pledge that they would (1) take responsibility for protecting national 
stability and reducing social tensions; (2) protect the authority of the government, 
avoiding insults aimed at national leaders or their families; (3) declare their readiness 
to carry out introspection, self-correction, and internal reform; and (4) avoid quoting 
blacklisted individuals. 66 
 The chastened papers fulfilled the mandate of point three by declaring their will-
ingness, in the spirit of Pancasila, to engage in internal reform through editorials that 
demonstrated humility and contrition.  Kompas told the government, “We need more 
time to learn to walk again.” 67 Although all papers escaped permanent closure, the 
ritual submission, Dakhidae writes, did equal, if not greater, damage to the survivors, 
leaving permanent scars. The most debilitating outcome, he continues, was accepting 
that their future survival depended on Suharto’s whim. These two journalistic show-
downs of the 1970s, he concludes, “ended an era of Indonesian political journalism.” 68 
 Legitimating Media Controls 
 As he maneuvered to depoliticize society, Suharto was building a comprehensive 
apparatus for media control that included both formal administration and ideological 
justifi cation. He constructed a nexus of ministries and regulations that rewarded com-
pliance and punished defi ance while reinventing Indonesia’s past, reviving principles 
from the 1945 constitutional debates that valorized cooperation, and invoking the 
post-1965 slaughters to stigmatize any form of dissent. 
 The decade after Malari saw the steady accretion of media controls, greatly nar-
rowing the scope of acceptable public discourse. The four-point pledge signed by chief 
editors in 1978 prohibited criticism of national leaders or their families. The acronym 
MISS SARA, set out in formal guidelines that same year, specified other areas the 
media should avoid: anything seditious, insinuating, sensational, or speculative, or 
that might provoke ethnic, religious, racial, or intergroup (class) tensions. 
 The peak of re-regulation was the overhaul of the 1966 Basic Press Law in 
1982. Like the earlier legislation it modified, this revision contained several clauses 
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promoting freedom of the press. Article 4 guaranteed that the national press would 
not be subject to censorship or other forms of “muzzling,” and Article 8 stated that 
publications did not need a license (Surat Izin Terbit, SIT) to publish. Article 5 identi-
fied freedom of the press as a basic human right. However, the law contained multiple 
provisions contradicting these three articles while leaving in place the Dutch lèse 
majesté and “hate-sowing” articles prohibiting speech that might insult the president 
or provoke contempt toward the government. 69 
 The most controversial provision was Article 13, requiring that all publications 
obtain a Press Publication Enterprise Permit (Surat Izin Usaha Penerbitan Pers, 
SIUPP). The regime declared that this requirement was distinct from the Sukarno-era 
SIT and therefore not in conflict with Article 8. Yet the SIUPP was more effective as a 
control mechanism than the content-oriented SIT it replaced, because of the rewards 
it offered cooperative publications and potential sanctions for noncooperation. 
 According to the minister of information, General Ali Murtopo, a primary func-
tion of the new SIUPP was to allow the government to block “irresponsible ele-
ments” from entering the media market, including “adventurers in press publications 
that can hamper the growth of a healthy national press.” 70 Restricting the number of 
publications, the argument went, would prevent the entry of too many players into 
an ostensibly limited market, thereby safeguarding the viability of smaller papers and 
magazines already struggling to survive. This advantaged existing publications of all 
sizes by shielding them from new competition, thereby turning the licenses into a 
lucrative rent, benefiting their owners and reducing incentives to oppose licensing. 
Nevertheless, there was little security in owning a SIUPP. If the government wanted 
to silence a publication, the same reasoning that protected its market position could 
also be used to revoke its SIUPP. By reward and potential sanction, the licensing 
system created a corrupt bargain that would induce media collaboration for the next 
two decades. 
 Inculcation of Self-Censorship 
 With these mechanisms in place, 1980s news outlets faced constant threats of 
bans, while individual journalists and editors could be fi red or thrown in jail for 
reports that caused off ense. Yet New Order media control was noteworthy not for 
its reliance on physical threats or legal penalties but for its eff ective imposition of 
self-censorship, a phenomenon Ashadi Siregar described as “almost a disease from 
which no one is immune.” 71 Schwarz attributes this success to the regime’s empha-
sis on preventative rather than punitive measures in policing the political arena. 72 
While Malari’s most visible repercussion was the closure of twelve publications, the 
National Press Council’s action three years later was more signifi cant in fostering 
habitual self-censorship. 73 The council also determined that journalists were to culti-
vate “positive interaction” among the press, state, and society. 74 
 Yasuo Hanazaki argues that to survive under the New Order, “publishers and edi-
tors were forced to accept the positive interaction concept.” 75 Yet, as in any system of 
control, legitimacy was key to maintaining long-term compliance. In Indonesia’s state 
propaganda, the concept of positive interaction acquired a level of legitimacy among 
public and media far higher than it might have had with external policing alone. 
Though dismantling regulatory controls was a priority for media reformers before and 
after Suharto’s fall, the legitimacy of the positive-interaction doctrine would be the 
more critical legacy to overcome in establishing a new political culture. 
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 This legitimacy had several sources. Sukarno’s rule had left a memory of a para-
lyzed government, lacking the mechanisms to resolve conflicts among parties sharply 
divided along ideological lines. Suharto’s reconstruction of the 1965–66 military-led 
massacre as a spontaneous eruption of civil war, virtually unchallenged throughout 
his reign, fostered widespread belief that the country’s harmony was fragile and Indo-
nesians were inherently prone to volatility. 76 
 Against this background, the New Order agenda to depoliticize the media and 
broader civil society, to reject the “politics as commander” ( politik sebagai panglima ) 
mentality of the previous era, held a certain appeal. Evidence of this attitude among 
news outlets can be seen as early as 1969 in the response to  Indonesia Raya ’s investiga-
tive reporting.  Kompas called this journalism an anti-corruption “crusade,” while an 
armed forces publication,  Angkatan Bersenjata , accused  Indonesia Raya of harming the 
national interest by aiding foreign oil companies in their plot to “destroy” Perta-
mina.  Kompas , joined by another large daily,  Pedoman , also began questioning Mochtar 
Lubis’s motives, sparking a debate over the proper place of the press in politics. 77 
 Following the 1978 four-point pledge, statements by  Kompas ’s chief editor, Jakob 
Oetama, reveal a deeper internalization. “While the Western press prioritized the 
oversight [function],” in Indonesia, he said, “the ‘partnership’ between the press and gov-
ernment needs to be supported.” Demonstrating his belief in a cultural foundation for 
such positive interaction, he continued: “The relationship that ties together the press 
and the government under Indonesian democracy in this era is not submission . . . 
[nor] opposition, but agreeable discussion, often called ‘partnership’ . . . based on 
the spirit of gotong-royong [mutual help], and consensus-oriented deliberation, and 
kekeluargaan that constitute Indonesia’s public character.” 78 Over time, this rhetoric 
of partnership, positive interaction, family-ism, and consensus gave self-censorship 
increasing legitimacy, while “politics” came to be considered “dirty.” 79 
 Abetting the legitimacy of government restrictions and self-policing was the 
regime’s construction of the news media as “free but responsible—where freedom 
includes the right not to publish.” 80 This phrase reduced the cognitive dissonance 
between the constitution’s guarantees for press freedom and the Basic Press Law on 
the one hand, and the tight constraints the news media faced on the other. It also 
legitimated self-censorship. Within the model of freedom with responsibility, news 
outlets could nominally use their own judgment, and the Suharto regime cited the 
absence of a priori censorship as evidence of media freedom. But consequences for 
wrong decisions could be severe, and daily judgment calls relied on uncertain assess-
ments of appropriateness, making the question of boundaries almost unanswerable. 
Such uncertainty, combined with arbitrary enforcement of perceived violations, pro-
duced a conservatism approaching paranoia among news outlets and a “climate of 
fear” that became far more stultifying than overt government censorship would have 
been. 81 
 Appropriation of Pancasila 
 Perhaps the most eff ective means for giving self-censorship legitimacy, however, 
was the regime’s revival of integralism and its appropriation of the Pancasila ideology 
to serve a corporatist agenda. The legitimacy of the “positive interaction” doctrine, for 
example, formalized in the National Press Council’s 1974 guidelines, drew on inte-
gralist norms articulated by the information minister, Mashuri [one name], during a 
speech at the University of Indonesia. The press could not, he insisted, behave as if 
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it were separate from society or the state, nor could it contribute to the alienation of 
other parts of society from the whole, since all belonged to “one great family that [is] 
supposed to think positively, to live harmoniously, and thus to interact positively”—a 
logic that made positive interaction itself a subset of integralism. 82 Showing accep-
tance of this logic within the media community, the publisher Oetama’s statements 
above affi  rmed the importance of consensus and  kekeluargaan in determining the 
proper relationship of the news media to the state. 83 
 Another 1985 law on mass organizations required political parties, nongovern-
mental organizations, and other social groups to register their members with the gov-
ernment and declare Pancasila as their sole ideological foundation. 84 To reinforce this 
commitment, the government also established a Pancasila indoctrination program for 
all soldiers, civil servants, students, and professionals. 85 
 Through these trends, the meaning and function of Pancasila changed, as Cribb 
and Brown put it, from a “vague, cover-all slogan whose chief message was that no 
ideology was to be permitted to dominate Indonesia” to a corporatist ideology with 
an underlying emphasis on harmony among all societal sectors. 86 In practical terms, 
this emphasis denied the value of airing differences of opinion or subjecting policy to 
public debate. 
 Common parlance reinforced this cultural conditioning as Pancasila metamor-
phosed to impose corporatist norms on nearly all institutional relationships, redefin-
ing whatever noun it modified. “Pancasila democracy” turned the ideal of deliberative 
democracy into consensus-by-fiat that silenced competing views. “Pancasila industrial 
relations” envisioned employers in a paternalistic, rather than antagonistic, relation-
ship with workers, making strikes inappropriate for defending labor’s interests. 87 A 
“Pancasila press,” in turn, would promote harmony and unity through positive report-
ing on the nation’s leaders, military operations, and government policy. 
 Transformation of Language 
 The language of public discourse came to refl ect the increasingly repressive envi-
ronment in other ways, most notably through the use of indirect phrasing to soften 
any reporting that might suggest criticism of the regime. As one editor explained, 
“We played with words. We didn’t call it poverty—it was ‘pre-prosperity.’ You didn’t 
say corruption. It was ‘high-cost economy.’ If a minister was caught misusing funds, it 
wasn’t corruption—it was a ‘procedural error.’” Prisons became “socialization institu-
tions,” while disaster coverage might call a famine a “disturbance in food provision.” 88 
Reports of soldiers committing human rights abuses blamed “oknum,” or “rogue indi-
viduals,” exonerating those in command. 89 
 The passive voice also removed agency, denying readers sufficient information to 
assign responsibility. Supporting the opacity, acronyms began to overwhelm the sim-
plicity and accessibility of Bahasa Indonesia. Following the news required mastery of 
a bewildering array of abbreviations often left undefined—FSPSI, SIPPT, SD IMBAS, 
SBKRI, PTTUN, PPW-LIPI—making information accessible only to those familiar 
with the current code. 90 English words, in turn, added another layer of obfuscation for 
anyone outside the educated elite. 
 More broadly, Hill describes the New Order press’s linguistic style as a “cautious, 
measured, some would say cringing, way with words.” 91 Indonesians and foreigners 
alike derided the media, particularly  Kompas , the conservative daily that became the 
country’s “paper of record,” for this often tortuous language. Yet the primary source 
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of proliferating euphemisms and labyrinthine prose was not journalists but the offi-
cials they routinely quoted through a practice called “recording journalism” ( jurnal-
isme rekaman ). 92 Todung Mulya Lubis describes this as “a kind of politics of avoidance 
[that] emerged as a calculated news policy.” When the media felt “obliged to publish 
certain news, it attempt[ed] to rely more on interviews with those . . . regarded as 
experts, rather than writing about the event directly.” 93 Such experts were overwhelm-
ingly public officials. 
 As late as 1995, a survey by the Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Informa-
tion (Institut Studi Arus Informasi, ISAI) of routine coverage from five leading dailies 
indicated that 20 to 30 percent of front-page stories consisted of “recording journalism”: 
articles composed from a patchwork of official quotes. 94 In coverage of a crisis or particu-
larly sensitive matters, such reporting could rise to well over 50 percent. For two weeks 
following the 1991 army massacre of 271 civilians in Dili, East Timor,  Kompas filled its 
front pages almost entirely with official quotes, even in articles unrelated to the mas-
sacre. 95 Euphemism and the passive voice also pervaded these official statements, pro-
ducing ever more recondite stories that obscured both the event and its investigation. 96 
 Following the news thus required audiences to develop special skills of 
interpretation—the art of reading between the lines, or “reading between the lies,” 
as Aristides Katoppo put it in what became a standard quip. 97 A 1998 history of the 
PWI noted that readers had to sort out three versions of “truth” in daily reporting: 
the “press version,” the “government version,” and the “real version.” 98 
 Jalaluddin Rakhmat has argued that such euphemism and linguistic sleight-
of-hand reflected a deep insecurity among New Order leaders who came to rely on 
“impression management” to avoid not only public criticism but also honest self-
appraisal and responsibility for problems. 99 But the media played along, exhibiting 
what Katoppo once called “the wisdom of cowardice.” 100 While this “New Order–
speak” may have originated in government circles, the mass media served as the 
critical vehicle for its dissemination and normalization. 
 Some saw this period’s media as almost a sentient organism, engaged in advance-
and-retreat tactics that avoided sustained criticism but delivered short blows on unre-
lated issues in different articles or even publications—a combination called “sniper 
journalism.” 101 If people read between the lines, they might notice that a newspaper 
apparently supportive of the regime was often critical. 
 Yet even practices of resistance were problematic, creating habits that may have 
inspired opposition among critical readers but arguably also reinforced New Order 
assumptions about the proper role of the media, such as the belief that any critical 
reporting should be in the form of “constructive criticism.” 102 Hill describes the most 
common method that the media used to fault the government as “criticism by praise,” 
explaining that “headlines never focus on negatives; articles bury barbs in the final 
paragraphs. Criticisms are rarely written in the active voice, and a circumlocutory 
passive form of speech disguises disapproval.” 103 Similarly,  Indonesia Raya ’s founder, 
Mochtar Lubis, once described New Order newspapers as relying on “very subtle allu-
sions to avoid hurting anyone’s feelings, having to be like a snake, circling round and 
round without ever striking the target.” 104 
 While this image of cautious subversion challenges the picture of the mass media 
as, in Hill’s words, “the most important area of maintenance and reproduction of the 
New Order’s legitimation,” such “guerilla” resistance might have boosted the New 
Order’s power by reinforcing fears of directly challenging the regime. 105 The circling 
snake may seem lethal but never strikes. 
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 Professional Co-optation 
 A fi nal legacy of New Order media controls was the government’s co-optation 
of the country’s only legal journalists’ association, the PWI, transforming it from 
an organization that represented journalists vis-à-vis the state to one that controlled 
them on the state’s behalf. After serving Sukarno, the association switched allegiance 
in 1966 and began advancing the New Order’s political agenda, fi rst by purging mem-
bers connected to the PKI. In his study of the association, Togi Simanjuntak argues 
that this purge marked the beginning of Suharto’s “taming” of the journalistic pro-
fession. From the PWI’s declaration of support for the new regime at its fi rst post-
Sukarno congress, he suggests, “one could already see that all activities of professional 
journalists would be made to conform to the decisions of the Information Ministry.” 
At the same time as this physical integration, “the very thought patterns of many 
Indonesian journalists . . . would be controlled or absorbed into the New Order’s 
political discourse.” 106 
 The PWI maintained some independence in the early days of New Order rule, 
rejecting the continuation of Sukarno’s press licensing system as an unconstitutional 
violation of freedom of the press. 107 More dramatically, when the Ministry of Informa-
tion required all journalists to become members of the PWI in 1969, the association’s 
Jakarta office head, Harmoko [one name]—later a top member of the Golkar ruling 
party who became minister of information—strongly opposed it, arguing that nothing 
in the PWI’s charter gave it the right to “create journalists.” 108 Divisions among the 
PWI’s leadership, however, soon undermined its capacity to resist such measures, and 
the association declared its support for the 1969 decree. 109 
 Starting in 1975, the Ministry of Information institutionalized the PWI’s monop-
oly over the representation of journalists through a series of decisions that made it 
the sole legally recognized association, or  wadah tunggal , for journalists in Indonesia. 110 
Simanjuntak explains that the concept of  wadah tunggal , that there should be only one 
association to represent journalists, was justified on “the pretext of raising the image 
and quality of the press.” 111 In practice, however, incorporating the PWI into the state 
effectively consolidated the latter’s power over print publications. 
 The ban on alternative associations, in conjunction with required membership, 
gave the PWI, and thus the state, considerable power over the media. Applications for 
publishing licenses required approval from government agencies, such as the Ministry 
of Information, as well as the PWI and the Association of Newspaper Publishers, a 
parallel sectoral organization. Moreover, license applications required would-be pub-
lishers to list their entire editorial staff, any of whom could be rejected by the PWI. 
License holders were not allowed to make changes to their staff without advance 
approval from the association. Finally, “for the rank-and-file journalist,” reports Hill, 
“a PWI membership card [was] theoretically essential, and rejection by (or . . . expul-
sion from) the Association, for whatever reason, [was] likely to close the door for-
mally on a press career.” 112 
 The full co-optation of the association, however, occurred through its integration 
into first the state bureaucracy and then the regime’s de facto ruling party, Golkar. 
Ironically, a key player in this process was the former journalist and future informa-
tion minister Harmoko, who had been the most vocal opponent of the 1969 decree 
making PWI membership mandatory. While rising to head the association’s cen-
tral office, Harmoko was also climbing within Golkar. A former PWI vice-treasurer, 
Atmakusumah Astraatmadja, has argued that these political connections altered 
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Harmoko’s perspective and led the association to become increasingly politicized, or 
“Golkarized,” under his leadership. 113 
 In 1993, Harmoko became the party’s chairperson in parliament; he also served as 
minister of information from 1983 to 1998. In moving to the ministry, he gave up the 
PWI leadership but maintained influence in choosing its officers as well as the mem-
bers of the National Press Council. Through such machinations, Simanjuntak argues, 
the PWI came to constitute “the long arm of Golkar.” 114 
 At first glance, the PWI’s story is its absorption into the state apparatus and the 
larger system that embodied integralism—with four theoretically separate institu-
tions (the Ministry of Information, the National Press Council, Golkar, and the 
PWI) incorporated in an interlocking matrix of controls under Golkar. At another 
level, the story illuminates the inner workings of a licensing system that gave all 
stakeholders, from publishers to working journalists, a rentier status. Unlike the 
externalized controls of state-run media, Suharto’s use of licensing to “create jour-
nalists” in privately owned media encouraged them, along with their employers, 
to buy into a corrupt bargain that limited competition for staff positions by estab-
lishing a rent for those lucky enough to gain employment. Government control 
through licensing over these nominally independent journalists incentivized what 
were essentially collusive media that strengthened the Suharto regime. More criti-
cally over the long term, it also normalized—among journalists and owners—the 
practice of colluding with the powerful, particularly the ruling party. Combined 
with the increasing crony ownership of media, this normalization would create a 
legacy more enduring than the media’s bureaucratic incorporation into the formal 
state apparatus. 115 
 Consequences 
 The consequences of Suharto’s gradual “taming” of the media were myriad. 
The co-optation or elimination of competing centers of power helped Suharto insu-
late himself from the uncertainties of political contestation. The media outlets that 
stayed in business cooperated, exchanging their editorial independence for market 
protection and survival, enabling his regime’s escalating corruption and human 
rights abuses. 
 With media and parliament tightly managed by the mid-1980s, Suharto amassed 
one of the world’s largest fortunes, which  Forbes magazine estimated in his last months 
in power at between $10 and $40 billion, making him the third wealthiest person in 
the world. 116 Though Suharto began this accumulation during his first years of office, 
much of the plunder came during the last decade of the New Order, through what 
was, in retrospect, fairly obvious manipulation of executive powers that might have 
been checked by a critical media. 
 The Suharto empire grew, in part, through commissions the family collected as 
middlemen between the state and those wishing to do business in Indonesia. After 
Suharto’s fall, the Ministry of Mines and Energy identified 159 companies engaged in 
contracts with the state oil and gas company, Pertamina, that had links to his inner 
circle. 117 In other lucrative deals, government offices arranged for Suharto’s children 
to purchase shares of state-owned companies at below-market value, which the chil-
dren then sold for windfall profits. 118 
 Finally, presidential decrees allowed Suharto’s children and cronies to siphon mil-
lions in “loans” from state reserves, such as the Ministry of Forestry and Plantations’s 
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Reforestation Fund. Among other ventures, they financed the 1997 Southeast Asian 
Games and a multimillion-dollar loan to a pulp paper company controlled by Suhar-
to’s golfing partner and former minister of industry, Mohamad “Bob” Hasan. 119 Such 
decrees also created the monopolies and tariff protections that generated wide profit 
margins for even the most poorly run of the Suharto empire’s companies. 120 A report 
from the Indonesian Transparency Society released five months after Suharto’s fall 
identified seventy-nine presidential decrees between 1993 and 1998 that directly ben-
efited the business interests of Suharto’s family or cronies. 121 Although Suharto was 
able to bypass parliamentary oversight in issuing most of these decrees, they still 
entered the public record—almost without mention in the media. 
 
 In Suharto’s last eighteen months, the costs of spreading corruption and a silenced 
media would become painfully apparent as the economy collapsed during the 1997 
Asian fi nancial crisis, plunging the nation into massive unemployment and wide-
spread hunger. The 1974 and 1978 crackdowns that had muzzled the print press and 
the country’s university students also encouraged the subjugation of broader civil 
society. These events moved Indonesia into a decade marked by stifl ed public debate, 
deepening corruption, and an increasingly quiescent media, subdued further by  Sinar 
Harapan ’s closure in 1986 and the ban of another publication,  Prioritas , in 1987. With-
out critical reporting as a check on the regime’s excesses, the following decade saw 
deepening structural corruption and a steep increase in Suharto’s use of the state to 
enrich his entourage, particularly his children, whose business empires soon pen-
etrated nearly every sector of the economy. 
 The foundations of control and corruption that came to define the New Order 
were in place long before Suharto took power. Reviving the ideology of integralism, 
Suharto augmented these controls by transforming the media into an embedded ele-
ment of state power, making journalists complicit in his regime’s legitimating dis-
course and inculcating a reflexive self-censorship that helped insulate the regime from 
political challenge. 
 Consequently, when the Asian financial crisis hit Indonesia in 1997, the regime’s 
organizing principle was not fair and open competition rewarding the best business 
plans with government contracts or the best candidates with public office. Rather, it 
was a system of institutionalized collusion providing the regime and its favorites with 
the certainties of rigged political, legal, and economic contestation. Cronies enjoyed 
no-bid contracts and the extraordinary profits afforded by protected markets. Wealthy 
or well-connected parties in lawsuits enjoyed the assurance of favorable verdicts. Can-
didates won office not through the uncertainty of free elections but through outcomes 
engineered by the ruling party’s political machine. These overlapping and interwoven 
elements of patronage politics, shielded from the scrutiny that might have checked 
them, left the Indonesian economy vulnerable to the shock of market discipline from 
the financial crisis. 
 The elaborate media controls developed under the Old and New Orders, from 
1959 to 1998, weighed heavily on Indonesia’s postauthoritarian media. Reformers, 
cohering as a community by the mid-1990s, therefore faced two main tasks. The 
first—challenging regulatory controls—involved a binary opposition between com-
pliance and resistance that would, over time, lead to legal reforms. As later chapters 
show, the second, even more complex, task was transforming the media’s underlying 
political culture, tainted by collusion, legitimated by ideology, perpetuated through 
self-censorship, and privileging consensus over accountability. 

 Chapter Two 
 Delegitimating 
Authoritarianism 
 We know that when conversation, or the lack of it, becomes a function of total 
power, words become victims of sacrifi ce. They may sound free or untied, like 
sacrifi cial horses in ancient India, but actually they are guarded and sent roam-
ing to mark out new borders of colonization. And at the end they are slaughtered 
like any other victim to appease the gods controlling the terror. 
 —Goenawan Mohamad, “A Kind of Silence,” closing remarks at 
“Pramoedya Unbound,” Asia Society, Jakarta, April 22, 1999 
 On June 27, 1994, some three hundred demonstrators arrived at the National 
Monument in downtown Jakarta, demanding the Indonesian information minister’s 
resignation and the end of print press licensing. The square was full of riot troops 
dressed in T-shirts bearing the words “Operasi Bersih” (Operation Cleanup). When 
the demonstrators reached the Ministry of Information, troops suddenly attacked 
with riot sticks—bloodying heads, breaking bones, and beating people senseless. As 
the protestors fled, the troops followed, randomly pummeling those within reach. 1 In 
this twenty-eighth year of Indonesia’s “Pancasila democracy,” protestors were calling 
for neither a religious revolution nor sweeping change but, very specifically, freedom 
of speech—a demand that would become a defining issue for the reform movement 
that ultimately ousted President Suharto. 
 In studying democratic transitions, an initial problem lies in identifying, in ret-
rospect, their genesis in developments often unfolding years before a regime’s actual 
fall. Understanding the media’s role in democratization requires first examining pre-
cursors of change. In Indonesia, well before the economic crisis and mass demonstra-
tions that forced Suharto from power in May 1998, numerous events took place that 
would influence the character of the country’s later transition. Among these, the sud-
den ban of three newsweeklies in 1994 was a transformative event for the media and 
the country that both anticipated Suharto’s eventual fall and shaped the agenda of the 
prodemocracy movement. 
 The Era of “Opening” 
 By the late 1980s, after a quarter century of deepening authoritarianism, the 
Suharto regime had absorbed nearly all competing centers of power into a corporatist 
apparatus and had transformed the national ideology, Pancasila, into a tool for stifl ing 
dissent. Ongoing newspaper bans—notably the closure of the country’s last indepen-
dent daily,  Sinar Harapan , in 1986—left a print media paralyzed by self-censorship and 
onerous regulation. 
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 However, in 1987, Suharto approved a program of economic opening to attract 
foreign investment, bringing unanticipated consequences as this liberalization slowly 
extended into the media. When he reversed course with new press bans in 1994, this 
political trend ended abruptly. Reverberations from this brief liberalization, particu-
larly within the media, would play a crucial, though often invisible, role in eroding 
acceptance of authoritarian rule and ultimately setting a specific course for the coun-
try’s democratic transition. 
 In this same period, a deeper critique of Suharto’s use of integralism to legiti-
mate his authoritarian rule began moving from the private to the public sphere, 
culminating in a major confrontation with the regime. During the decade before 
Suharto’s fall, this critique, progressively widening the scope of dissent, emerged 
in four significant arenas of public discourse: discussions in intellectual circles, 
new trends in the print press, political talk shows in the broadcast media, and an 
unprecedented public trial in the legal arena. Each manifestation posed a significant 
challenge to the regime’s legitimating rhetoric and functioned at a deeper level, 
disrupting the placid exterior of New Order Indonesia by unsettling its imposed 
certainties and collusive pacts. 
 The first level of critique had roots in private conversations among intellectu-
als who began interrogating the political order, particularly the regime’s authoritar-
ian ideology. By the early 1990s, several newsweeklies with an urban middle-class 
readership were challenging the regime more directly through investigative reporting, 
critical interviews, and provocative commentary. Broadcast “infotainment” programs, 
including political talk shows, also emerged to stretch the bounds of permissible dis-
course, challenging the New Order’s integralist norms of public conversation. 
 As demand rose for more varied media fare, democratic space opened and criti-
cism of the regime grew more overt. Seeking to check these changes, Suharto cracked 
down on three of the boldest publications, effectively reversing liberalization in the 
print press. While the bans intensified a climate of fear in surviving newsrooms, they 
also inspired defiance when two publication owners refused the chance to reopen 
under conditions set by the regime. 2 Owners, editors, and journalists then used 
another byproduct of political opening, a new court that allowed challenges to gov-
ernment decisions, to pursue a landmark lawsuit against the minister of information. 
The unprecedented public trials that followed fractured the manufactured consensus 
of the New Order, prompting an implicit repudiation of print press licensing by two 
courts. In a surprising break from the past, Suharto failed to engineer a predetermined 
outcome, thereby unleashing an uncontrolled narrative and inspiring a resistance 
movement that would outlive the regime. 
 Interrogating Integralism 
 One of the earliest challenges to the regime’s ideological underpinnings emerged 
among academics. By the 1980s, despite multiple press bans and policies to depoliti-
cize universities, critiques of the New Order were percolating in intellectual circles. 
Their infl uence was narrow but signifi cant, not fanning public dissent but slowly dis-
crediting the regime’s justifi cations for its system of control. 
 This discourse took particularly salient form in an academic thesis by Marsillam 
Simanjuntak, a medical doctor and former student activist. Submitted to the Univer-
sity of Indonesia Faculty of Law in 1989, the thesis probed the corporatist founda-
tions of integralism, the statist ideology first articulated by Supomo during the 1945 
 Delegitimating Authoritarianism 35
constitutional debates. Simanjuntak observed that from the mid-1970s, integralism 
had enjoyed a state-sponsored renaissance under Suharto but refuted its legitimacy 
as a founding doctrine, noting that the term did not appear in the 1945 constitution. 
The framers, he argued, in rejecting monarchy and hereditary rule, had also rejected 
key integralist assumptions, particularly the principle that sovereignty belonged to the 
state and not the people. Given this historical reality, he asked why integralism had 
regained status as a founding philosophy under Suharto. 3 
 The question was rhetorical and necessarily academic. But with the New Order at 
the peak of its authoritarian power, Simanjuntak’s thesis posed a profoundly subver-
sive challenge. Primarily, it questioned the foundations of the doctrine legitimating 
New Order controls. In teasing out integralism’s Hegelian antecedents, Simanjuntak 
produced a trenchant critique of its antidemocratic tenets and normative authority, 
warning that Suharto’s adherence to Supomo’s original vision would “carry serious 
consequences” for democracy and the people’s sovereignty by fostering “totalitarian-
ism and authoritarianism.” 4 Perhaps most damningly, Simanjuntak noted both Supo-
mo’s and Sukarno’s 1945 laudatory references to the Third Reich and imperial Japan 
as models for emulation, documenting fascist principles’ influence on integralism’s 
conception. 
 Though the treatise gained only limited circulation, intellectuals took up its 
tenets as they started engaging the constitutional questions it raised in open debate. 
In 1989, the year Simanjuntak submitted his thesis, the news media, most notably 
the magazines  Forum Keadilan and  Majalah Persahi , began airing these critical views. 
In November, the daily  Kompas convened a three-day seminar on the critique, giving 
Simanjuntak the opportunity to attack regime-sponsored academics who had given 
integralism constitutional legitimacy. In August 1990,  Forum Keadilan followed up 
with a twenty-one-page spread highly critical of the ideology, quoting numerous pub-
lic intellectuals. Among these was Goenawan Mohamad, editor in chief of the news 
magazine  Tempo . Mohamad shared the growing skepticism over Supomo’s under-
standing of Indonesia’s history, casting doubt on the latter’s assertions of immutable 
cultural foundations for integralist governance. 5 A month later,  Tempo gave Simanjun-
tak another platform to attack the regime’s repression of rights and enjoin the people 
to “clobber” any government attempt to “block, hamper, or impede the channels of 
free expression.” 6 
 Seizing the momentum, some forty prominent public figures, including Simanjun-
tak and Abdurrahman Wahid, the leader of the Muslim association Nahdlatul Ulama, 
united around this emerging critique and convened the new Democratic Forum in 
1991. The regime responded by breaking up their meetings with force, rejecting, as 
Robert Hefner put it, the need “for a pro-democracy organization in a country that 
had already achieved a ‘Pancasila Democracy.’” 7 Officials then intensified Pancasila 
indoctrination programs, inserting integralist doctrine in textbooks for Pancasila and 
Citizenship Education and expunging references to human rights from tertiary school 
curricula. 8 
 Sidelines: Subtle Subversion 
 Despite this crackdown on debate over the nature (and future) of Indonesian 
democracy, the media continued pushing the boundaries of political opening, and 
critiques of integralism took diverse forms. One was Mohamad’s widely read weekly 
column in  Tempo , Catatan Pinggir (Sidelines), which challenged, albeit obliquely, the 
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regime’s integralist rhetoric through content and through its distinctive discursive 
form. 
 At several points, resonances between Simanjuntak’s treatise and the ideas in 
Sidelines are clear, particularly in discussions of the New Order’s denigration of 
individual rights. In a column boldly titled “Human Rights,” for example, Mohamad 
quotes Sukarno’s announcement during the constitutional convention of 1945: “We 
are drawing up the Constitution with the sovereignty of the people (rakyat), and not 
the sovereignty of the individual (individu).” Mohamad then asks, “Why the people 
and not the individual?” and presents Sukarno’s explanation: it is “the rights of liberty 
of man-as-individual ‘that [have made] the countries of Europe and America full of 
conflict, unrest, class struggle and war.’” But Mohamad rejects this logic, asserting 
that “Sukarno was surely mistaken”—an implicit critique of President Suharto’s simi-
lar denunciations of individual rights. 9 
 In a different column, “Family,” Mohamad’s defense of individual rights is pref-
aced by a deconstruction of the family metaphor Suharto used to popularize integralist 
doctrine. The discussion concludes, “the country is never a family, and a head of state 
can never be like a real father to the citizens.” 10 Similarly, in “Monsters,” Mohamad 
describes his epiphany “that not everyone agrees with Professor Supomo, who . . . 
described the ‘state’ as like a wise father to its children, the ‘people.’ After all,” he 
continues, “hasn’t the experience of the young Republic shown that the ‘father’ can 
act wrongfully toward the children?” 11 
 Published in February 1992, “Han Sui,” a column about three children whose 
father was tortured and killed, opens by asking: “Where do rights come from?” Echo-
ing Enlightenment theories of natural law, Mohamad speculates: “From God, one 
opinion would say. . . . [Rights] have existed since our existence began and therefore 
cannot be taken away.” His commentary becomes more poignant as he recounts the 
children’s story. The voice of the oldest, Han Sui, haunts him, making him “always 
ask,” when thinking of rights, “why it was that Han Sui seemed to have no right to 
make an issue of the death of his father—and why I felt that I had no right to tell 
it.” He reflects on debates over rights that have inspired statements like that by the 
American Association of Anthropology: “What are held to be human rights in one 
society may be regarded as anti-social by another people.” At a philosophical level, he 
acknowledges, “‘West’ is indeed ‘West’ and ‘East’ is ‘East.’ How complicated.” Yet for 
Han Sui’s father, and others suffering a similar fate, “the matter is not abstract: they 
have been tortured.” 12 
 “Han Sui” ventures an implicit critique of the “Asian values” discourse popular-
ized in the 1990s by neighboring autocrats Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore and Mahatir 
Mohamad of Malaysia to justify authoritarianism throughout Southeast Asia. Other 
Sidelines columns focus more narrowly on “Indonesian values” and Suharto’s pro-
motion of a distinctive “Indonesian democracy” to legitimate suppressing rights. 
Recalling Sukarno’s command “Indonesia, choose your own genuine democracy!” that 
prefigured Suharto’s call for a “Pancasila democracy,” Mohamad predicts “the twen-
tieth century will probably end in disillusionment. . . . [T]his original democracy,” he 
explains, “with its distinctive style—this better alternative that we have hoped for—is 
extremely difficult to find.” 13 
 Other pieces can be read as defenses of Western democracy. In “Management of 
Conflict,” for example, Mohamad again addresses fears that liberal democracy breeds 
conflict—a phobia, he says, shared by all totalitarian regimes that view conflict as 
“the rider on the horse of the apocalypse, bearing chaos.” Indonesians are “afraid 
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of conflict,” he explains, “because conflict, in our situation of never-ending poverty, 
brings with it risk, and risk is not something that we can take.” Indonesians learn 
from childhood to avoid behavior that might inflame conflict. Consequently, they 
“tend to react to conflict with a lack of self-confidence.” Democracy, by contrast, is 
reassuring because it admits “conflict as an integral part of us, even when we are all 
within one fishpond.” Democracy is not the source of conflict; democracy is, rather, 
“the management of conflict.” 14 
 In these and other ways, the Sidelines columns repeatedly challenged the regime’s 
disparagement of the West and individual rights. Yet a defining element of Moha-
mad’s style is not consistency nor conviction but a certain ambivalence. He is being 
cautious, often critiquing the regime indirectly and evading the immediate threat of 
censorship. But he is also employing a distinctive genre of writing he identifies as the 
“essay” that presented its own challenge to Suharto’s use of integralism to maintain 
control over public discourse. 
 Mohamad does not describe the essay genre as specifically subversive, but iden-
tifies elements that seem to run counter to integralist norms. The genre’s “use of 
language and allegories,” for example, “disturbs journalistic linearity” and stands 
“against the acronym-studded columns of bureaucratese” pervading New Order 
public discourse. 15 Quoting Theodor Adorno, Mohamad says that the essay “starts 
not with Adam and Eve but with what it wants to talk about . . . and stops when 
it feels finished rather than when there is nothing more to say.” Its substance, in 
a sense,  is its form—a form with “the quality of someone in an abstracted mood 
aimlessly sauntering on the sidewalk.” He concludes, “Precisely because it is largely 
an insubstantial undertaking,” the essay is “polemical,” and thereby “stands against 
[the government’s] mania for result and regularity.” It offers a means to “circumvent 
[authoritarianism’s] utilitarian demand for predictability.” 16 
 Taking Mohamad’s analysis further, part of the Suharto regime’s “mania for 
result and regularity” was its demand for continual renewal of consensus, for reso-
lution and elimination of doubt or lingering queries. As Jennifer Lindsay notes, 
Sidelines ignores this requisite, rarely delivering a sense of resolution, much less 
consensus. What these columns offer instead is the opposite—not conflict, nor 
even disagreement, but simply questions. “Are human rights the same as Coca-
Cola?” Mohamad asks in 1977. 17 Later he asks, is the state—“as Hegel said—the 
defender of the common good?” and “What does the individual mean to society, in 
fact?” 18 
 Such questioning alone was potentially subversive in a culture where, as Yusuf 
Bilyarta Mangunwijaya (Romo Mangun) says, asking questions had become taboo. 19 
Yet the ambiguity in Sidelines also presented a deeper challenge to the regime. One 
can imagine the New Order’s culture of consensus as spherical, enveloping public 
discourse within an orb in which conflicting views and unresolved questions were 
smoothed over—“phased out,” in Suharto’s words. 20 Tellingly, the Indonesian word 
for “unanimous” is, in fact,  bulat , meaning “round” or “spherical.” 
 The perplexities of Sidelines resisted absorption into this self-contained public 
sphere, suspended instead in tacit opposition to demands for order and certainty. 
The columns’ meandering propositions, the questions they raise but do not answer, 
became, in a sense, like threads hanging loose from an otherwise smooth surface of 
consensus and resolution. If one were to tug at these threads, Mohamad suggests, the 
regime’s very legitimacy might begin to unravel. “A slight tear in the cloth,” he notes, 
“quickly can be seen as a gaping hole.” 21 
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 Apart from the specific ideas the columns carried, their essay form, marked by 
wandering ruminations and resistance to resolution, posed its own challenge to the 
Suharto regime, or at least its authoritarian certainties. More broadly, the columns 
began questioning New Order controls on public discourse justified by both integral-
ist rhetoric and the regime’s construction of the nation as inherently unstable. 
 Interview Talk Shows 
 A related trend was developing in broadcasting during this period, as commer-
cialized television popularized a diff erent array of news and entertainment genres. 
Imported primarily from the West, the programs expanded the range of fare avail-
able to viewers and the boundaries of shared culture. Several also posed potentially 
subversive challenges, through both form and content, to the Suharto regime’s inte-
gralist discursive norms and their legitimating logic. Foremost among these was the 
political talk show, pioneered on television by Wimar Witoelar’s  Perspektif , which, like 
Sidelines, attempted to cultivate the critical thought stigmatized under authoritarian-
ism. 22 In the rise of the talk show, we see again the intentional use of a generic form to 
perform political resistance. But we also see a genre taking on a life of its own, as  Per-
spektif inspired imitators—shows that risked regime backlash but, bolstered by their 
profi tability, continued multiplying long after  Perspektif ’s cancelation, even, in some 
cases, contrary to the pro-regime biases of the broadcasters airing them. 
 Prior to commercialization, the state-controlled network, Televisi Republik Indo-
nesia (TVRI), had been the sole provider of television fare, functioning primarily, in 
the words of Philip Kitley, as a site for manufacturing “consensus and convergence 
through corporatist structures and policies.” 23 In its promotional literature, Kitley 
notes, the network emphasized “the spirit of unity” and rejected “sensationalism and 
exploitation of violent, destructive or negative incidents.” Consequently, state news 
under Suharto, as under many authoritarian regimes, became little more than cover-
age of ribbon-cutting ceremonies marking the inauguration of various development 
projects, delivered by anchors sitting woodenly against a monochromatic backdrop. 24 
More broadly, Kitley explains, news programs became rituals for the promotion of an 
idealized order, a veritable “container for human action,” supportive of the regime. 25 
 In the late 1980s, TVRI’s monopoly ended as citizens gained access to foreign 
television through cross-border satellite transmissions. The foreign fare, Kitley notes, 
troubled Suharto early on for its potential to undermine New Order values. Children’s 
animated films were seen to reflect Western values by downplaying the collective, 
assigning higher value to “aspects of individualism.” Commercials, designed specifi-
cally to “ differentiate between individuals and groups,” worked against the integralist 
imperative to merge all individual identity into a cohesive collective identity. Finally, 
increasingly popular Western soap operas were problematic both in form and content. 
With their ceaseless churn of conflicts and family infighting, the shows presented 
portraits of domestic interaction radically divergent from state-promoted images of 
the harmonious family. Their recurrent cliffhangers, holding audiences through com-
mercials and from one episode to the next, deferred the expected narrative closure of 
state-sponsored dramas and instead normalized conflict without end. 26 
 Suharto, wary of commercial television from the beginning, banned its entry into 
Indonesia for most of his reign. 27 But with parabolic antennas multiplying on roof-
tops, blocking access to foreign programming proved increasingly difficult, politically 
and logistically. The regime first tried, with little success, to counter the influence of 
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these shows by producing competing, ideologically acceptable versions on Indonesian 
television—notably the TVRI-produced serial drama,  Keluarga Rahmat ( The Rahmat 
Family ). 28 
 Another way to compete with foreign television, favored by Suharto’s children 
and cronies anxious to expand their business empires, was to launch domestic com-
mercial stations producing their own Indonesian versions of foreign shows. Yielding 
to pressure, Suharto began granting commercial television licenses in 1987, first to 
his oldest son, who launched RCTI (Rajawali Citra Televisi Indonesia), and then to his 
oldest daughter, his foster brother, and two close business associates. 29 The expecta-
tion was that the new stations, as loyal members of the national “family,” would pro-
mote Indonesian values and regime interests. 30 Most critically, the government-run 
TVRI would retain its monopoly on news, which would be rebroadcast by the private 
stations throughout the day. 
 In practice, however, the private stations responded to commercial imperatives 
and soon became a Trojan horse in the New Order’s control over the public sphere. 
Concerned less with state mythologies than with financial profits, they found ways 
around regulations barring their own news production. RCTI began airing “soft 
news,” or “information” shows that gradually expanded coverage to include segments 
on crime, “everyday issues,” and sometimes more controversial matters, such as slum 
clearances and the business exploits of Suharto’s youngest son. 31 
 These quasi-news shows, paralleling similar trends in radio, not only pushed the 
boundaries of allowable content but also took risks in introducing unscripted inter-
views to commercial television. 32 Then in 1993, with stations seeking ways to increase 
their audiences, Witoelar went further by convincing producers at SCTV to launch a 
full-length interview talk show,  Perspektif , modeled on CNN’s  Larry King Live . 33 
 Witoelar imagined that even though it aired on a regime-connected station, such a 
show could be liberating in breaking through the fear and obfuscation he saw paralyz-
ing the public sphere. 34 Of the era’s many possible approaches to the talk show, Larry 
King’s staid, nonconfrontational format of one-on-one conversation may have seemed 
the least threatening to Suharto’s New Order. Nonetheless, King’s show possessed 
the key elements of the talk show genre that represented, in Indonesia’s authoritarian 
context, real change to a television landscape heretofore marked by highly controlled, 
predictable, monologic, and often didactic speech. 
 Despite King’s apparent “ordinariness,” Witoelar later argued, his genius—
being “curious” rather than contentious—lay precisely in delivering the authentic 
and unplanned. 35 In contrast to many US talk shows that were staged to frame brief 
moments of unscripted spontaneity, King required his celebrity guests to drop the 
safety net of prepared questions and risk a full half hour of genuine conversation. 36 
Following this model, Witoelar described the unedited spontaneity of his own show 
as its greatest strength. “I emphasize to each guest,” he explained, “that  Perspektif 
discussions do not use lists of questions of any sort. Conversations are allowed to 
take their own course.” 37 Guests on  Perspektif were generally public figures, and dis-
cussions tended to hew closely to each person’s particular realm of expertise. Regard-
less of topic, the ultimate goal was to lead guests just outside their comfort zones, 
generating unrehearsed “emotions and thought” and thereby producing the dynamic 
required to transform talking heads into dialogue. 38 
 In his book on  Perspektif , Witoelar expands on the importance of genuine dialogue 
in holding audience attention, pointing out that “conversation cannot just be two peo-
ple taking turns.” 39 The latter merely grants guests a platform for holding forth—an 
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example of what Edwin Jurriëns calls TVRI’s “monologism disguised as dialogism.” 40 
In Witoelar’s words, such conversation is “boring.” For the speaker, “it is no problem, 
but s/he does not know the TV sets in people’s homes are all being shut off.” What 
viewers really seek, Witoelar argues, are unscripted conversations. These conversa-
tions can be about anything—the key is that people think for themselves when they 
feel they are “part of the conversation,” that “there is something still unresolved to 
be discussed.” 41 
 Perspektif delivered open-endedness, spontaneity, and ventures into the taboo, cre-
ating the commercially profitable tensions missing from government-produced talk 
shows. Finally, the show added one more element that violated the regime’s prefer-
ence for resolution and closure. Like the foreign soap operas that proved so popu-
lar with Indonesians, Witoelar’s show kept audiences tuned in through commercials 
by using conversational cliff-hangers—breaks at dramatic moments in an unfolding 
dialogue. 
 A 1995  Perspektif interview with author Seno Gumira Ajidarma, “Expression 
through the Short Story,” exemplifies these elements. 42 What begins as a discussion of 
literature, focusing on an intriguing, if grotesque, short story by Ajidarma, veers into 
perhaps the most sensitive political terrain of the Suharto era—Indonesia’s military 
pacification of East Timor, the site of an ongoing struggle for independence. This topic 
alone pushed at the boundaries of acceptable speech, creating the kind of tension that 
made the talk show format alluring, if not addictive. The conversation that followed, 
however, committed a deeper transgression by raising questions about freedom and 
its proper limits and then leaving them unanswered, dangling in suspension for audi-
ences to contemplate on their own. 
 Witoelar begins by providing viewers with a summary of Ajidarma’s short story, 
“Telinga” (“Ear”), about a beautiful girl who gets a package from her boyfriend, who is 
at war, and finds a severed ear “with blood still on it.” Presently, “she receives another 
ear, then several, more and more,” and begins “stringing them up in her house, blood 
still dripping.” Ajidarma confirms that these ears belong to people who have heard 
something forbidden, presumably from “spies.” Witoelar then asks, “OK, but why do 
more and more [ears] come—because more and more people are having their ears 
cut off? More and more people hear news that’s not allowed to be heard?” Perhaps, 
Witoelar speculates, as “more and more people want to rebel . . . the eyes must be cut 
out, or simply the whole head [until] eventually his girlfriend is sent a head.” He ends 
by asking: “OK, what does all this mean?” 43 
 Until this point, the interview concerns a story about a soldier, a girlfriend, and 
severed body parts. The story’s implicit suggestion that soldiers of any nationality 
are committing actual atrocities is a risky topic of conversation. But an Indonesian 
audience would be in suspense, wondering whether Ajidarma will admit to criticizing 
Indonesia’s military. Defying this anticipation, Ajidarma neither confirms nor denies, 
but instead ventures into even more dangerous territory: “Yeah, it’s like this. As far 
as the concrete idea, why an ear, that is because of a news story published by [the 
magazine]  Jakarta-Jakarta sometime around 1992 that shocked me. At that time, the 
governor of East Timor . . . Mário Carascalão, received guests who were going to file a 
complaint. The article wrote that when four youth entered, two of these did not have 
ears. Cut off . . . These two lines hooked, stuck [ nyantel ] directly into my head.” 44 
 Through this conversational twist, an invisible political line has been crossed. 
Ajidarma has broached the taboo subject of East Timor and implied that the military 
is censoring information or committing atrocities—or both. Yet in keeping with the 
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conventions of the show, Ajidarma still avoids any direct challenge to the Suharto 
regime. For viewers asking whether he wrote the story to condemn either the military 
or government censorship, his answer is simply that he was inspired by the oddity of 
the situation. “So there are people who like to cut off ears, what does this mean?” the 
writer asks. “What’s the point? [Do they] think people whose ears are cut off like it?” 
He ends by saying: “I was amused by this, amused by sadism, by cruelty. And so this 
story.” Witoelar responds: “So, humor then.” 45 
 As Witoelar closes with the simple word, “humor,” sidestepping the author’s 
political agenda, the viewer is left with unanswered questions about ears and blood. 
Are soldiers committing atrocities? Is information being censored? What is it the gov-
ernment does not want the East Timorese, or other Indonesians, to hear? 
 At this juncture, the interview is producing an effect similar to that created by 
Goenawan Mohamad in his  Tempo essays, raising serious questions but leaving them 
unanswered. But then Witoelar goes further. With these disturbing implications still 
in the air, the discussion takes a new turn as he asks Ajidarma about freedom of 
speech—another subject that would have been particularly touchy at that time. “We 
are already free,” Ajidarma says in a surprising reply, and therefore “do not have to ask 
for freedom.” In this simple statement he takes the conversation in a philosophical 
but fundamentally subversive direction, casting freedom as a natural right, not some-
thing to be sought in increments from a controlling government. He is challenging 
the Suharto regime’s preferred understanding of freedom as conditional, a privilege 
to be granted or revoked. He then raises the stakes even higher by saying, “We earn 
our freedom as far as we struggle for it”—words that could almost be a call to arms. 46 
 Just when the conversation seems headed toward a controversial debate over 
“asking” versus “struggling,” Witoelar suddenly, cheerfully, pauses for commercials, 
promising to pick up the same point after the break. Arguably a more natural break-
ing point would have been just after his concluding statement on Ajidarma’s severed 
ear story: “So, humor, then.” As in other interviews, however, Witoelar pauses in the 
middle of an intensifying discussion, a choice that no doubt served SCTV’s economic 
imperative to hold the audience through the commercials. But then he never returns 
to the original subject, and therefore never finishes the conversation. 
 Why? Fear of government ire is plausible, but insufficient, given the temerity 
of the entire interview. Witoelar has offered another explanation for such decisions. 
In his memoir  Stealing Clarity from Confusion , he says he would consciously steer his 
interviews away from conclusion so as “not to claim the guest/host was smarter than 
the viewer.” Rather than delivering answers, he sought to encourage viewers to think 
for themselves. “Otherwise,” he explains, the show “would become indoctrinating.” 47 
As with Mohamad’s column Sidelines, the unanswered questions became threads left 
dangling in the country’s public discourse rather than tied neatly back into the state’s 
ordered construction of social reality. 
 Opening’s Closure 
 While political opening in the early 1990s helped transform public conversa-
tion from scripted to unpredictable, the regime’s tolerance for this transformation 
was short-lived. In September 1995, upon learning Witoelar’s next guest on  Per -
spektif would be Mochtar Lubis, the publisher of the banned newspaper  Indonesia Raya , 
government offi  cials forced SCTV to cancel the entire program. A key factor was the 
topic of the off ending interview: a crackdown on the print press that had begun the 
42 Chapter 2
previous June with the government’s unexpected decision to ban three popular news-
weeklies,  Tempo ,  Editor , and a tabloid named  Dë TIK . 
 The context for these bans was both political opening and an intraelite power 
struggle spilling into the media. After four years of relaxed controls, news outlets 
overall had become increasingly aggressive in reporting and commentary. But the 
boldest were exposing intraelite conflict and publishing exposés based on leaks from 
this same elite. The youngest of the three banned publications, the weekly tabloid 
 Dë TIK , had made its name through interviews with critics from within the military, 
revealing growing resentment over Suharto’s promotion of civilians to posts tradi-
tionally reserved for generals. Just before the bans,  Dë TIK had published a leak that 
implicated the president’s family in the Bapindo banking scandal. 48 
 With this confrontational reporting driving  Dë TIK ’s rapid growth,  Tempo and  Edi-
tor also became increasingly aggressive in their coverage of elite conflict. 49 All three 
began vying for interviews with political insiders critical of the government. They also 
reported on cover-ups protecting the regime, presidential succession, and the major 
loan scandals of the early 1990s. The relative freedom they had to report such stories 
was an encouraging sign that the government was serious in its political opening. 
 In the spring of 1994, however, a controversy developed between a Suharto favor-
ite, the minister of research and technology, B. J. Habibie, and the finance minis-
ter, Mar’ie Muhammad, over Habibie’s purchase of thirty-nine former East German 
warships. The transaction had sparked heated protest from Germany’s parliament 
over concerns that Indonesia would use the ships for human rights abuses in outly-
ing provinces. In Jakarta, Muhammad repeatedly rejected Habibie’s requisitions for 
expensive renovations, which required millions of dollars above the purchase price. 50 
 Significantly, as Duncan McCargo notes, news of this conflict emerged not from 
investigative reporting, but from infighting among the political elite. 51  Tempo broke the 
story, but by June, most of the national media had followed. Reflecting the regime’s 
rising displeasure, the information minister, Harmoko, summoned the editors of the 
Jakarta press to accuse them of denigrating the nation’s ideological principles and 
prohibit any further reporting on the warship purchase. 52 Yet media attention to the 
ministerial infighting continued. 
 On June 9, Suharto delivered a sharp reprimand during a speech opening the har-
bor for the new fleet. In an indirect reference to the media, he stated angrily that those 
“who half-understand the issue, then declare their opinions, have . . . pitted parties 
against each other . . . to the point of threatening [the nation’s] stability.” He con-
cluded, “If they cannot be warned, we will have to take steps.” 53 Following this speech, 
rumors began circulating that the government would act on this threat. Angered by 
 Tempo ’s report, Habibie prepared to file a million-dollar libel lawsuit. 54 But before he 
could follow through, on June 21, the Ministry of Information passed a decree revok-
ing  Tempo ’s SIUPP, along with the permits of  Editor and  Dë TIK . 55 
 The ministry claimed to be shutting down  Editor and  Dë TIK for technical viola-
tions.  Dë TIK , it said, had become a political tabloid, publishing general news with a 
license for crime reporting. But there was no clear explanation for  Tempo ’s closure. 56 
When pushed, Harmoko stated that  Tempo ’s reporting had the potential to ignite eth-
nic, religious, racial, or intergroup conflict, citing three articles and a political cartoon 
published years earlier. 57 
 The announcement sparked immediate protest. Journalists, students, artists, and 
members of the wider public joined employees of the banned weeklies in unprec-
edented demonstrations. One observer described a thousand people, “ignoring their 
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own safety,” protesting peacefully for days in “the biggest demonstrations held in 
Jakarta during the last ten years.” Similar protests took place in other cities, while 
“hundreds of non-governmental organizations, alternative youth and students’ orga-
nizations, [and] labor unions, along with domestic and foreign intellectuals” issued 
written declarations protesting the bans. 58 
 Leading intellectuals, such as academic Ashadi Siregar and artist Emha Ainun 
Najib, were among the most outspoken. Siregar proposed caustically to one group of 
protesters, “If we’re not allowed to report honest news, then let’s just consume lies.” 59 
Demonstrators carried placards condemning the bans and Harmoko’s role. After sev-
eral failed attempts to meet with Harmoko, one group sent 150 balloons to Allah to 
highlight the absurdity of their inability to communicate with their government. 60 
At a time when people were routinely arrested for such criticism, letters expressing 
disapproval of the government’s actions poured into media outlets, while intellectuals 
submitted unsolicited articles condemning the bans. 61 Several advocacy organizations 
sent faxes directly to President Suharto, the vice president, the attorney general, and 
the armed forces commander, arguing that the bans would instill a sense of power-
lessness among members of the media, hampering their ability to inform the public. 62 
In a bold televised statement, attorney Todung Mulya Lubis called the bans “a naked 
violation of the law.” 63 
 “History Had Begun to Change” 
 Objections to the crackdown on  Perspektif were equally impassioned and equally 
ineff ectual in infl uencing the regime. 64 At fi rst, surviving outlets spoke out. The daily 
 Media Indonesia , in an unusually frank editorial, stated, “A climate like this is truly 
unhealthy. The press must not be paralyzed by constant fear.” The editorial warned 
further that the Ministry of Information should not take for granted its power to 
revoke licenses as a weapon for winning confl icts with the media. Abuse of this 
authority, it declared, “is too expensive for democracy and openness.” 65 In an editorial 
for the magazine  Panji Masyarakat , Arbi Sanit praised the print press as a channel for 
conveying the public’s “aspirations” and cautioned that the bans would prove danger-
ous in a country where demands for greater democracy had grown “increasingly loud 
and clear.” 66 On the streets, demonstrators from other media outlets held up banners 
saying, “Next Will Come Our Turn to be Banned.” 67 
 In the week following the bans, protests around the country received wide cov-
erage. But by the next week, the media stopped this reporting after the Ministry of 
Information warned editors to “cease blowing up the issue.” Such coverage, the min-
istry explained, was making people “confused.” 68 These warnings were effective, and 
observers reported a climate of fear developing in the nation’s newsrooms. Surviving 
outlets ultimately redoubled self-censorship, prompting one journalist to compare the 
industry to an “ostrich.” 69 
 But in a surprising break from the past, the bans’ victims—publishers, employ-
ees, street hawkers, even subscribers—fought back, staging protests, filing lawsuits, 
launching an independent journalists’ association, and inspiring new opposition to 
the regime. In attempting to reassert control, the regime inadvertently set the stage 
for further confrontation in the courts, on the streets, and inside university campuses. 
 Although this pressure was insufficient to reverse the government’s decision, 
commentators believed that the heated response by fellow media and public alike 
marked a significant change from past resignation.  Tempo ’s editor in chief, Goenawan 
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Mohamad, noted that past bans had led media outlets to lie low until the confrontation 
passed, afraid of becoming the next target. Some survivors would even applaud the 
government’s decision, happy to have fewer competitors. Then, “isolated and unde-
fended,” the banned publications would proceed to the Ministry of Information—the 
same ministry that had shut them down—and beg for a new license, fear driving them 
to pay large bribes to facilitate this process. Their licenses restored, the banned pub-
lications would start up again, “as if their feet were not bound and their mouths not 
gagged.” Each time, Mohamad concluded, “amnesia follows, even forgives,” allowing 
“the arbitrariness of what happened [to escape] the loathing that might prevent it 
from occurring again.” 70 
 This time, Mohamad said, the bans led to neither silence nor the usual “amnesia, 
trembling, and indifference.” Instead, protests emerged across Indonesia, marked by a 
new determination that made the government nervous. Observing continued defiance 
in the face of violent crackdowns, Mohamad concluded that anger over the bans had 
become “public property.” History, he said, “had begun to change.” 71 
 “Democracy Is Dead” 
 Exploring the sources of this anger and determination illustrates the extent to 
which history had begun to change. A key element was profound disappointment. 
The 1994 media closures hit when expectations for the future were running high in 
Indonesia amid economic growth, political stability, and foreign investment. Despite 
its brevity, Suharto’s new policy of “openness” had made a tangible impact and gener-
ated widespread hope that this political trend would continue. 
 Dashed expectations in any situation can be a powerful impetus to action. In 
Indonesia, belief that the country was developing into a first-world democracy, able 
to compete in a global economy, was accompanied by tense anticipation that Suharto, 
already in his early seventies, might allow a peaceful transition to a new administra-
tion in the next election. 
 Alarm over the regime’s backtracking gave the bans significance beyond concerns 
over displaced workers and lost investments. Foreign observers expressed disbelief 
and warned of diminished investor confidence and damage to Indonesia’s reputa-
tion abroad. 72 The most anguished statements, however, came from Indonesians who 
flooded media offices with calls and letters expressing everything from bewilderment 
to outrage. One fax read, “I am disturbed, sad and sick at heart. Opening and democ-
racy are already gone in this beloved Republic.” In an emotional speech before demon-
strators, writer Umar Kayam asked, “If we still have bans, where is democracy?” As if 
answering this rhetorical question, a banner held by demonstrators read, “Democracy 
is dead.” 73 
 The bans also hit as a new middle class was emerging, anxious for opportunities 
in a climate of economic growth and political openness. Poised precariously between 
the wealthy, well-connected elite and the country’s vast underclass, the middle sectors 
of society depended on the level playing field and legal protections provided by the 
rule of law.  Tempo itself had become symbolic of the middle class’s rising status 
as the country developed into a modern nation. Historian Onghokham (Ong Hok 
Ham) argued that the public’s reaction represented “an important test . . . which 
validates the role, function and mere existence of the middle class in Indonesia,” 
since this class “needs information, [and] will never develop in a totalitarian sys-
tem.” 74 That class, reported Arief Budiman, included “intellectuals, students and 
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other fighters for democracy [who] took to the streets.” 75 In sum, one of the most 
important breaks from the past was the public’s reaction: viewing the bans as an 
attack not only on the publications but on the entire middle class that threatened to 
derail the country’s political and economic advances. 
 Another factor inspiring the new determination was the surprising response of 
the banned publications’ owners and personnel, particularly from  Tempo and  Dë TIK . 
Only five days after the ministry’s decree, starting the cynical pattern that Mohamad 
describes, regime cronies prepared to turn the closures into market opportunity. 76 The 
regime’s restriction on the number of publishing permits, to about 264 in 1991, made 
media ownership a lucrative rent for privileged members of this de facto publishing 
“cartel,” including  Tempo . Consequently, new investments in the publishing industry 
required acquisition of an existing license. 77 
 Seizing the chance to gain access to this protected market, Habibie was planning 
to not only sue  Tempo but also require that it replace its editors and shareholders 
before resuming publication. 78 According to several sources, he told  Tempo represen-
tatives to approach one of Suharto’s closest friends, timber tycoon Mohamad “Bob” 
Hasan, to discuss a business relationship. 79 The information minister, Harmoko, 
moreover, was reportedly soliciting cash bribes and company shares for granting new 
print press licenses, while Suharto’s son-in-law, Prabowo Subianto, was also maneu-
vering to control  Tempo . 80 
 A few weeks after the bans, the government offered  Tempo ,  Dë TIK , and  Editor 
the opportunity to obtain new licenses, conditional upon replacing management 
and shareholders. 81 In effect, the newsweeklies faced the same political and practical 
choices that had confronted all print media since 1978. To stay in business was to 
compromise. To resist would allow their publications to “die” and be replaced by oth-
ers that were crony controlled. 82 
 Each journal responded differently to the dilemma. Few among  Editor ’s staff 
joined the protests staged by  Dë TIK and  Tempo employees, some expressing irritation 
at being grouped with the others in the crackdown. 83 Recognizing the closures as a 
market opportunity,  Editor ’s representatives accepted the government’s conditions for 
a new SIUPP. By January 1995,  Editor resumed publishing under the new name  Tiras 
with start-up capital from the minister of manpower, Abdul Latief—increasing regime 
ownership of media. 84 By contrast,  Tempo and  Dë TIK sent delegations to meet with leg-
islators and members of the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnasham) 
to demand, unsuccessfully, restoration of their licenses. 85 In the following weeks,  Tem-
po ’s parent company, PT Grafiti Pers, dispatched representatives to negotiate a new 
license, and the magazine’s board of directors talked with outside investors. 86 
 Ultimately, however,  Tempo and  Dë TIK refused to replace their editors or share-
holders. Nor did they sign any statements promising to circumscribe future reporting 
to obtain new licenses.  Dë TIK ’s largest shareholder, Surya Paloh, who suffered an 
earlier ban in 1987, said he was “tired of building up papers only to have them banned 
or beaten around.” 87 Mohamad, noting that  Tempo employees had held a majority of 
shares since its inception, refused to allow his magazine to be taken over by new 
investors and bridled at pressure to replace senior staff. “Personally,” he commented, 
“rather than give in to such pressure, it would be better if  Tempo were not revived.” 88 
 After these decisions,  Tempo ’s largest investor negotiated with regime crony, Bob 
Hasan, to launch a new publication called  Gatra , and thirty-five of  Tempo ’s journal-
ists joined the staff. 89 An even larger group, however, rejected this opportunity. They 
worked instead with Mohamad to start a new magazine, but were ultimately denied 
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a license. 90 Similarly, Eros Djarot and his  Dë TIK staff launched a parallel publication 
using an existing license, but immediately lost it when the Association of Indonesian 
Journalists (PWI) withdrew its approval. 91 
 The Founding of AJI 
 Reacting to the regime’s apparent success in crushing independent journalism 
through this maneuvering, many of the country’s leading journalists broke precedent 
in another way, joining forces to take a principled, potentially dangerous stand for 
media freedom. A key factor prompting this development was the response of the 
PWI—the country’s sole journalists’ association. Rather than defend the journalists 
it claimed to represent, the association stated that it “could understand” the govern-
ment’s actions. 
 A book on the bans explained that it was this final betrayal by the PWI that 
gave birth to the new professional association, the Alliance of Independent Journalists 
(AJI). 92 While few, if any, had expected the PWI to condemn the Ministry of Informa-
tion outright, its response seemed excessively deferential. On July 5, 1994, a del-
egation claiming to represent the country’s journalists delivered a letter of protest 
bearing 357 signatures to the PWI’s leadership. 93 In early August, the group launched 
a campaign called Aksi Tagih Janji (Action to Demand Fulfillment of a Promise) to 
hold the PWI to account. 94 Finally, on August 7, more than eighty journalists and 
 Tempo columnists met outside Jakarta in Sirnagalih to plan a course of action for con-
tinued opposition to the bans. 95 
 The meeting produced a statement, later called the Sirnagalih Declaration, that 
condemned “all forms of interference . . . which limited freedom to express opinion[s] 
and the rights of citizens to obtain information.” It further rejected the  wadah tung-
gal “concept of a sole authorized professional association for journalists.” 96 This last 
clause, backed by the founding of AJI, was an attack on the PWI’s right to be that asso-
ciation. But it also challenged the New Order’s entire system of corporatist control 
through sectoral representation. 
 The new association “promised to be more in solidarity towards colleagues that 
face bans.” It rejected the paternalistic attitude of owners claiming to have a greater 
responsibility to protect their employees’ jobs than to protest crackdowns. 97 Their real 
responsibility, AJI argued, was to take a tougher stance against the bans. 
 While AJI’s official membership would remain small under Suharto, journalists 
now had a professional association with no compromising links to the government. 98 
AJI also began publishing an underground newsletter— Independen —that soon claimed 
ninety members of parliament as regular subscribers. 99 In the news vacuum left by the 
closure of  Tempo ,  Dë TIK , and  Editor ,  Independen developed a loyal following for covering 
sensitive issues, such as the sizable media interests held by the information minister, 
Harmoko, and his relatives. 100 
 Within a year, however, police raided AJI’s offices, seizing its computers, files, fax 
machine, money, and correspondence. On March 17, 1995, plainclothes intelligence 
officers arrested three members for violating Article 19(1) of the Basic Press Law, 
which prohibited the use of the media for private interests, and criminal statutes out-
lawing defamation of the president, the spread of hatred against the government, and 
instigation of animosity among the public. 101 
 A criminal court sentenced the three AJI members to long jail terms, and the 
attorney general banned  Independen . The PWI then aided this government crackdown 
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by attempting to ostracize all those associated with AJI—evicting thirteen journal-
ists who had signed the Sirnagalih Declaration from its Jakarta branch and creating 
a blacklist of those associated with the three banned publications. Within a few 
days, the PWI’s Jakarta branch summoned editors from eight publications deemed 
“critical” to demand that they fire the thirteen journalists it had just expelled. 102 As 
this pressure forced AJI members from their jobs, a new slang word,  mengAJIkan 
(to AJI-fy), gained currency as a term for blacklisting someone for defending freedom 
of the press. 103 
 Landmark Lawsuit 
 Under these pressures, support for AJI moved deeper underground. Simultaneously, 
however, the movement began fi ghting on another front: in open confrontation with the 
regime through the courts. The challenge began in September 1994, when Goenawan 
Mohamad and forty-three  Tempo journalists used a new state court, the Pengadilan 
Tata Usaha Negara (PTUN), to sue the minister of information for damages from the 
arbitrary revocation of their license. 104 A few weeks later, more than a thousand media 
employees, newsagents, and subscribers fi led their own class-action suits at the Cen-
tral Jakarta District Court, calling for judicial review of the 1984 licensing decree on 
the grounds that it confl icted with the Basic Press Law. The fi rst suit was lodged by 
more than thirty nonjournalist employees of  Tempo , joined by several newsagents and 
street hawkers, demanding compensation for two years’ lost income. 105 The second 
group consisted of nearly one thousand former subscribers and 121 journalists who 
had worked for the closed publications. The subscribers complained that the bans had 
robbed them of “the right to obtain objective, quality information,” and the journal-
ists argued that they had lost their ability “to fully pursue their function as agents 
of social control (over government), as is demanded by the Basic Press Law.” 106 In 
addition to their call for judicial review of the 1984 licensing decree, this group also 
demanded nullifi cation of the 1994 decree revoking the licenses of  Tempo ,  Editor , and 
 Dë TIK . 
 The Central Jakarta District Court refused to hear any cases, but the PTUN—
a court created specifically to allow citizens to challenge government decisions—
accepted the  Tempo journalists’ suit. News outlets barred from reporting on street 
protests now moved to cover this developing story. As public attention shifted to the 
suit, the case became a “national obsession.” 107 
 The  Tempo journalists protested lost income and arbitrary decision-making that 
ended their jobs without due process. But they also claimed damages from less tangible 
losses, including their constitutional right to freedom of expression, “the opportunity 
to enrich the life of a nation,” and loss of a forum “to disseminate objective informa-
tion, channel the public’s aspirations, and [impose] constructive social control.” 108 
 Plaintiffs were further emboldened by the moral imperative of their cause. In 
a collection of essays explaining the decision to sue, Ahmad Taufik, one of the AJI 
members later sentenced to three years in prison, explained, “Maybe because my 
hopes were wrong, anger in me burst forth like a tidal wave. . . . Banning is the mur-
der of press creativity, the revocation of information choice needed by the public.” 109 
Although several expressed an almost quixotic faith in the courts, many plaintiffs 
insisted that winning was not what mattered, with larger principles at stake. Most 
wanted merely to demonstrate that the government could no longer “make decisions 
as they please, without going through legal channels.” 110 One editor joined the suit to 
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oppose the “desecration of human rights” represented by the bans. 111 Others spoke 
of a desire to gain moral strength, regardless of the outcome. The hunger for this 
strength, a photographer said, must overcome the fear of losing one’s livelihood. 112 
Editor Ivan Haris admitted that he was also “afraid of being beaten by soldiers, and 
worse, then being arrested and tortured.” Yet, like others, he felt an obligation to 
future generations, asking, “What will my children say if I stay quiet?” 113 
 Over Harmoko’s strenuous objections, the PTUN launched eight months of delib-
erations. Until the final hour, the  Tempo plaintiffs’ expectations were low. The day 
before the decision, Mohamad learned from a court insider that the judges planned to 
rule in the minister’s favor. 114 But on May 3, 1995, the chief justice, Benjamin Mang-
koedilaga, announced that Harmoko had acted in an unlawful and “authoritarian” 
manner by revoking  Tempo ’s license. 115 The verdict, which nullified the revocation, was 
based on the finding that canceling the license did amount to banning the magazine, 
something expressly forbidden in the Basic Press Law. The court ruled further that 
Harmoko had not followed due process, escalating suddenly from a first to a final 
warning. 116 
 The plaintiffs were nearly as shocked by the victory as they had been by the 
bans; their disbelief was redoubled by the stipulation that the minister must cover 
their court costs. Skeptical of “the independence of Indonesia’s judicial institutions,” 
Mohamad and the other plaintiffs were slow to grasp that the judges were ruling 
in  Tempo ’s favor. “For almost an hour we listened,” he said, and “only then [did we 
understand]. . . . I shook hands and had my hand shaken, hugged and was hugged by 
our lawyers, countless friends, including those who sobbed openly, or tried to hold 
back tears.” 117 
 The ruling prompted loud cheering and applause, with Mohamad praising Chief 
Justice Mangkoedilaga and his colleagues, reminding supporters, “what has to be 
celebrated is not the victory of [the plaintiffs], but rather the courage of the three 
judges.” 118 He also cautioned their ruling would become “an empty victory unless we 
can make use of it. . . . If the press shows a small portion of courage, it will take up 
this issue. Now is the time to do it.” 119 
 While none of the surviving media outlets answered Mohamad’s call to push for 
abolishing the 1984 decree, most gave prominent coverage to the PTUN’s ruling. 120 
More cause for celebration came when the plaintiffs, facing an appeal by Harmoko, 
won another surprising victory before the next-highest court, the Pengadilan Tinggi 
Tata Usaha Negara Jakarta. But on June 13, 1996, the Supreme Court overturned both 
lower court rulings, finding that the information minister’s cancelation of  Tempo ’s 
license did not conflict with the Basic Press Law. 121 The high court not only nullified 
the PTUN’s landmark ruling, it also left news outlets in a weaker legal position than 
before, leading Mohamad to declare: “Today is [the day] the Supreme Court legalized 
repression of the press.” 122 
 The ruling denied the plaintiffs the opportunity to appeal. Despite the historic 
nature of the two-year battle,  Tempo ’s license revocation was final. While the maga-
zine’s demise inspired emotional eulogies proclaiming its irreplaceability, in the end, 
the country adjusted, and the new, crony-owned  Gatra had little trouble filling its 
predecessor’s slot at newsstands. 
 To eradicate the memory of  Tempo ’s lower court victories, the regime pressured 
the media to stop covering the subject, barring SCTV from airing an interview with 
the PTUN’s now-famous chief justice. 123 Other intimidation followed. Armed with 
Article 510 of the criminal code, stipulating that groups of more than five people 
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must obtain a permit for a public gathering, police began raiding seminars, religious 
events, lawyer-client conferences, and even a poetry reading. 124 Surveillance cameras 
and undercover officers kept track of who was attending potentially subversive events. 
In one instance, police jailed a pregnant woman simply for speaking up about a police 
assault on another woman at an earlier rally. 125 Intelligence officers also arrested a 
British schoolteacher for attending a discussion on the bans, subjected her to a harsh 
three-day interrogation, and eventually deported her. “Although I didn’t utter a word 
during the meeting,” she said, “my attendance seemed . . . sufficient evidence that I 
was a ‘subversive.’” 126 
 Challenging “Unity and Stability” 
 With this heightened repression, anger over the bans faded from public view, 
challenging the proposition that history had begun to change. Yet there were several 
indications that the new “determination” Mohamad described did not fade but grew 
stronger, at least among a subset of journalists. 127 One was ongoing defi ance despite 
repercussions. The renegade journalists’ association, AJI, continued its activities 
even after the government outlawed  Independen and sent three members to prison for 
involvement in its publication. Among these activities was the unrepentant launch of 
 Suara Independen , which, like its predecessor, was unlicensed and critical of the govern-
ment. Former  Tempo staff  also revived an old magazine,  D&R ( Detektif & Romantika ), 
owned by  Tempo ’s parent company, and turned it into a critical political weekly. 
 Other journalists started producing unlicensed opposition publications on the 
internet, while email-based news networks kept activists informed and in contact. 128 
Mohamad directed his attention to new projects, including establishing the election 
watchdog the Independent Election Monitoring Committee, which arguably posed a 
greater threat to Suharto than the suppressed magazine,  Tempo . Finally,  Tempo itself 
stubbornly persevered online through  Tempo Interaktif , which was not only more 
openly critical of the regime than its print version but also an important information 
source for its audience of students and other activists. 
 Wimar Witoelar exercised similar defiance. With its cancelation,  Perspektif was 
effectively banned as a television show. But it gained new life elsewhere as outraged 
fans convinced Witoelar to take it on the road, hosting live shows in cities across 
the archipelago. Witoelar also syndicated a radio talk show,  Perspektif Baru , carried 
by stations nationwide, and published in more than two dozen regional newspapers. 
Producers were pressured to stop broadcasting the new program, demonstrating 
Suharto’s continued control. 
 More significantly,  Perspektif ’s influence continued to expand through imitation as 
similar talk shows on radio and television survived and new ones were launched, gain-
ing in number and popularity even on stations owned by Suharto’s family. 129 When 
the regime forced stations to pull interviews or even, as with  Perspektif , cancel entire 
programs, these decisions simply blocked one broadcast or ended a single show. 130 
They could not reduce the appeal of the format or effectively discourage other produc-
ers from launching similar shows. In effect, profit repeatedly trumped fear. 
 With continued resistance, a new rhetoric of opposition emerged, tying together 
a growing activist movement committed to long-term change. The lawsuit itself set in 
motion an educational process within the media and among the public by widening 
knowledge of the law and its manipulation by Suharto, inspiring discussions of the 
bans’ legal basis. For example, the plaintiffs’ charges of arbitrariness called attention 
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to the government’s ability to circumvent due process, sparking criticism that the 
regime had bypassed the courts and disregarded the National Press Council. All these 
accusations discredited New Order claims to have developed Indonesia into a  negara 
hukum , or “country based on the rule of law.” 
 The government’s unity rhetoric began generating an increasingly articulate 
counterdiscourse that subverted the integralist “Pancasila jargon” used against free 
speech. 131 One commentator asked, “In a country of Pancasila democracy, why is 
speaking the truth outlawed?” 132 Others challenged the claim that bridling the media 
was necessary to national stability, and some charged the government with undermin-
ing the very stability it claimed to protect. 133 
 Though cautious, these statements resonated with the unspoken hypothesis devel-
oping among elites that the bans signaled the beginning of the New Order’s decline. 
Some anticipated that a stifled media would allow increased corruption, which in turn 
would weaken the government. 134 Taking a broad view, historian Onghokham warned 
that the closures would discourage investment and thus damage economic develop-
ment, an important pillar of Suharto’s legitimacy. 135 The most explicit prediction of 
the regime’s decline, however, came from columnist Julia Suryakusuma, who warned, 
“Fear generates fear. The need to revitalize fear through bannings and beatings indi-
cates that the powers that be are beginning to fear their own shadows. In the end, the 
bannings are a tacit recognition of the power of the word, and a tacit admission of the 
fragility of power, in an era of succession in Indonesia.” 136 
 
 In hindsight, it is tempting to view Suharto’s fall in 1998 as the realization of such 
predictions. However, if we examine the interval between the Supreme Court ruling 
against  Tempo and Suharto’s resignation two years later, any causal links between the 
media bans and the regime’s downfall seem tenuous. After the Asian fi nancial crisis 
undermined Suharto’s legitimacy, the triumph of the  reformasi movement might seem 
a logical consequence of the country’s growing rejection of New Order repression and 
the regime’s own internal decay. The 1994 bans did contribute to both, sparking new 
opposition to authoritarian controls and accelerating this decay after the media lost 
virtually all ability to impose accountability on public offi  cials. “Suharto lost power 
in May 1998 partly as a result of his failure to listen to criticism and his intolerance 
of dissenting voices,” argues Duncan McCargo. “The policy of ‘killing the messenger’ 
seen in the 1994 bannings marked the beginning of the end for Suharto and the New 
Order.” 137 
 Growing access to foreign broadcasts and the privatization of television also 
helped undermine the regime’s system of control. The new genres of this period, from 
soap operas to political talk shows, contradicted the New Order’s integralist vision by 
challenging its immersion of individuals into a collective national body, its celebration 
of the family as a harmonious microcosm of the nation, and its assertion of consensus 
as the aim of all public conversation. These challenges helped unravel the regime’s 
tidy integration of individual, family, and nation. 
 On the other hand, Suharto had already survived three decades of rising cor-
ruption, low transparency, and periodic surges in opposition. During Asia’s finan-
cial boom before 1997, even with high levels of graft, wealth in Indonesia increased 
and the middle class grew, reinforcing the regime’s legitimacy. Its success over three 
decades in absorbing independent civil institutions also left would-be reformers with 
few channels for protest. While frustration among Indonesia’s media-oriented middle 
class did explain, in part, the unprecedented public protest against the closures of 
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 Tempo ,  Dë TIK , and  Editor , this sector was still neither big enough nor rich enough to 
launch a serious challenge to Suharto’s New Order. 
 Nor is it clear that, before the crisis, the middle class had sufficient will to try. 
As late as August 1996, after a regime crackdown on demonstrations in support of 
opposition leader Megawati Sukarnoputri, Goenawan Mohamad was still pessimistic 
over whether any group in Indonesia was willing, much less able, to sustain a reform 
movement. He felt the middle class was too enamored with the country’s new, ram-
pant materialism to become the base of such a movement. 138 It took an economic 
crisis a year and a half later to jolt a dormant, scattered opposition into action. As 
Vince Boudreau argues, it was the fiscal crisis, specifically the 1997 currency devalua-
tions, that “produced what no opposition had so far achieved: coordinated and multi-
sectoral grievances across Indonesia.” 139 
 Nevertheless, the regime’s bans sparked a movement focused on media freedom 
and independence that would significantly influence an emerging anti-Suharto oppo-
sition and, in turn, the character of the transition that followed. The bans forged a 
new solidarity between the shuttered publications and the public they had served. 
Mobilization continued through the fledgling AJI, whose members defied the govern-
ment prohibition of alternative professional associations and continued to influence 
the reform process after Suharto’s fall. Equally important,  Tempo ’s lawsuit opened 
government policy to unprecedented legal scrutiny that posed a new challenge to one 
pillar of the regime’s legitimacy—its claim to the rule of law. The two court rulings 
for the plaintiffs, in turn, were a surprising break from the predetermined outcomes 
characteristic of the country’s judicial process. Though the regime ultimately won 
the case in the Supreme Court, the lower court verdicts were, in effect, the most pub-
lic defiance of the fixed contests of authoritarianism in decades. These verdicts also 
foreshadowed protests against the engineering of the 1997 national elections and the 
subsequent demonstrations that pushed Suharto from power. 
 Perhaps the most significant unexpected development, however, was the refusal 
of  Tempo and  Dë TIK to accept the government’s terms for reopening, eschewing the 
corrupt bargain of engineered contestation in yet another arena—the country’s pro-
tected media market. 
 These decisions, moreover, established an important precedent in the press com-
munity as  Tempo and  Dë TIK owners gave up a share of that market to lay bare the 
unspoken reality of media ownership: survival, with its lucrative rewards, required col-
lusion. Democratization, by contrast, would require independence.  Tempo and  Dë TIK , 
along with the members of AJI who risked blacklisting and prison, set a standard for 
both owners and journalists, eroding the rationalizations that had made capitulation 
in the name of survival acceptable. 
 The legal dramas that followed also shook the regime and subjected its media 
controls to unprecedented scrutiny. Over time, the lawsuits gave a nascent democratic 
opposition the opportunity to develop both a reform agenda and a coherent critique 
of the regime’s use and abuse of the law. The sustained resistance of the new activists 
mobilized by the 1994 bans also influenced later events, helping normalize and even 
legitimate dissent. Even before Suharto stepped down, it was already unfashionable 
to be anti- reformasi . By the time Suharto’s successor, B. J. Habibie, began arresting 
demonstrators in late 1998, serving time in jail had become a badge of honor, making 
this new repression unsustainable. Moreover, groups fighting for media reform allied 
with other activist networks, including student supporters of opposition figures. Sig-
nificantly, when students began the demonstrations that evolved into a broad-based 
52 Chapter 2
reform movement, they regularly communicated with and sought advice from activist 
elements in the media. 140 When the demonstrators finally forced Suharto from office, 
freedom of speech was one of their chief demands. 
 While we can only speculate on how a reform movement might have progressed 
without the galvanizing effect of the 1994 bans, the protests and lawsuits they inspired 
became important forums for articulating both a platform of opposition to the New 
Order and a critique of the regime’s system for controlling information. Although 
there is no clear causal connection between this public outcry and Suharto’s even-
tual resignation, the anger had a transformative effect in the emergence of a new 
consciousness among Indonesians who later formed the backbone of the  reformasi 
movement. 
 In the process, the bans helped pave the way for democratic reform to become 
the dominant agenda of those seeking change after the Asian financial crisis hit. This 
new core of activists was dedicated to freedom of expression and fair contestation, 
positioned to influence the direction the country took as it weathered the collapse of 
the New Order. 
 Chapter Three 
 Suharto’s Fall 
 Because we are silenced 
and you never shut up . . . 
 Because we are threatened 
and you impose your will by force . . . 
therefore we say NO to you. 
 Because we are not allowed to choose 
and you can do what you like . . . 
 Because we wear only sandals 
and you use your rifl es freely . . . 
 Because we have to be polite 
and you have the prisons . . . 
therefore NO and NO to you. 
 Because we are like a fl owing river 
and you are a stone without a heart 
the water will wear away the stone. 
 —W. S. Rendra, “Water Will Wear Away the Stone,” 
delivered at Trisakti University, in response to 
the shooting of four students on May 12, 1998 
 With the ban of newsweeklies  Tempo ,  Editor , and  Dë TIK in June 1994, Indonesia’s 
brief political opening came to an abrupt close, and constraints on civil society tight-
ened. The country had begun to change, but there was little evidence in the public 
sphere. Throughout his reign, President Suharto’s legitimacy had rested on providing 
order, stability, and economic development. As long as he appeared to deliver on these 
grounds, opposition forces had difficulty questioning his authority. But in 1997, the 
Asian economic crisis hit Indonesia with devastating force, undermining his regime’s 
claim to all three accomplishments and creating an opportunity for a student-led 
reform movement to challenge his continued rule. 
 This chapter tells the story of this challenge and Suharto’s subsequent fall from 
power. But it also looks critically at the complex and often contradictory nature of the 
media’s relationship to the student movement. Complicating its reciprocal nature was 
a division between mainstream outlets, which remained cautious to the end, relying 
upon the sacrifices of student demonstrators to win them greater freedom of expres-
sion, and more critical publications forced underground by the bans, such as  Tempo , 
whose martyrdom and continued resistance set a standard for students as well as fel-
low journalists. This dissident movement, led by media activists, further influenced 
students via collaboration with nongovernmental organizations that themselves 
recruited from campuses. 1 By branching out into new terrain, such as poll watching, 
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the movement also made fair elections a primary focus for students and other reform 
leaders. Through these relationships, both freedom of expression and transparent 
electoral contests became key objectives for the emerging  reformasi movement—clear 
priorities that carried over into the postauthoritarian period and had a significant 
impact on the trajectory of the transition. 
 Movement Before the Movement 
 In the early 1990s, national debate over the media’s proper role in a specifi cally 
Indonesian democracy regained prominence; it was then silenced in the crackdown 
following the 1994 bans. With the approach of the 1997 parliamentary elections, 
repression escalated to include raids on public gatherings, particularly those related to 
election monitoring, human rights, and the opposition leader and daughter of Presi-
dent Sukarno, Megawati Sukarnoputri. 2 A pro-Megawati speech at one demonstration, 
for example, brought a member of parliament nine months in prison for “insulting the 
President, armed forces and other public institutions.” 3 Such prosecutions were also 
noteworthy for reviving the draconian antisubversion law banning “any activity which 
directly or indirectly can infl uence state policy and its implementation.” 4 
 In this climate, the most visible mediators of public discourse—the news outlets 
that had survived the bans—became cautious to the point of a painful self-censorship. 
Following the bans,  Tempo ’s editor in chief, Goenawan Mohamad, had foreseen a process 
of “forgetting”—that is, widespread acceptance of a corrupt bargain that would “make 
the victims lose their will to say ‘no’ to the injustice” of the government’s actions. “High 
wages, job security, opportunities to advance—along with fear—can indeed mesmer-
ize,” he said, “until the victims themselves lose their perspective as victims, until what’s 
fair and unfair get mixed up in their heads, until they themselves become irritated at 
being reminded of how important self-worth, solidarity and freedom are for humanity.” 5 
Indeed, the bans quashed the critical reporting fostered by the regime’s earlier opening, 
and much of the media continued on as if nothing had changed. 
 But beneath this surface of compliance, journalistic resistance continued in ways 
both symbolic and concrete to shape future events. In concrete terms, such dissent 
enlarged the activist community who first articulated the civil rights discourse that 
would be critical to the later transition. The defiant stance of this community had 
symbolic import that valorized individual sacrifice and risk-taking in the name of a 
greater cause—freedom of speech—and elevated that cause to become a defining issue 
of the emerging, student-led  reformasi movement. 
 Much of this valorization came through ascent of a rhetoric of political martyrdom 
introduced by victims of the media bans and later picked up by students and main-
stream media. First voiced in street protests, this discourse grew in reach and force 
during  Tempo ’s protracted legal battle to reverse revocation of its license. Ultimately, 
through language and symbolic action,  Tempo ’s advocates transformed an impersonal 
institution, a suppressed newsweekly, into a still-warm body that represented the 
hope of greater democracy. 6 In effect, they transmuted a banned magazine into a 
national martyr. 
 With ritual and rhetoric, the press community mourned  Tempo as an anthropo-
morphized icon of media freedom. The journalist Ahmad Taufik, for example, called 
the ban “murder” and convened funeral rites for the newly embodied victim, using the 
Islamic prayer Salat al-Janazah in a public ceremony. 7 Media activists, students, and 
artists also incorporated rituals of mourning into protest activities, such as carrying 
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funeral biers in marches and flying flags at half-mast. 8 Finally, activists wrote essays 
that were tantamount to eulogies, mourning the passing of the magazine as if it were 
a martyred leader. 9 
 Daniel Dhakidae, a writer for  Kompas , injected perhaps the most vivid language 
of martyrdom into this discourse, calling the bans an “execution . . . a felony, the 
murder of the right to speak, murder of the right to do business.” He condemned the 
regime’s methods for seducing owners of banned publications “to sell their souls for 
new permits.” 10 Students urged the owners not to capitulate, and  Dë TIK ’s and  Tempo ’s 
refusal to compromise won them widespread recognition as heroes, inspiring songs 
and poems, notably “The Ballad of Unchecked Arrogance” by Y. Soesilo—a somewhat 
sardonic but ultimately upbeat tribute to  Tempo . 11 
 More broadly, a discourse of courage and principle evolved out of the court bat-
tles and prison sentences that protesters now faced. Young journalists in particular 
were suddenly prepared to sacrifice their careers in order to, as Goenawan Mohamad 
put it, “say ‘no’ to kissing the ass of Satan.” Students, a significant share of  Tempo ’s 
readership, embraced this discourse, summarized in the magazine’s manifesto  Why 
We are Filing Suit : “Freedom indeed carries expensive risks, but the choice is not 
negotiable.” 12 
 While casting  Tempo as a murdered martyr was a key discursive element in the 
resistance, more concrete was the stubborn perseverance of the renegade journalists’ 
association, AJI, in meeting, recruiting, and launching an underground press with its 
newsletter  Independen and, after  Independen ’s ban,  Suara Independen . 13 Internet provid-
ers made the online publication of  Suara Independen and a half dozen other illicit news 
bulletins possible through email lists such as Apakabar, reaching thousands of readers 
and surprisingly difficult to censor. In mid-1996, police did arrest a university lecturer 
for printing and xeroxing an emailed report, and the military assigned intelligence 
agents “to search office by office, editor by editor” for the culpable internet-based 
journalists. 14 Nonetheless, this clandestine circulation continued, frustrating govern-
ment intervention. 
 Former  Tempo journalists also maintained resistance through above-ground pub-
lications. 15 Without awaiting official clearance, in March 1996, one group launched 
a web publication named  Tempo Interaktif , whose first edition broached the sensitive 
subject of a privileged “national car” project run by Suharto’s son. 16 Other  Tempo 
alumni revived a defunct entertainment magazine,  Detektif & Romantika ( D&R ), trans-
forming it into a hard-edged news weekly. Journalists blacklisted for their AJI affilia-
tion continued their careers by writing for  D&R under pseudonyms. Although its chief 
editor once insisted that “we did not design the magazine to oppose the government,” 
the initials  D&R came to stand not for  Detektif & Romantika but rather for  Demokrasi & 
Reformasi —the catchwords of the anti-Suharto movement. 17 Living up to its opposi-
tion image, the magazine developed an increasingly adversarial stance yet escaped 
government censure for nearly its entire run before Suharto’s fall. 
 Nongovernmental organizations—such as the Legal Aid Institute, the Indonesian 
Forum for the Environment, and the Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy—also 
maintained their activist campaigns through this period. Though their programs had 
clear political overtones, the state made few attempts to restrain them. One member 
of the Institute for Policy Research and Advocacy speculated that the regime’s toler-
ance reflected their minimal impact beyond Jakarta’s narrow political elite, amounting 
to little more than “turbulence in a glass” that kept middle- and upper-class activists 
occupied in harmless opposition activities. 18 
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 Simultaneously, the media’s contribution to the reform movement was weakened 
by the regime’s repression, which split their community in the wake of the bans. 
Above-ground, mainstream news outlets complied with Suharto’s dictates, muting 
their criticism and miming the regime’s rhetoric. In the expanding underground 
media, however, resistance deepened, spreading a spirit of defiance adopted by stu-
dent demonstrators, and ultimately many mainstream journalists, just three years 
later. 
 These underground networks formed through efforts by Goenawan Mohamad to 
“channel money” from sympathetic funders and “spread the struggle,” thereby gener-
ating projects that both employed blacklisted journalists and united them with other 
activists. Out of this convergence came the Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of 
Information in early 1995. Inside a few unassuming buildings behind a small café 
in South Jakarta grew a community, known as Komunitas Utan Kayu, that served as 
cover for the institute’s operations. Mohamad set up an artists’ gallery next to the café 
and eventually a small theater behind, all part of the ‘“subterfuge” that obscured this 
group’s main activity: the digital dissemination of information blocked by the regime. 
In back rooms, from a server secured via encryption funded by the Asia Foundation, 
the Utan Kayu community distributed online newsletters, strengthening opposition 
networks at home and abroad. 19 Behind the café’s modest facade there was, moreover, 
a latter-day salon that strengthened the intellectual core of the opposition movement. 
At the café’s tables, journalists and activists met in clouds of clove cigarette smoke for 
conversation and debate. 
 From a realpolitik perspective, the underground news bulletins,  D&R ’s provoca-
tive reporting, and even AJI’s ongoing defiance arguably were just so much “turbu-
lence in a glass” and would have remained so had it not been for the 1997 economic 
crisis. Yet apart from increasing the flow of information, these activities also strength-
ened inter-activist connections, knitting together a wider movement as media reform-
ers collaborated with emerging nongovernmental organizations. Together, these 
groups supported presidential candidates to replace Suharto, organizing “free speech 
forums” specifically for the exercise of pro-opposition speech. They also served key 
rhetorical functions that kept the community united and focused, modeling continued 
resistance in the face of defeats and intimidation. Finally, though few in number and 
operating deep underground, these activists repeatedly performed the courage that 
others—journalists and nonjournalists alike—sought in themselves. “It’s very sym-
bolic just to say that we will never succumb,” explained Goenawan Mohamad, adding, 
“Courage, like fear, is contagious.” 20 
 It is impossible to know how far such contagion in Indonesia would have spread 
without the 1997 economic crisis. It was decidedly slow in reaching the majority of 
media professionals, even on the eve of Suharto’s fall. But there is little question that 
courage did sweep through the nation’s universities in the mid-1990s as students took 
the lead in the reform movement. The economic crisis may have emboldened them, 
but their courage was also influenced by  Tempo ’s earlier fight against the regime’s 
media bans and the rhetoric of political martyrdom this struggle inspired. 
 Consequences of a Stifled Press 
 For nearly four years, 1994 to 1997, a confl uence of factors—fear of another crack-
down, crony ownership of media outlets, and government control over the only legal 
journalists’ association—stifl ed editorial criticism and discouraged reporting on the 
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regime’s excesses. Freed from oversight, the regime entered a period of virtually unre-
strained and ultimately self-destructive economic plunder that culminated in the 1997 
economic crisis. The bad debt and losses to the state facilitated by presidential decrees 
and media silence eventually led the country into fi nancial collapse that drove Suharto 
from offi  ce and challenged earlier assumptions about the thinly disguised authoritari-
anism of “Pancasila democracy.” 
 The oppressive climate after 1994 limited the media’s ability to impose economic 
transparency, facilitating the acceleration of corruption. Unrestrained by press or par-
liament, Suharto used the state apparatus to enrich cronies and family, above all his 
children, whose business empires penetrated nearly every sector of the economy. In 
July 1997,  Forbes magazine estimated Suharto’s wealth at between $10 billion and $40 
billion, making him the third-wealthiest person in the world after the sultan of Bru-
nei, Hassanal Bolkiah, and King Fahd bin Abdulaziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia. 21 
 Most mechanisms enabling such accumulation were technically legal. Through 
presidential decrees, for example, Suharto forced companies to pay levies or donate 
to his “charitable” foundations and simultaneously allowed his children and cronies 
to siphon millions in loans out of state reserves. In one blatant instance, the Ministry 
of Forestry and Plantations made a multi-million-dollar loan to a pulp paper company 
controlled by Suharto’s golfing partner and former minister of industry and trade, Bob 
Hasan. 22 
 The president’s decrees also created the monopolies and tariff protections that 
generated wide profit margins for even the most poorly run crony companies. Among 
the seventy-nine such decrees between 1993 and 1998, Decree No. 42 of 1996, for 
example, exempted a car company owned by Suharto’s son from tax and duties on 
the Korean-made vehicles that it imported. 23 Though Suharto was able to bypass par-
liamentary oversight in issuing most of these decrees, they still entered the public 
record. Yet almost no mention of them appeared in the media. 
 As often occurs in a rent-seeking economy, these deals advantaged the president’s 
entourage while disadvantaging the state and ordinary Indonesians. An audit by Price-
waterhouseCoopers revealed that at the end of Suharto’s reign, the state oil monopoly 
Pertamina alone had been losing billions of dollars per year to corruption and inef-
ficiency. 24 A study by the World Bank found that at least 30 percent of Indonesia’s 
development budget over the previous twenty years had evaporated through such 
deals. 25 
 The Suharto empire also grew through commissions the family collected as mid-
dlemen between the state and virtually anyone who wished to do business in Indone-
sia. After Suharto’s fall, the Ministry of Mines and Energy identified 159 companies 
that held contracts with Pertamina through links to Suharto’s family or cronies. 26 In 
other lucrative deals, government offices arranged for Suharto’s children to purchase 
shares of state-owned companies at below-market value, which the children then sold 
for windfall profits. 27 
 The key vehicles that family and cronies used to accumulate and then launder 
their fortunes were the dozens of foundations, exempt from taxes and external review, 
that the regime had created over the years. Established to support charitable causes, 
such as mosque construction or school scholarships, these foundations controlled 
several billion dollars by the late 1990s. They grew through small deductions from the 
salaries of all civil servants beginning in the 1970s and “donations” from state banks 
or entrepreneurs seeking business opportunities. Larger foundations sometimes acted 
as banks offering low interest rates for state-sponsored projects. They also funneled 
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money into political campaigns or private accounts as part of Suharto’s patronage 
system and financed the purchase of controlling shares in hundreds of companies for 
regime insiders. 28 Again, there was virtually no media coverage of these activities. 
 The most flamboyant of the president’s six children, Hutomo Mandala Putera, 
or “Tommy,” owned majority shares in a golf course in Ascot, England; one-half 
of a share in a $4 million yacht in Darwin, Australia; and 60 percent of the Ital-
ian sports car company Lamborghini. 29 Domestically, Tommy owned controlling 
interests in several businesses, including an airline, the Humpuss conglomerate, 
and a company granted exclusive tax concessions to produce a “national car.” The 
estimated $200 million of assets owned by Suharto’s middle daughter, Siti “Titiek” 
Hediati Harijadi, included interests in a Burmese cement factory and a large rail-
way company in Turkmenistan. Before his father fell from power, the estimated 
worth of Suharto’s oldest son, Sigit Harjojudanto, was $450 million. By far the 
largest empires were those of Suharto’s eldest daughter, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana, 
or “Tutut,” and his second son, Bambang Trihatmojo. Tutut’s estimated worth in 
1997, according to one source, was $2 billion—accrued largely from a vast con-
glomerate spanning petrochemicals, banking, and television. The estimated worth 
of Bambang was even greater—$3 billion in 1997—with a business consortium, 
Bimantara, holding over one hundred subsidiaries with interests including automo-
biles, oil, and telecommunications. 30 
 An investigation by the Ministry of Forestry and Plantations found that Suhar-
to’s family and friends owned or controlled nine million hectares of rain forest, an 
area roughly the size of the main Indonesian island of Java. 31 Despite international 
coverage, Jakarta’s above-ground news outlets managed a knowing avoidance of the 
spreading corruption, in effect becoming complicit in this ongoing concentration of 
power. 
 The Asian Economic Crisis 
 Between the 1994 bans and mid-1997, most news coverage of the Suharto regime 
steered away from criticism and practiced a local variant of “development journalism” 
that gave a sense of continuing growth. Although support for certain opposition lead-
ers, particularly Megawati Sukarnoputri, grew in boldness, there was little coverage to 
suggest that a major political storm was brewing beyond vague concern over Suharto’s 
failure to designate a successor. 
 Then, in July 1997, the Asian financial crisis, sparked by the crash of the Thai 
baht, prompted a run on Indonesia’s currency, the rupiah. By January 1998, the 
rupiah had lost 70 percent of its value and per capita income had dropped from 
$1,000 to $400. 32 By mid-March, the banking system, riddled with bad loans, trem-
bled on the brink of collapse, creating what one observer predicted would “go down 
[in history] as the worst financial crisis ever witnessed, certainly since biblical 
times.” 33 As other growth indicators sank, inflation rose rapidly, at one point pass-
ing 200 percent. 34 With the economy’s sharp plunge, nature itself seemed to rise in 
revolt as forest fires produced smog thick enough to crash planes and blacken skies 
all the way to Kuala Lumpur. Without warning, Indonesia suddenly faced its worst 
drought in fifty years. 
 The regime attempted to contain the crisis by prohibiting public debate over its 
cause or cure, blocking private television stations from broadcasting a November 
1997 dialogue between the finance minister and parliament about plans to liquidate 
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sixteen national banks. Though two stations had already advertised the event, the 
ministry insisted on its cancellation, claiming that a broadcast by stations other than 
the government-run TVRI would violate the 1997 Broadcasting Law. In the end, even 
TVRI did not air it, denying audiences any chance to watch this widely anticipated 
conversation on economic reform. 35 
 The underground press, which by now included the online  Tempo Interaktif , 
reported some of these public secrets as news, including detailed exposés of Suharto’s 
hidden wealth by George Aditjondro, an activist exiled to Australia. His reports, with 
revelations in the international media heavily censored by the regime, were dissemi-
nated on the growing email lists, such as Apakabar, Pijar, and SiaR. Yet while this 
dissemination revealed much to a small online public, its function was still largely 
symbolic, demonstrating continued journalistic defiance. 
 The Student Movement 
 Despite eff orts to suppress debate, by the end of 1997, rumblings of discontent 
grew into overt criticism of the government’s performance, though only tangentially 
through the mainstream media. 36 As the rupiah continued its free fall, losing nearly 
90 percent of value, and parliament’s selection of the next president approached, criti-
cism found voice in protests emerging across the country, defying government restric-
tions. Many were led by newly laid-off  workers. But the rising number of student 
demonstrations was, in retrospect, the clearest sign of a dramatic shift in the coun-
try’s political climate. 
 In Indonesia’s comparatively brief history, university students had twice before 
played a pivotal role at moments of crisis, lending this upsurge of activism a pow-
erful symbolism that helped protect demonstrators from outright repression. These 
protests also represented rising anger among middle- and upper-class Indonesians, 
whose children were forming the front lines. By spring of 1998, observers noted a new 
confidence on the streets as students realized that the government’s fear of interna-
tional attention was making officials cautious. Even students left relatively unscathed 
by the crisis, aware of the leverage their privilege afforded them, felt compelled to 
speak out on behalf of others. 37 Within the larger public, many Indonesians—from 
taxicab drivers to business leaders—viewed the students as defenders of the nation’s 
interests. As one university president said, “Somebody has to represent public opin-
ion.” There were even rumors, corroborated by later events, that segments of the 
military were quietly backing the students as part of their behind-the-scenes efforts 
to force Suharto’s resignation. 38 
 As the plight of the poor worsened, idealism infected the  reformasi movement, 
and students saw themselves as the voice of the  rakyat , an emotive term for Indo-
nesia’s vast impoverished underclass. Indeed, early demonstrations were relatively 
conservative and centered on economic rather than explicitly political issues. Seth 
Mydans observed, “One telling sign posted on a bulletin board here suggests their 
priorities. ‘Wanted,’ it reads, ‘Rice. Sugar. Cooking Oil. Democracy.’” A student leader 
explained, “We want change but we don’t want to be involved in conflict.” 39 Soon, 
however, conflict became unavoidable. 
 In February 1998, student leaders started disappearing. According to Allan Nairn, 
insiders acknowledged that the disappearances were part of a terror campaign by mili-
tary intelligence units. 40 Others speculated that they were part of the military’s carrot-
and-stick approach to contain and co-opt the rising opposition—offering “dialogue” 
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with select groups while curbing the movement’s autonomy by kidnapping and tor-
turing key leaders. 41 
 This terror also involved intimidation through telecommunications, when the 
military began using cell-phone companies to monitor and occasionally interrupt pri-
vate calls. One human rights lawyer reported a voice breaking into one of his conver-
sations, saying, “I will kill you tonight.” 42 Such threats became serious as evidence 
mounted that the military was operating death squads. A Jakarta hospital reported 
receiving 165 unidentified corpses over the next two months, most discovered along 
railroad tracks and marked with signs of torture. 43 
 Whatever the intent of these operations, anger replaced fear as word of the 
kidnappings circulated. By contrast, Indonesia’s thousand-member parliament con-
tinued full-throated support, reelecting Suharto on March 10 to his seventh term by 
a unanimous voice vote followed by thunderous applause and a standing ovation. 44 
With news of this vote, protests grew bolder, and a new rhetoric of martyrdom 
gained force. One student who had been beaten unconscious in a demonstration 
stated, “We will continue the struggle, whatever the Government does, even if that 
means we die!” 45 
 The Suharto regime responded with increased repression. In mid-March, military 
leaders went beyond requiring permits for gatherings by announcing a total ban on 
demonstrations. 46 This edict had little impact. By the end of the month, there were 
daily protests at universities nationwide. Students at one of the more radical cam-
puses began burning Suharto in effigy, shouting, “Reform or death!” 47 The crackdown 
only led students to escalate demands. 48 The military responded by banning all elec-
tronic media from broadcasting the rallies. 49 
 Even in this climate of growing protest, above-ground media remained cautious, 
still avoiding overt criticism. An exception was the provocative newsweekly  D&R , 
which in March 1998, after two years of increasingly critical reporting, featured on 
its cover a caricature of Suharto as the King of Hearts with a caption reading, “The 
President in Crisis.” 50 According to one editor,  D&R staff ran the issue fully aware that 
the cartoon would lead to a ban. But, he added, there was already reason to believe the 
regime would fall before it could issue the order. 51 
 Despite the media’s general self-censorship, Suharto lashed out personally at 
journalists in April 1998, blaming negative coverage for the crisis. At the president’s 
bidding, the information minister, Alwi Dahlan, warned the media about publishing 
news items that were unproportional, lacked proper perspective, and left the public 
“disinformed.” 52 
 By this time, however, free speech had become a wider cause taken up by stu-
dents, who began wearing handkerchiefs as gags and covering their mouths with duct 
tape. At one rally, a demonstrator reinforced the symbolism of the tape over his mouth 
with a banner that read: “The price of honesty is [even] more expensive than the price 
of sembako [the nine basic necessities].” 53 
 Anger intensified when kidnap survivors ignored threats from their abductors to 
keep quiet and appeared in public with chilling accounts of electric shock and water 
torture. 54 Their reappearance called attention to the many victims who still had not 
returned, adding a disturbing undertone to these rallies. The mainstream media shed 
some of its caution by devoting significant attention to the disappearances. 55 The 
movement then picked up more steam as students started coordinating between cam-
puses, using computer networks as their primary communication to bypass bottle-
necks and surveillance on more public channels. 56 
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 Trisakti and May Riots 
 Despite the growth of intercampus networks, nearly all student demonstrations 
were confi ned to campuses until May 1998. Then on May 4, the government raised 
the price of fuel by 71 percent, sparking public protests across the country punctuated 
by several days of riots in Medan that left six dead. 57 The unrest had begun to spread 
beyond the universities. 
 Five days later, President Suharto left for a week-long visit to Egypt. While he was 
away, the moment many feared finally arrived. On May 12, 1998, in broad daylight, 
military snipers fired on a student demonstration at the elite Trisakti University in 
downtown Jakarta, killing four. The next day, journalists at RCTI, which was owned by 
Suharto’s son, insisted on airing a “full account” of the event, including a spontaneous 
eulogy by the station’s weatherman, Kukuh Sanyoto. Though their act occurred very 
close to Suharto’s fall, Sanyoto later noted that a mood of rebellion at the station had 
been brewing for many weeks, if not months. 58 The shooting, he explained, “pushed 
the Indonesian media deeper into the activist mood of the times.” 59 The progression 
that led to the RCTI staff ’s defiance, however, reflected the reciprocal influence of the 
movement on the media and the media on the movement. 
 News of the shootings sent shockwaves through Jakarta. Despite the grow-
ing tension between demonstrators and government, the realization that soldiers, 
the “people’s army,” had actually killed unarmed students—particularly at a school 
attended by children of top military and civilian officials—stunned many Indonesians. 
The fallen students became heroes, and thousands marched behind the weeping rela-
tives who carried their bodies to a Jakarta cemetery. At one of the graves, a student 
explained her disbelief: “The army should never have shot them. This is not a war. We 
don’t have any weapons. We have only our voices.” 60 
 Jakarta erupted in violence. On May 13, residents reacting to television images 
of “police firing indiscriminately at students” poured into the streets in protest. 61 
Elsewhere, less identifiable mobs formed, pulling down lampposts, setting fire to 
motor vehicles, and smashing storefront windows, looting as they went. Security 
forces in other areas fired tear gas and rubber bullets into crowds and shut down 
major highways. These actions prompted eight foreign governments to urge the 
Indonesian military to end the crackdown and instead quell the riots with demo-
cratic reforms. 62 Washington sent a military delegation to “warn their Indonesian 
counterparts in blunt terms that the country could face collapse without restraint 
by the armed forces.” 63 
 Despite this pressure, the rampage continued. From his vantage point on a high-
rise rooftop, one correspondent reported that the city “looked like a vast inferno,” 
while “huge columns of smoke rose in every direction, with new fires erupting every 
few minutes. Police helicopters circled, while down on the streets, ambulances weaved 
their way through crowds of people chanting and clapping at each intersection.” 64 In 
just two days, hundreds of buildings were burned and over a thousand people died. 
 To the outside world, it appeared as though Indonesians had spun out of con-
trol. Much of the violence hit Chinese Indonesians, as roving groups—assumed to 
be enraged rioters—looted and burned businesses and homes, leaving many victims 
inside to die in the flames. Later reports revealed that packs of young men also raped 
and mutilated an estimated 150 women and girls of Chinese descent. 65 
 Western coverage portrayed these events as expression of deep resentments 
against ethnic Chinese for the wealth and privilege they had enjoyed under Suharto. 66 
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The  New York Times , for example, reported that mobs sought to vent their rage against 
Suharto, but “the Chinese [became] the hapless proxies for an unpopular president.” 67 
 Later investigations, however, including one by a government fact-finding team, 
revealed that much of the violence against Chinese-Indonesians had been orches-
trated by military provocateurs as part of an elite power struggle. The reports cited 
eyewitness accounts of trucks discharging well-built young men with military crew 
cuts, dressed in student-like clothing. These groups would arrive at shopping areas, 
throw out burning tires, shout antigovernment slogans, and then invite people to join 
a looting frenzy in the neighborhood’s shops and malls. The instigators would then 
disappear, leaving behind burning buildings, some with hundreds trapped inside. 68 
 Other indications of military involvement included reports that some of the sur-
viving rape victims had noticed military uniforms inside their rapists’ vehicles. But 
the most compelling evidence was the sheer scale, sophistication, and systematic 
character of the destruction. As Wimar Witoelar noted, a “pile of evidence” showed 
that “people of the military of course did start it,” including “a geographic analysis 
[showing] 60 riots within a period of one hour moving in a certain direction across 
town.” He added, “students could not move with such military precision and set a 
five-story building on fire in half an hour. I know. It takes them three hours to light 
a bonfire.” 69 With similar logic, Ariel Heryanto argued, “No racial or ethnic groups 
in Indonesia, no matter how agitated, could possibly inflict a systematic violence in 
which 1198 lives . . . were lost, 150 females were raped, 40 shopping malls and 4,000 
shops were burned down and thousands of vehicles and houses were set afire simul-
taneously in 27 areas in a capital city . . . in less than 50 hours.” 70 
 Elite Rivalries 
 As the violence continued, the stock market crashed and the country’s currency 
plunged another 16 percent. Aware of the extraordinary powers parliament had 
granted Suharto just three months earlier, many worried, when he cut short his trip 
to Egypt, that the aging president might impose martial law. 71 Instead, he returned 
home to a barrage of criticism and calls for his resignation. 
 Perhaps the most dramatic defection was that of the MPR Speaker, Harmoko, who 
stated on May 18, “For the unity of the nation, the President should wisely take the 
decision to resign.” 72 Known as a die-hard loyalist, Harmoko still suffered notoriety 
for banning  Tempo ,  Dë TIK , and  Editor as information minister in 1994. During the 
heaviest rioting, a mob stormed one of his houses and burned it down—an event that 
may have influenced his shifting loyalties. 73 Whatever his motivations, Harmoko’s 
change of heart marked a turning point. The following day, he announced that leaders 
of all parliament factions would meet to ask Suharto to step down. The president’s 
hand-picked legislature had turned against him. 
 In response to this stunning announcement, the commander of the armed forces, 
General Wiranto [one name], declared that Harmoko’s statement “had no legal basis” 
and insisted that Suharto “still has duties and obligations to perform.” Wiranto 
accused the students of starting the riots and warned them not to hold protests 
planned for later that week. 74 
 But rumors were also spreading of a military split between Wiranto and Lieuten-
ant General Prabowo Subianto—Suharto’s son-in-law, commander of the Army Strate-
gic Reserve and leader of the elite Kopassus rangers. Earlier in the crisis, Wiranto had 
made overtures to the students, assuring them that the military supported reform. By 
contrast, Prabowo commanded the troops that had shot the Trisakti students. Rumors 
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were rife that if Prabowo replaced Wiranto, there would be a Tiananmen Square–style 
crackdown on the students. 75 
 Within hours of Wiranto’s warning, the country witnessed a turn of events few 
could have imagined. On May 19, thousands of students, escorted by soldiers, poured 
through the gates of the parliamentary compound in downtown Jakarta and occu-
pied the main buildings. Legislators found themselves unable to leave. One observer 
described “extraordinary, dream-like scenes” of thousands of angry students holding 
sit-ins, waving protest banners, and dancing to rude anti-Suharto songs in a place that 
normally functioned as “a political temple used to worship Mr. Suharto.” 76 At the end 
of the day, however, the students left peacefully, riding buses presumably provided by 
the military. 77 
 During one tense moment, Kopassus soldiers loyal to Prabowo drove into the 
compound, looking uncomfortable as students hugged them and handed out roses. 78 
Despite their submission to these embraces, the Kopassus visit appeared to be a show 
of force in the power struggle between Prabowo and Wiranto. Regular soldiers on 
guard around parliament, for example, were wearing bullet-proof vests. Since the stu-
dents were not carrying guns, observed one journalist, “the vests suggest that some 
general may [be] worr[ied] about an assault by rival army units.” 79 
 That evening, Prabowo led military leaders to announce on television that they 
had ordered troops to “defend the nation” against protesters. 80 Throughout this 
broadcast, scrolling text warned viewers not to join the next day’s nationwide rallies 
commemorating Indonesia’s independence movement. The opposition leader Amien 
Rais also appeared, urging people to stay home. Significantly, Wiranto was not pres-
ent, though he issued a separate warning against more demonstrations, suggesting 
an end to his tolerance of the student occupation. Finally, President Suharto himself 
delivered a televised address, promising he would hold a new election and would not 
run. 81 
 Jakarta Loses Fear 
 These broadcasts had little eff ect. The next day, May 20, Jakarta residents swarmed 
into the streets by the tens of thousands to demand Suharto’s resignation. For many, 
participation stemmed from a belief that the army was bluffi  ng with its wire bar-
ricades and tanks. Some hypothesized, however, that this boldness could lead to a 
crackdown because the army might fi nd that mere threats no longer meant control. 
“In other places in Asia,” Nicholas Kristof added, “soldiers have often showed a mea-
sure of camaraderie with students shortly before shooting them.” Kristof nevertheless 
concluded, “Almost by the hour, the fear of Mr. Suharto and his generals has been 
draining away in Indonesia. . . . The bottom line is that for the fi rst time in decades the 
Indonesian government seems more afraid of the people than they are of it.” 82 
 Back at parliament, students, now numbering nearly fifteen thousand, again 
flooded through the gates. Reporters allowed in to cover this unprecedented event 
described the students as having the run of the buildings, turning the place into what 
one called “an Indonesian version of Fort Lauderdale, Fla. during spring break.” 83 
One side of a building became a “Democracy Wall” covered with  reformasi posters 
and slogans. The students also took turns at the podium of the main chamber doing 
comic impersonations of national leaders, including Wiranto and Harmoko. Outside 
the buildings, the atmosphere was even more raucous. According to one report, stu-
dents “pranced atop the broad green roof and carried a coffin through the grounds, 
chanting, ‘Suharto is dead!’” 84 
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 As the students swept through the legislature’s hallways, the economy collapsed 
further and Jakarta faced a serious food shortage. Lawyers and business leaders joined 
the demonstrations. The same parliament that had voted unanimously in March to 
give Suharto a seventh term now announced they would reverse this decision. 85 For-
eign leaders also began pressuring the president to concede power. While American 
officials argued that they did not have as much influence over Suharto as they had 
had over the Philippine president Ferdinand Marcos in 1986, they made quiet plans 
to offer the general safe passage into exile. The International Monetary Fund then 
suspended payments from the $43 billion bailout package recently established to help 
Indonesia through the crisis. 86 
 On this second day of their occupation, the students, rather than leave the grounds 
at sundown, camped out for the night while various factions attempted to broker 
a resolution to the standoff. The situation was precarious. Several Western officials 
believed it likely that the military would take over, repeating the scenario that had 
brought Suharto to power thirty-two years earlier. 87 
 In the official version of the events that followed, Wiranto spent the night per-
suading Suharto that resigning would be preferable to facing impeachment proceed-
ings, and pledged to defend him and his family. Suharto finally gave up. On May 21, in 
a short televised ceremony, he handed over power to his vice president and protégé, 
B. J. Habibie. While conceding his effective expulsion from office, he insisted throughout 
his resignation speech on a corporatist conception of society with himself as Bapak, 
or “father”—head of a still-embodied nation. Dropping the convention within Malay 
languages that uses the passive voice to efface ego, Suharto invoked the first person 
singular no fewer than eight times in just twelve sentences. That same day, eleven 
members of his cabinet resigned. 88 
 Students and the Media 
 For the mainstream media, the events culminating in Suharto’s resignation were 
a wake-up call, rousing them from their complacency, rupturing their privileged rela-
tionship with the regime, and forcing them into an unaccustomed activism. When the 
Asian economic crisis hit, the country’s news media had largely avoided negative cov-
erage. Even when students’ growing boldness began to create opportunities for criti-
cal commentary, most outlets remained cautious. Yet, as editor Endy Bayuni noted, in 
the end, the demonstrations simply grew too large to ignore. Once a few outlets began 
covering them, there was no turning back. 89 
 It was not the media, therefore, but students and workers, through their own pro-
tests, who first exploited the political opening created by the economic crisis, using it 
to break the long taboo against criticizing the president. More significantly, through 
determined defiance of the government’s ban on demonstrations, the students began 
normalizing public dissent and gave members of the media their own opening. 90 In 
the reinforcing dynamic of the political firestorm that emerged among protesters, the 
media, and dissident elites, news coverage became an accelerant by providing demon-
strators a wider audience for their criticisms. In short, as Bayuni put it, “The [student] 
movement broke the barrier against freedom of expression, and with it came freedom 
of the press.” 91 
 With the onset of the economic crisis in 1997, the legitimacy of Suharto’s New 
Order began to crumble, creating an opening for the emerging  reformasi movement 
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that eventually felled the regime. As Edward Aspinall argues, however, this nascent 
opposition lacked organization and off ered “no credible democratic alternative” to the 
collapsing regime, making it diffi  cult to explain how the subsequent democratic tran-
sition gained footing and proved resilient against forces of reversal. The students who 
led the movement, for their part, had developed only a nebulous critique of the regime 
and presented a relatively slender agenda for a post-Suharto transition. 92 
 While many elements are relevant to understanding the transition’s trajectory, 
the 1994 newsweekly bans and the media reform movement they set in motion were 
key. The bans blocked news outlets from imposing transparency, thereby leaving 
the country vulnerable to the shock of the Asian economic crisis that undermined 
Suharto’s legitimacy. 93 Protests they sparked unleashed new defiance, knitting bud-
ding activist groups into multiplying alliances and producing a political synergy that 
was mediated and inspired by dissident journalism. Through these alliances, the new 
movement, while breaking ground for the eventual  reformasi revolution, served as an 
organizational webbing that held a loose community of media activists, nongovern-
mental organizations, and political oppositionists in resistance to a regime that tried 
to isolate and close down all such activities. During the seemingly quiescent years 
from 1994 to 1997, moreover, the students who led the anti-Suharto charge were 
also influenced by the drama of the bans. One of their widely shared priorities was 
the unshackling of public speech—in the media, on the streets, and within college 
campuses. 94 
 As they advance to new phases, movements, which are by nature ephemeral, 
can be both principled and pragmatic in maintaining coherence and commitment. 
By articulating a critique and a common agenda for change, the dissident journalists’ 
movement in Indonesia created a community with a shared commitment to abstract 
principles and concrete policy reforms—above all, freedom of speech. In a period when 
demands were essentially negative, expressing opposition to the regime, repressive 
laws, and a politicized military, one of the few positive programs for change that could 
guide reform in the postauthoritarian era was a broad faith in transparency, fairness, 
and freedom of speech as correctives for the many problems blamed on the Suharto 
regime. Though the student-led  reformasi movement was inherently short-lived, a 
commitment to institutionalizing freedom of speech and effecting electoral reform 
endured long after Suharto’s fall, making both goals defining issues of the transition. 

 Chapter Four 
 Reformasi 
 Press freedom is a line in the sand. 
 —Bambang Harymurti, editor in chief of  Tempo , 
“Media: Pressing for Their Freedom” 
 On May 21, 1998, facing rising public anger and international pressure, Presi-
dent Suharto resigned and ceded power to his vice president, B. J. Habibie. Even as 
Indonesia reeled from riots and arson that left over 1,200 dead, euphoria quickly 
spread. With the start of this transition, known as  reformasi , for much of the 
country—from the upper classes to the unemployed—everything suddenly seemed 
possible. Labor unions and nongovernmental organizations could organize openly. 
The hundreds of political prisoners jailed under the New Order had new hope of 
freedom. Public denunciations of corruption, collusion, and nepotism signaled 
new resolve to curb these practices that were undermining both good governance 
and economic progress. With this resolve came hopes for economic recovery and 
new opportunities. For those denied due process under Suharto, his removal offered 
possible legal redress. Even those living in provinces torn by separatism had cause 
for optimism as the curtain of silence shrouding the regime’s human rights viola-
tions began to lift. 
 The open climate also emboldened people to test the government’s new tolerance 
for critical speech in myriad settings, but most visibly in the news and entertain-
ment media. Correspondingly, among the many reforms needed after three decades of 
authoritarianism, freedom of speech was an immediate focus for  reformasi leaders and 
supporters, who feared a sudden reversal of this liberalization and other gains. 
 At the start of any democratic transition, reformers must confront forces favor-
ing reversal, whether simple inertia or reactionary resistance. In its first year, Indo-
nesia’s democratization was beset by conservative opposition in multiple forms. 
Initial exuberance overcame much of this pressure for reversal, and in the rush to 
get on the right side of history, even Suharto’s former allies were declaring them-
selves “pro- reformasi .” 
 Among the broader coalition that had backed the New Order, however, members 
of the once-tethered media, now freed from authoritarian controls and bolstered by 
an expanding civil society, were among the only institutional actors to resist democra-
tization’s reversal over both the short and long term. This inclination, though uneven 
across outlets, was evident throughout the transition’s first year in two distinct forms: 
mobilization in the press community to defend and institutionalize new freedoms; 
and the exercise of these freedoms to expand the boundaries of permissible speech, 
impose transparency on the reform process, and further the contestation necessary to 
the democratic circulation of power. 
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 Initial Challenges 
 With Suharto’s fall, the challenge for the entire  reformasi movement, including 
media reformers, was to carry their agenda beyond this initial victory. Despite the 
installation of a new president, it was diffi  cult to know where the transition would 
lead. Initially, there was considerable cause for cynicism. Unlike other ousted dicta-
tors faced with a choice of death or fl ight, Suharto placed his cronies in the cabinet, 
picked a loyal successor, and retired to his luxurious compound in Central Jakarta. As 
Jeff rey Winters noted, with Habibie’s inauguration, Indonesia’s  reformasi movement 
“both peaked and collapsed on the same day”—removing Suharto, but resigned to a 
successor regime that was “a continuation of the same government.” 1 In the same 
vein, Todung Mulya Lubis declared the Habibie administration “the New Order minus 
Suharto.” 2 
 At numerous points throughout this first year, the nation’s stability also appeared 
at risk, creating ample pretext for reimposing authoritarianism. The most immediate 
challenge came from the economic crisis that had undermined Suharto’s legitimacy 
but did not end with his resignation. Instead, circumstances for millions of Indone-
sians continued to deteriorate, creating conditions ripe for unrest. 3 “In hardly more 
than a year,” reported the  Los Angeles Times , a nation that had been “a star performer” 
among Southeast Asia’s economies now found that “a generation of growth [had] 
simply been wiped away.” 4 By mid-1998, the crisis had forced more than twenty mil-
lion people out of work, with millions more likely to follow by year’s end. 5 By Sep-
tember, inflation approached 80 percent, a twenty-three-year high, while seventeen 
million families faced “dire food shortages” and workers were losing jobs, by one 
estimate, at a rate of fifteen thousand per day. 6 
 Economic desperation converged with the government’s weakened social con-
trols, producing 1,714 demonstrations and 69 “riots” in the first four months of the 
new era. 7 In rural Indonesia,  Forbes magazine reported, “hungry Indonesians have 
taken to raiding food warehouses, shrimp farms and paddy fields.” 8 On Java, rov-
ing gangs plundered coffee plantations while another group hauled fifteen thousand 
chickens away from a farm. Elsewhere, people were ripping up Chinese graves to 
steal jewelry from the corpses and, in some cases, the teak coffins. Farmers in one 
town “chased a group of golfers off the ninth green with hoes and axes and began 
planting vegetables.” 9 Loekman Soetrisno reported, “After two months, the rural 
reform movement mysteriously stopped and plundering began. For the urban poor 
and village landless,  reformasi means plundering. This could destroy all that has been 
achieved.” 10 
 The country’s leadership also posed problems during the transition. Habibie 
faced challenges overwhelming for even the most dedicated proponents of reform. 
But the administration’s commitment to meaningful change seemed tenuous, a reality 
underscored by early moves to punish critics and reassert control over public speech. 11 
 Compounding this dubious turnover in leadership, the new era left all the old 
institutions firmly in place. Particularly relevant to media reform, the notorious Min-
istry of Information retained jurisdiction over the mass media. While the public mood 
restricted officials’ actions, the ministry retained all its mechanisms for media control, 
including the restrictive SIUPP licensing system that, as one editorial suggested, still 
hung like “the sword of Damocles” over editors’ heads. 12 
 Nevertheless, by the time Jakarta cleared away the broken glass and skeletons of 
burned-out cars, the country’s political landscape had been altered substantially by 
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the events of the previous months. The regime that had ruled unchallenged for three 
decades had crumbled, and leadership no longer revolved around the dictates of one 
man but instead had to accommodate a multitude of competing factions, all claiming 
to be pro- reformasi . The same parliament that had voted unanimously in March to 
grant Suharto a seventh term had discovered, in the general’s last weeks, the cour-
age to act as an independent branch of government. Even the once infallible “father 
of development” appeared chastened, offering in his resignation speech a remarkable 
apology for all his “mistakes.” 13 His successor, President Habibie, promised to repeal 
repressive laws, allow opposition parties, hold new elections, and—in keeping with 
 reformasi rhetoric—rid the country of corruption, collusion, and nepotism. 14 
 Indonesia was also transformed by the sudden expansion in political participa-
tion. Student protests had forced open the public sphere to a degree not seen for 
decades, and by the time the students allowed soldiers to escort them from parliament 
grounds, their boldness had infected most of the country. In the following weeks, 
a figurative dam burst as people of all backgrounds openly participated in political 
conversations. Most visibly, the media moved quickly to exploit the postauthoritarian 
climate, casting off layers of taboo to publish ever more sensational stories on every-
thing from financial corruption to the plight of political prisoners. 
 Aware of the fragility of this political moment, representatives of print and broad-
cast media moved immediately to secure legal protections for their new freedom and 
overhaul the New Order’s apparatus of regulatory controls. After organizing under-
ground for nearly four years, media reformers were prepared to articulate a clear 
agenda. Within a week of Suharto’s fall, a group of journalists, editors, and newspaper 
owners staged a protest before the Ministry of Information, ready to confront Habi-
bie’s new minister of information, Lieutenant-General Muhammad Yunus Yosfiah, 
with demands for three major reforms: abolishing the press licensing system; allow-
ing journalists to form their own associations free from mandatory membership in 
the government-sponsored Indonesian Journalists’ Association (PWI); and permitting 
blacklisted reporters to write under their own names. 15 
 Yosfiah was a controversial figure whose military affiliation alone justified wari-
ness from the delegates. He also had led security in Balibo, East Timor, during Indo-
nesia’s 1975 invasion, when five Australian journalists were killed in what was later 
determined to be a military-sanctioned assassination, earning Yosfiah the nickname 
“Butcher of Balibo.” 16 Yet on this day in 1998, he invited the delegation into the Min-
istry of Information and responded affirmatively to nearly everything they said. 
 Yosfiah’s positive response may have reflected deference to the Habibie adminis-
tration’s professed support for free speech, but he later articulated deeper personal 
beliefs. While he had been studying at the US Army Command and General Staff 
College in Fort Leavenworth in the 1980s, a course on US First Amendment law con-
vinced him of the importance of a free news media in developing Indonesia into an 
advanced society. In his first year as information minister, he repeatedly paraphrased 
Thomas Jefferson’s famous statement, “[W]ere it left to me to decide whether we 
should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, 
I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter.” 17 
 Yosfiah acted on this conviction by abolishing the notorious 1984 decree that had 
empowered the government to revoke a publication’s business license at will. In its 
place, he issued a new decree on June 5, 1998, barring license revocation except via a 
court of law. The decree also eliminated the state’s onerous requirements for obtain-
ing a publishing license; what had taken years, connections, and costly fees was now 
70 Chapter 4
reduced to filling out a form. 18 Another new regulation allowed multiple journalists’ 
associations, freeing the press from the  wadah tunggal system that had given so much 
power to the PWI. 19 Finally, new rules on broadcasting reduced the number of govern-
ment news bulletins that radio stations had to relay from thirteen to three a day and 
freed radio and television broadcasters to produce their own hard news. 20 
 Many felt these measures did not go far enough. Leo Batubara from the Associa-
tion of Newspaper Publishers complained of the media’s continued susceptibility to 
executive manipulation, particularly via the courts. 21 Legal expert Robinson Hamo-
nangan Siregar argued that, despite the reforms, media were just as constrained as 
they had been under Suharto because the notorious “hate-sowing articles” of the 
criminal code remained in effect. Siregar also took issue with the government’s con-
tinued right to “freeze” press licenses. 22 
 Like most media representatives, the reformist Alliance of Independent Journal-
ists (AJI) welcomed the changes, but also characterized the ministry’s efforts as “half-
hearted,” offering three main criticisms: First, despite reforms, the continuation of the 
SIUPP system left the government with too much power over the print press. Second, 
though journalists could now choose any affiliation, the stipulation that they must 
belong to at least one journalists’ association violated their freedom of association 
and organization. And third, though less onerous, the requirement that broadcasters 
must still relay government-produced news “constituted a violation of the principles 
of media freedom and pluralism.” 23 
 Impact of the First Reforms 
 Even these limited reforms, however, had an immediate impact. Within fi ve 
months, the Ministry of Information had issued 333 new publishing licenses, more 
than doubling the total allocated during Suharto’s entire reign. By the end of 1999, 
the number of new licenses reached well over a thousand—transforming coverage, as 
shown in the appendixes below. Opposition political parties ran at least four of the 
tabloids, fl outing decades of New Order–cultivated antipathy toward partisan journal-
ism. 24 On the streets, newsstands were soon overfl owing with low-budget tabloids 
and glossy newsmagazines, and hawkers struggled to display long armfuls for cus-
tomers in passing cars. The arresting headlines and graphics in these curbside arrays 
promised the reporting on corruption and elite confl icts that now typifi ed media fare. 25 
 Established publications accustomed to burying controversy deep within articles 
now splashed provocative quotes from shunned opposition figures, including labor 
activist Muchtar Pakpahan and East Timor rebel leader Xanana Gusmão, across front 
pages. Even more dramatic was the frenzy triggered by reports on the once untouch-
able subject of Suharto’s wealth, as the print media scrambled to top one another in 
revelations about the family’s vast accumulation of property and possessions. Callers 
on talk radio vented outrage at unfolding details. Street hawkers added to the spec-
tacle by selling xeroxed lists of Suharto family assets accompanied by matching mug 
shots. 
 The media also began airing exposés on the abuses of power that had built the 
Suharto family empire. The  Jakarta Post reported that at least 120 businesses holding 
contracts with the state oil company, Pertamina, were owned by Suharto’s children 
or friends. The paper further revealed that city council members were now impos-
ing $1.86 million in fines for building permit violations on a Suharto family hotel, 
and police were reviewing contracts for processing driver’s licenses controlled by 
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Suharto’s daughter.  Bisnis Indonesia reported on the cancellation of four contracts for 
port services held by Suharto’s son. 26 
 Even on television, still controlled by Suharto’s children and cronies, little was 
off-limits. After Habibie’s speech promising new elections, a televised panel featured 
an opposition candidate delivering a stinging critique inconceivable under Suharto. 27 
Producers on TPI (Televisi Pendidikan Indonesia), owned by Suharto’s daughter, 
began airing exposés, including one on the pacification of the province of Aceh show-
ing graphic footage of military atrocities. 28 
 Publications and radio programs shut down under Suharto now resurfaced in new 
forms.  Tempo magazine, “consigned to the glorious dustbin of history” just two years 
earlier, resumed publication in August 1998. 29 The banned weekly tabloid  Dë TIK also 
started up again as  Dë TAK and quickly reestablished itself as a leader in both cir-
culation and temerity. Canceled broadcast programs resurfaced in forms far bolder 
than the originals. At the vanguard of what one announcer dubbed “reformasi radio,” 
Safari-FM launched the radical call-in show  Wacana Jakarta ( Jakarta Discourse ) featur-
ing Ahmad Taufik, one of the AJI activists jailed in 1994, as a host. Safari-FM’s pro-
gram director, Nor Pud Binarto, launched the show believing in radio’s revolutionary 
potential and its power to defend the media’s new freedoms. Binarto’s earlier cutting-
edge show,  Jakarta Round-Up , had been canceled after guest Goenawan Mohamad 
condemned the government for banning his magazine  Tempo . 30 Now  Wacana Jakarta 
regularly went much further, covering everything from the army’s role in politics to 
ethnic and religious conflicts. 
 Uncensored debate also became a staple of television programming. Talk shows 
resembling CNN’s  Crossfire multiplied, and several earned higher ratings than even 
the most popular  sinetron soap operas. 31 Wimar Witoelar, whose show  Perspektif had 
been canceled in 1995, launched two new television talk shows,  Selayang Pandang and 
the more controversial  Dialog Aktual on rival station Indosiar.  Pro dan Kontra on TPI 
facilitated combative one-on-one debates. 32 One of the most innovative shows, TPI’s 
 Dialog Partai Partai , featured unscripted debates between politicians before a live stu-
dio audience of outspoken university students. 
 With the end of mandatory membership in government-sponsored professional 
organizations, more than twenty new media associations formed within a year. Some 
claimed to represent the interests of all media workers, while others focused on 
groups such as photographers and television journalists. In 1999, several also joined 
the Southeast Asian Press Alliance, a coalition of journalist organizations from coun-
tries throughout the region that was created to “demonstrate that press freedom is a 
universal value.” 33 
 Early Threats 
 President Habibie, the center of the controversy that precipitated the 1994 press 
bans, expressed pride in his administration’s liberalizing role. When the media fea-
tured student calls for his resignation, he appeared committed to freedom of speech, 
at one point thanking the students for their contribution to reform. Speaking before 
a language conference, he urged government offi  cials to reform their use of Bahasa 
Indonesia, the national language, to promote more transparent governance. 34 
 These words, however, followed moves to circumscribe the media’s new freedom. 
In July 1998, only a month after his information minister had relaxed business licens-
ing, Habibie proposed that journalists be required to obtain renewable professional 
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licenses. Proponents argued that such a mechanism was needed to enforce industry 
standards. The Ministry of Trade and Industry then tried to garner support for the idea 
by linking it to a proposal to abolish Suharto’s 15 percent tax on newsprint. The plan 
sparked a storm of protest from both the wider press community and officials in the 
president’s own Supreme Advisory Council and never became policy. 35 
 Jakarta’s burgeoning civil society also played a critical role in resisting new con-
trols on public speech. On July 24, 1998, soon after the licensing controversy, the 
new government issued an emergency decree (No. 2/1998) requiring written police 
authorization forty-eight hours in advance for gatherings of more than fifty people 
and banning all protests at night or “in the vicinity of the Presidential Palace, mili-
tary installations, places of worship, hospitals, airfields, ports and railway stations.” 36 
Heated opposition forced the Habibie government to revoke this decree. 37 
 Responses to a subsequent attempt at suppression further indicated a changing 
power equation between civil society and government. In September, Habibie took 
offense at speeches made at a conference, “Dialogue for Democracy,” that had been 
held in August. For the first time since taking office, the new president ordered legal 
action against his critics, summoning the actress and playwright Ratna Sarumpaet to 
appear before the police for insulting the president and “organizing a conference with-
out a permit.” Ironically, Sarumpaet had been one of the last prosecuted for a speech 
violation by the Suharto regime, imprisoned for organizing the “People’s Congress,” 
which opposed his March 1998 reelection. This time, Sarumpaet ignored the sum-
mons, explaining, “I figured if they really wanted to talk, they could come to me.” 38 
 In these same weeks, tensions over public speech rose as students returned to the 
streets, protesting the upcoming parliamentary session that would establish the legal 
framework for the 1999 elections. In early October, angry that these decisions would 
be made by Suharto’s handpicked legislature, over a thousand students forced their 
way through security cordons onto parliament grounds, repeating their dramatic siege 
of May. In other cities, tens of thousands joined concurrent rallies, refusing to accept 
the session’s legitimacy. In response, the armed forces commander, General Wiranto, 
began pressuring students to end their rallies, and Habibie supporters disseminated 
pamphlets calling the movement “Communist-inspired.” 39 
 Lines in the Sand 
 In the face of mounting tension, most news outlets set aside caution and tested 
the limits of government tolerance—a task critical to maintaining democracy over the 
long term. As Jean Goodwin has argued, what we think of as “freedom of speech” has 
little to do with the vast majority of public expression. At issue instead are boundar-
ies dividing acceptable speech from that which threatens or off ends. 40 Or as  Tempo ’s 
Bambang Harymurti later said, “Press freedom is a line in the sand.” 41 
 In Indonesia, pushing such boundaries—in effect, crossing lines to expand the 
range of acceptable speech—served the transition by helping secure the media’s right 
to impose accountability on leaders and their decision-making. If journalists in a 
democracy do not stretch boundaries consistently, such rights become an abstract 
principle rather than actual practice. If space for such reporting is not actively asserted 
and maintained, the state will gradually narrow the boundaries of permissible speech, 
citing national security or privacy or the dignity of the president and others in office. 
 There is a difference, however, between the noncontroversial coverage that fills 
most of a daily newspaper or newscast and reporting that aggressively pushes the 
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limits of tolerance, potentially striking at the core of power. The latter is particularly 
important for its ability to provoke confrontations with the state, prompting offi-
cials to draw one of those lines in the sand. In Indonesia, such confrontations were 
necessary to construct a legal framework defining speech that deserves legal pro-
tection from state agencies, enabling news outlets to predict, with some degree of 
certainty, the consequences of airing provocative content. Over the long term, such 
certainty could empower the media to defend territory already gained and rights 
already asserted. 
 News exposing malfeasance or incompetence and forcing political figures onto 
the defensive further increased transparency and accountability during Indonesia’s 
democratic transition. In addition, stories that produced “scandal” helped shake up 
the political process, shift the balance of power, and inject new uncertainty into elec-
toral and other contests—all of which helped counteract trends toward stagnation and 
reversal. 
 Some news outlets pushed harder than others in pursuing such coverage, testing 
the boundaries of their new freedom with full-blown exposés, almost daring officials 
to react. Significantly,  Tempo ’s inaugural post-ban cover story revealed military involve-
ment in the rapes of ethnic Chinese women during the May 1998 riots, arguably the 
most sensitive controversy of the day. 42  Dë TAK was equally aggressive. In November 
1998, a point of maximum tension between the military and students,  Dë TAK pub-
lished a hard-hitting exposé on military involvement in a mysterious murder spree by 
killers dressed like Japanese ninjas throughout East Java. 43 
 The serial murders had already fueled widespread speculation about possible 
conspiracies. Military and police officials claimed that descendants of the Indo-
nesian Communist Party cadres killed in 1965–66 were exacting revenge for the 
participation in that purge of the Muslim organization, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). NU 
representatives insisted that the killings were part of a scheme to pit the largest 
Muslim associations against each other, weakening their base before the national 
elections. 44 Significantly, one spate of killings coincided with NU’s efforts to form a 
new political party headed by its leader, Abdurrahman Wahid, who accused Presi-
dent Habibie’s cabinet of involvement. 45 Others speculated that elements of the 
armed forces were engineering the attacks to justify the military’s continued role 
in politics. 46 
 The Indonesian media reported such accusations, and a few outlets highlighted 
evidence of military involvement, though this was largely circumstantial. 47 In its 
November exposé, however,  Dë TAK went further. At the heart of its detailed report 
was an eyewitness description by a deserter from a military-connected camp train-
ing agents provocateurs, including the ninja murderers, to create political instability. 
Significantly, the report linked the operations to Kopassus, an elite unit once com-
manded by Suharto’s son-in-law, damaging the military’s credibility as defender of 
public order.  Dë TAK also traced control over these units to Jalan Cendana, the Suharto 
clan’s street in central Jakarta, reporting that the “Cendana” family was using these 
campaigns to divert attention from  reformasi initiatives, including the investigation of 
Suharto’s wealth. 48 
 The exposé also connected the East Java murders and May’s military orches-
tration of anti-Chinese violence reported by  Tempo , citing the deserter’s claims that 
Kopassus soldiers were dispatched “to set fire to stores” to incite violence, and that 
each recruit was given resources to enlist the aid of five to ten civilian rioters. Con-
firming earlier, more speculative reports in other publications, the deserter stated that 
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the ninja murders aimed to disrupt the congress in Bali being held by the opposition 
Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan, 
PDIP). 49 
 Although the Suharto clan’s suspected role in the ninja murders had been the sub-
ject of countless rumors,  Dë TAK’s insider testimony on the operations of the Kopassus 
deserters, a group the military denied even existed, was indeed news. 50 Not only did 
the exposé confirm earlier reports on these deserters and detail the infrastructure of 
their training camps and command. It also revealed the Suharto family’s continued 
capacity for psychological warfare and political destabilization. 
 The timing of the  Dë TAK report was significant, hitting the streets just before 
the November parliamentary session, when barbed wire barricades began reappear-
ing in Jakarta and students prepared to square off against security forces. The report 
strengthened their case in protesting the military’s continued hold on dedicated par-
liamentary seats; it also justified efforts to contain the young men of the Pam Swa-
karsa (Voluntary Security Units), who were being bussed in and armed with spears 
and sharp sticks ostensibly to help with security, but who became a force for inciting 
violence. 51 Simultaneously, a joint fact-finding team, composed of members of the 
government and nongovernmental organizations, released a report implicating the 
military in the destruction and sexual violence against ethnic Chinese during the May 
1998 riots, affirming  Tempo ’s earlier findings. 52 
 The impact of these reports on the transition is difficult to measure. But the 
most serious threats to democratization in the first year included high-level efforts to 
foment intergroup conflict. Violence fueled by the military was used to justify states 
of emergency and suspension of civil liberties in specific regions, such as Maluku 
following the outbreak of interreligious violence in 1999. 53 News coverage reinforc-
ing the impression of a breakdown in order legitimated such measures. Conversely, 
reports on military instigation of violence justified restraint in authorizing a military 
crackdown to restore order. 
 These reports also tested government tolerance for the media’s new freedom by 
challenging the military’s privileged position. Yet they did not prompt a backlash. 
This nonresponse seemed to affirm acceptance by officials, including the military, of 
the media’s critical stance. Alternatively, it demonstrated only a suspension of author-
itarian controls. In either case, the lack of repercussions may have emboldened col-
leagues, while the reports’ success created a market incentive for rival publications to 
push the boundaries of free speech even further. 
 Black Friday 
 At the time of the  Dë TAK report’s release, journalists met a diff erent kind of back-
lash in covering a scheduled November special session of parliament. Initial planning 
for the session provoked vehement student opposition to the slate of Suharto-era 
legislators who would, by default, set the rules for the democratic transition. As the 
government forged ahead, demonstrators again fl ooded the streets outside parliament 
chanting, in solidarity with journalists, “Banning is banned!” News outlets once again 
provided prominent coverage. 54 
 The media’s use of their new freedom manifest in this coverage, whether inten-
tionally or inadvertently, helped defend the transition from reversal in three important 
ways: magnifying objections to legislative biases in setting the rules for the transi-
tion; asserting the media’s right to report civil unrest; and sustaining pressure on 
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legislators to concede to several student demands critical for the transition, particu-
larly a decree guaranteeing the right to free speech. 55 
 A key incentive for the heavy coverage was, of course, increased audience share, 
and not all reporting supported the students’ agenda. Television stations, as the next 
chapter will describe, were still owned by Suharto’s circle and favored the military and 
the ruling party, Golkar, over the students. 
 Regardless of motivation or partisan bias, both print and broadcast media imposed 
unprecedented scrutiny on the legislative process. All five private TV stations, once 
barred from airing parliamentary discussions on the economy, were now broadcasting 
breaking updates on the session’s controversial proceedings. ANteve even showed 
a satiric montage of legislators dozing off and chatting on their cell phones during 
the session. 56 Throughout, Jakarta’s radio stations broadcast blow-by-blow accounts, 
interspersed with live interviews, bringing the highly charged atmosphere of the 
streets right into listeners’ homes and cars. 57 The volatility they presented made gov-
ernment tolerance of this coverage even more remarkable, particularly since television 
and radio were broadcasting demands to expel the military from politics and dissolve 
the current parliament. 
 In the end, this tolerance was limited. With memories of images showing brutal-
ity toward students in May still vivid, security forces were hostile to journalists carry-
ing cameras. The day before the November session, soldiers assaulted five journalists 
covering an altercation with students on a central Jakarta boulevard. On the session’s 
second day, police and soldiers turned on three photojournalists filming a clash out-
side a downtown university campus, kicking one reporter and clubbing another as he 
tried to flee, damaging their cameras and sending all three to the hospital. 58 
 The reaction of the media was significant for its solidarity. General Wiranto apolo-
gized to the photojournalists when he visited them in the hospital and later vowed 
to punish the soldiers responsible. This response failed to mollify media representa-
tives, who were particularly angry that soldiers had started the assaults after reporters 
showed their press cards. “It is hard to escape the impression that ABRI [Angkatan 
Bersenjata Republik Indonesia, Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia] has no 
clear desire to control its violent character,” read a statement from AJI. “The word 
‘sorry’ is very easily said, much as ABRI sees little difficulty in opening fire on or 
clouting unarmed citizens peacefully protesting.” 59 Over two hundred journalists 
staged a mass protest on the parliament’s front steps, using their access to this sanc-
tum to get the government’s attention. They also filmed the gathering to ensure the 
public would see it on the evening news. 60 
 As the session proceeded, reports only grew bolder, as images of soldiers in full 
riot gear brandishing weapons filled television and print media. Then, as legislators 
were voting for the last resolutions on Friday, November 13, soldiers fired into the 
crowds, killing three protestors and injuring hundreds more. Later that night, troops 
fired on the students again, fatally wounding another three. 61 
 The print press responded by filling the next morning’s front pages with graphic 
photographs and large headlines, some dripping with blood. As citizens marched down 
otherwise empty streets to honor the fallen students, Jakarta was again filled with an 
eerie mix of anger and sadness. Even the popular daily  Pos Kota —owned by Golkar 
leader and former information minister, Harmoko—condemned the crackdown with 
sensational coverage that drew crowds of readers to newsstands. 
 In a televised statement, President Habibie extended condolences to the victims’ 
families but also spoke of attempts by “various societal groups” to use the students 
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to advance their agendas in clear violation of “the law and the constitution.” Their 
actions, he said, were a form of treason that “aimed to topple a legitimate govern-
ment” and “threatened the unity and integrity” of the nation. 62 
 Military commentators likewise mixed statements of regret with suggestions 
that the students were pawns of darker forces. Television news anchors on both 
TVRI and the private stations reinforced this hostile interpretation with leading 
questions about student alliances with certain suspicious groups. But the print 
media, including the conservative  Kompas , challenged this interpretation as an 
attempt, in Wimar Witoelar’s words, “to divert attention away from the true issues 
to be investigated—the use of live ammunition and extremely harsh handling of 
unarmed student demonstrations.” 63 
 The crackdown showed that freedom of expression at the street level remained 
illusory, a “right” that students had enjoyed only at the pleasure of ruling elites. But 
news coverage during the November session also demonstrated significant gains. 
Television coverage, as noted above, ultimately undercut the students’ objections to 
a biased legislative process that could derail the democratic transition. But these sta-
tions also established a precedent in reporting on proceedings of the full parliament 
(MPR), providing the public with access that, a year later, would include live coverage 
of another special session showing legislators attacking a sitting president. Equally 
important, the nation’s print and broadcast journalists showed unprecedented unity 
in protesting military assaults on reporters. Finally, the combination of escalating 
protests and media coverage pressured legislators to concede to numerous student 
demands important to the transition, including a formal decree guaranteeing freedom 
of expression. 64 
 “Dancing on a Rotten Stage” 
 Despite these milestones, media reformers feared that the window for institu-
tionalizing recent gains could close at any moment. 65 In a troubling reminder of how 
quickly  reformasi trends could end, the vanguard talk show of “ reformasi radio,”  Wacana 
Jakarta , whose slogan was “we say what we want,” unexpectedly went off  the air with 
little explanation. The show’s staff , which included AJI activist Ahmad Taufi k and 
radio personality Sri Megawati Kurniadi, were suddenly unemployed. Simultaneously, 
some of the bolder print media outlets,  Dë TAK ,  Merdeka ,  D&R , and  Tajuk , found them-
selves confronting lawsuits over their investigative reports—a reminder of how little 
legal protection journalists actually had. 66 
 One of the more articulate statements on the problem of legal protection came 
from AJI leader Heru Hendratmoko, who expressed reservations about the ongoing 
“euphoria over democracy” infecting the country. “It is as if the press were dancing on 
a rotten stage,” he said. “There is no guarantee [we] can enjoy [our current] freedom 
forever. Because . . . all the products of press law are very weak.” Though acknowledg-
ing the government’s repeal of the ministerial decree allowing arbitrary revocation of 
media licenses, he cited new threats from the public, who “often [do] not use their 
right of reply as the first mechanism to solve a problem.” 67 
 The heart of the matter, Hendratmoko explained, lay in the media’s lack of fun-
damental legal rights. He explained, “I imagine we could be like the U.S. [where the 
press is protected by] the First Amendment, but in Indonesia we are blocked by our 
constitution that [guarantees only] freedom of association, assembly and expression 
of one’s opinion, as regulated by law. . . . There lies the problem. Because, it could 
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be [that] a law is made specifically to curtail freedom of the press, as was done by 
the New Order.” 68 Consequently, Hendratmoko and other reformers turned to over-
hauling the country’s convoluted media laws through the Indonesian Press Society, a 
consortium dedicated specifically to such reform and comprising representatives from 
several professional associations. 69 
 After the November session, reformers and sympathetic legislators felt renewed 
urgency to institutionalize the media’s new freedoms before pressure for reversal 
could build. The promise of national elections in 1999 only added to the urgency by 
producing uncertainty, reformers reasoned, that could prompt the Habibie govern-
ment to reinstate media controls to guarantee victory. The administration’s draft of a 
new bill, in fact, contained numerous articles empowering it to regain control over the 
media. The Indonesian Press Society therefore stepped up efforts to perfect its own 
draft press law quickly, while fashioning separate bills for broadcasting and film. The 
good news was that legal reform advocates, bolstered by international prodemocracy 
programs and sympathetic parliamentarians, now wielded considerable influence over 
the policy agenda for their industry. 
 The Smoking Tape 
 By late 1998, the campaign to legalize media freedoms was gaining momentum. 
Most critically, the information minister, Muhammad Yunus Yosfi ah, continued to 
defend the industry’s liberalization, even debating critics on live television about the 
media’s role. 70 Yet there still had been no test of the media’s legal rights in a direct 
confl ict with the president. 
 Then, in February 1999, the news magazine  Panji Masyarakat published a report 
embarrassing the Habibie administration, prompting the president to threaten a law-
suit and launch an investigation of the magazine’s sources. The report damaged the 
standing of the ruling party, Golkar, in the run-up to the June elections, forcing the 
party to confront the prospect of losing to a challenger after decades of assured land-
slides. Considered among news outlets as a “test case” of both media freedom and 
journalistic solidarity, the confrontation that followed was the first time that news 
outlets were seen behaving collectively as an independent fourth estate instead of the 
rent-seeking and generally self-serving businesses they had become under Suharto. 71 
Through the politics it unleashed, the unity it produced, and the principles it high-
lighted, the case became the most important media controversy in the transition’s 
first critical year. 
 The case began in January 1999, when a number of Jakarta’s news outlets acquired 
a cassette containing a wiretapped telephone conversation between two voices that 
sounded like those of the attorney general, Andi Muhammad Ghalib, and President 
Habibie discussing the government’s investigation of Suharto’s fortune. 72 In this 
exchange, allegedly a day after Suharto had visited the attorney general in November 
1998, the speakers pondered how long Ghalib should question the former president 
about his assets to avoid the impression that the government’s inquiry was a sham. In 
one revealing quote, the voice attributed to Ghalib explained that he had interviewed 
Suharto for three hours because “if [it] had been only two hours, then later people 
[would say], oh, this is just another charade.” 73 
 The exchange revealed a careful plot to fool the public, or at least an inside 
joke at the public’s expense. After Habibie asked how Suharto’s case was going, the 
attorney general replied that summoning the ex-president had mollified the public, 
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transforming its anger into “pity.” 74 Ghalib also updated the president on investiga-
tions of oil tycoon Arifin Panigoro, one of the regime’s staunchest critics, and another 
businessman, possibly Sofyan Wanandi. Commentators interpreted the update as 
confirmation that these investigations had been ploys to divert attention from Suhar-
to’s case. 75 
 The taped dialogue was, essentially, a “smoking gun” that belied the Habibie 
regime’s professed dedication to justice and reform. Of the many outlets aware of 
its circulation, only a small tabloid,  Berita Keadilan , had already reported the tape’s 
existence, receiving almost no notice. 76 But on February 18,  Panji Masyarakat released 
a cover story detailing its full contents. 77 
 The  Panji version sold out almost as soon as it hit the streets. By the next day, 
xeroxed copies of the report were selling at major intersections for nearly the price 
of the entire magazine. Originals were going for six times the cover price.  Panji then 
printed three times its normal production and still ran short. 78 For the next few weeks, 
it became Indonesia’s must-buy newsmagazine, selling out quickly in Jakarta and 
other major cities. 79 The rest of the media, in turn, pumped out endless follow-up 
stories on the case covering nearly every possible angle, from speculation on who 
was behind the wiretap and comparisons with the US Watergate scandal to detailed 
diagrams of the technical aspects of wiretapping. 
 Ghalib responded by denying that he had ever had such a conversation. Habibie 
effectively contradicted his attorney general by ordering a police investigation to find 
out who had tapped his phone, thereby acknowledging the tape’s probable authentic-
ity. Officials also began “hunting for” charges—as a  Panji lawyer put it—that could be 
filed against the magazine. 80 
 The day after the report’s release, police appeared at  Panji ’s office and escorted its 
acting chief editor, Uni Zulfiani Lubis, to their headquarters, where they interrogated 
her for nearly five hours. The legal basis for the summons was a pre-Independence 
law passed in 1946 that barred the “dissemination of untruthful information.” 81 
However, the purpose of the interrogation, Lubis later explained, was not to attack 
 Panji ’s reporting per se, but to induce her to name the tape’s source. “From the first,” 
she said, “Habibie didn’t deny [it] was his voice. But he wanted General Wiranto to 
find out who did [the wiretap].” Her interviewers told her that if she revealed  Panji ’s 
source, “they would find the guy” who had tapped the phones and leave her alone. 82 
 Lubis said that the interrogation was intense, but she knew that the police and the 
government were wary of pushing the situation too far. The officers who came to pick 
her up “said they had already prepared [a] letter [declaring] me a suspect. But they 
didn’t use it,” possibly fearing public backlash. 83 Lubis remained only a “witness” in 
the investigation, and not a very helpful one. 
 The police widened their net and, reprising the devastating press crackdown of 
1978, summoned fourteen chief editors from other news outlets that had either broad-
cast the recorded conversation or published its transcript. 84 The goal, as with Lubis, 
was to compel these outlets to disclose their sources. 85 Those summoned underwent 
individual questioning because “the police were hoping one would give in.” 86 
 The response from these editors was very different from the media leadership’s 
response to similar summonses in 1978. The day after Lubis’s interrogation, she 
received a call from  Tempo saying that someone from the police was spreading word 
that she had already cracked and named her source. But a well-known attorney was 
present during the questioning and, with him backing her account,  Tempo told her 
that they had not believed the rumor. Realizing the dilemma these police tactics could 
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create for the other editors summoned, Lubis warned them, “Don’t go alone. Because 
if you go alone, there is no witness who can testify that you didn’t [give up your 
source].” After her warning, “no chief editor . . . [went] to the police offices alone.” 
And no one revealed the tape’s source. 87 
 Two weeks later, Roy Suryo from Gadjah Mada University used voice spectrum 
analysis to determine the tape’s authenticity. He first compared the voice on the tape 
to one of Habibie’s televised speeches, and then compared it to a tape of the comedian 
Butet Kartaredjasa impersonating Habibie. The match between the tape and Habibie’s 
televised speech was very close, Suryo told the media, much closer than the match 
between the voice on the tape and Kartaredjasa’s impersonation. 88 
 Shortly after announcing these findings, Suryo was summoned by Indonesia’s 
notorious military intelligence agency, Badan Intelijen Negara (BIA). He agreed to 
meet, but not without some trepidation, he later explained, as he was fully aware of 
the agency’s involvement in the disappearance of political activists under Suharto. 89 
He alerted members of the media and, armed with his cell phone, traveled from Yog-
yakarta to BIA’s headquarters. A few hours later, he called to explain that after driving 
him around for a while, his interrogators had treated him to lunch and were now his 
good friends. Journalists who had stood by, ready to publicize any mistreatment of 
Suryo, concluded that BIA, at least, did not intend to harass either  Panji Masyarakat or 
Suryo to protect Habibie. 90 Suryo spent the rest of the afternoon relating his story on 
a popular radio talk show. 91 
 Press Community Response and Critique 
 The enormous publicity that  Panji enjoyed after the report showed competitors 
how profi table such a high-risk story could be. Other outlets not only felt obliged to 
storify  Panji ’s exclusive but also appeared to jump in eagerly, devoting serial coverage 
to the case. The scandal dominated radio and television for several days and generated 
heavy print coverage for another two weeks: On February 20, for example, the news-
paper  Merdeka carried eleven articles, an editorial, and a political cartoon on the case. 
Nearly every report, in print or over the air, gave a de facto plug to  Panji by naming the 
magazine as the outlet that had fi rst published the tape’s transcript. 
 The continued coverage indicated that the story had also become a boon for these 
other outlets, a lure for expanding their own audiences.  Panji claimed a spike in circu-
lation following the report and enjoyed a 27 percent increase in advertising between 
February and April. 92 It also raised its cover price from Rp7,800 to Rp8,500. 
 Amid this media blitz, however, journalists from other publications were pri-
vately critical. M.S. Zulkarnaen from  D&R dismissed the wiretap report as “gossip” 
and “sensationalism.” He claimed that  D&R had also known about the tape but “on 
principle” decided not to report it. As a news magazine, he added, “We cannot exploit 
gossip . . . we have to know the truth.” 93 Budiman S. Hartoyo, a senior editor for 
 D&R blacklisted under Suharto, took a somewhat different position. In publishing 
the tape’s transcript, he said,  Panji had exhibited “unusual political courage,” particu-
larly since other media had access to the same information. On the other hand, what 
 Panji had done was not investigative reporting, which involves “digging and digging.” 
Instead, he argued, the report was “a kind of lucky break” for the magazine. 94 
 Ezki Suyanto, from  Dë TAK , argued that  Panji was more opportunistic than brave. 
Her critique was at two levels, assessing the report’s value for both journalism and 
political reform. She said that  Dë TAK had learned of the cassette weeks earlier and 
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that she had heard it at the office of the legal aid organization LBH. During an editorial 
meeting, she said,  Dë TAK ’s staff had debated whether to report it. They decided not 
to, primarily because they could not confirm the tape’s authenticity. Habibie’s spokes-
woman, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, had avoided meeting with  Dë TAK to hear the tape, and 
Ghalib had denied, without listening to it, that the other voice was his. 95 
 Panji had no more luck than  Dë TAK in getting on-the-record verification for either 
voice, but found a way around the legal and ethical challenges this presented, stating 
only that the voices “resembled” ( mirip ) Habibie’s and Ghalib’s and reporting not that 
the conversation on the tape proved anything, but simply that it was circulating. 96 In 
her critique of  Panji ,  Dë TAK ’s Suyanto did not dispute that her own paper might have 
published the tape’s contents if its editors had found a journalistically sound way to 
do it. But they decided that it was “not [a] legitimate” news story because it was “only 
a conversation” about a situation that was “already apparent from the way [the gov-
ernment] was investigating Suharto.” She further explained that “without data,” the 
tape “doesn’t prove anything. It’s not evidence.” Therefore, “from a legal perspective, 
it can’t be used.” 97 
 Even more problematic, Suyanto argued, the ambiguities of  Panji ’s reporting had 
diverted the public’s focus from the Suharto investigation to  Panji ’s alleged trans-
gressions. Airing the conversation, moreover, served almost no purpose in advancing 
political reform. The report’s transformation of a public secret into a media scan-
dal was “just sensationalism” that amounted to “wasting time” for more important 
endeavors. 98 
 As Suyanto predicted, attention did shift from the Suharto investigation to a 
hunt for the mastermind behind the wiretap. 99 But the ground shifted again when 
the police summons of Uni Lubis and the other chief editors provoked a response of 
defensive solidarity. Whatever private reservations they might have had about  Panji ’s 
reporting, publicly the press community united in defense of journalists’ right to do 
what  Panji had done. The consensus was that  Panji had neither violated journalistic 
ethics nor broken the law, and the government should cease interrogations. 100 Even 
the historically progovernment PWI announced readiness to provide legal and logisti-
cal support to defend  Panji should the magazine face a lawsuit, stating that “[w]hat 
was published by the magazine was in the public interest” and “the product of suc-
cessful investigati[ve] reporting.” 101 
 Perhaps most critically, one editor after another cited the newly created Journalis-
tic Code of Ethics as the basis for not cooperating with the investigation. In doing so, 
they united around both a collective assertion of their rights and a mutual commit-
ment to specific journalistic responsibilities. The controversy bound together journal-
ists, editors, and owners in professing mutual commitment to a shared ethical code. 
 The controversy also led the press community to affirm their responsibility to the 
Indonesian public’s “right to know” and to claim their own right to protect sources 
( hak tolak )—both of which at this point enjoyed only limited legal status. The  hak tolak 
had been codified in the nation’s Basic Press Law, as amended in 1982. 102 A closer look 
at the 1982 amendment reveals that, had the wiretap case gone to trial, the invocation 
of either “national security” or “public order” could have rendered this right moot. 103 
Similarly, the public right to know had a tenuous legal foundation. The recently passed 
MPR Decree No. 17 stated that “each person has the right to seek, obtain, possess, 
store, process, and convey information using all available channels.” 104 But as long as 
the government could invoke a security issue, neither the  hak tolak nor the public’s 
right to know offered real protection. 
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 The minister of justice was already threatening to use state security laws against 
those responsible for the wiretap, any of which could have been invoked against out-
lets airing the tape. 105 President Habibie also accused  Panji of violating his “human 
rights” by invading his privacy, declaring this breech an “intellectual criminal act that 
cannot be tolerated.” What if, he asked, cabinet discussions or other important tele-
phone conversations were also being tapped? “What if [conversations between] wives 
speaking with husbands about their families are then tapped?” 106 
 Rebutting both the national security and privacy charges,  Panji ’s defenders noted 
that the magazine had published the wiretapped conversation after the tape had been 
circulating for months and its contents were no longer a “secret” of any kind. 107  Panji ’s 
attorney, Adnan Buyung Nasution, also challenged the national security claim at its 
foundation, arguing that Indonesia could not leave it to those in power to decide “arbi-
trarily” what was a state secret “lest all crime, dishonesty, corruption, collusion and 
nepotism, everything that harms the public, is covered up on the grounds of [being] 
a state secret.” 108 In a forum on the case, AJI members determined that no “national 
secret” had been revealed, nor had anyone’s privacy been violated. The issues in the 
tapped conversation were public, not private. But as one member pointed out, public 
figures in Indonesia were not yet considered “public property,” and an Indonesian 
public figure’s right to privacy was more protected than that of ordinary citizens. 109 
 Impact of the Wiretap Scandal 
 This debate was a reminder that, eight months after Suharto’s fall, there was still 
no clear statutory basis in Indonesian law for distinguishing speech that was sim-
ply inconvenient for those in power from speech that constituted either a threat to 
national security or an invasion of privacy. Nor was there a body of case law off ering 
applicable standards for resolving such issues. Had the wiretap case gone to trial, as 
many advocated, this situation might have changed. 110 But it never reached the courts, 
leaving the legal arena a potential minefi eld for journalists reporting controversial 
information. The wiretap’s revelations also did little to advance the reform move-
ment’s agenda of seeing Suharto stand trial. 
 Nevertheless, the  Panji Masyarakat report and its aftermath furthered the demo-
cratic transition in multiple ways. The debate over the case transformed a passing 
political crisis into an enduring legal principle. Five months after the scandal had pit-
ted the public’s right to know against the government’s invocation of national secu-
rity, reformers achieved passage of the 1999 Press Law, supplanting the New Order’s 
Basic Press Law that had been used by the information minister, Harmoko, to close 
down  Tempo ,  Dë TIK , and  Editor in 1994. 
 The new law did not directly address the question of privacy, and the  hak tolak was 
still readily overridden by the invocation of national security or public order. Despite 
these limitations, the law marked a clear break with the past, inspired in part by the 
wiretap controversy, by explicitly recognizing the public’s right to know, a principle 
absent from previous legislation. Significantly, this right is a central theme of the new 
law, which not only enshrines the principle, but cites it four times. The wiretap case 
thus provided an opportunity to form a consensus leading to legal protection for the 
right to know against the invocation of national security and public order, the corner-
stones of the New Order’s media controls. 
 At an industry level, the case’s de facto resolution in  Panji ’s favor also confirmed 
that, in the context of political transition, the conversion of private rumor into public 
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scandal produced commercial success, collegial solidarity, and political protection. 
Attorney General Ghalib’s reputation suffered a serious blow, magnified by later reve-
lations by Indonesia Corruption Watch that he had accepted Rp9.2 billion ($1 million) 
in bribes from business tycoons under investigation by his office. 111 In June, Ghalib 
was suspended from his post after the media aired this latest scandal.  Panji Masyarakat , 
by contrast, survived to become one of the country’s leading news magazines. 
 
 In its fi rst year, Indonesia’s transition faced multiple threats to its long-term viability. 
The media, supported by an expanding civil society, were central in resisting reversal 
at every stage. This resistance took two primary forms: the exercise of new freedoms 
to widen the bounds of allowable speech and inject needed uncertainty into politi-
cal contestation, and the mobilization of members of the media to defend these new 
freedoms. 
 Responding to the rapid liberalization following Suharto’s fall, the media were 
aggressive in asserting newly won autonomy and widening the scope of permissible 
public discourse. Over a thousand new players obtained publishing licenses, and 
print and broadcast media rushed to outdo each other with sensational headlines 
on corruption and elite conflicts. Established media players, apprehensive about 
the influx of newcomers, extended a cautious welcome. But rather than lobbying 
for a return to the protected market ensured by the New Order’s restrictive licens-
ing, veteran journalists, publishers, and editors convened workshops to increase 
professionalism and shield the industry as a whole from the reimposition of gov-
ernment controls. 
 Wary of the ephemeral nature of this climate, media reformers also collaborated 
to secure institutional protections for their new freedom. Sixteen months into the 
transition, they won passage of the 1999 Press Law. This new legislation, described 
by Janet Steele as “arguably the crown jewel of Reformasi,” offered twenty-one arti-
cles that fulfilled nearly every demand of media activists. 112 Broadcast representatives 
worked to pass the similar 1997 Broadcasting Law, which opened their industry to 
over one hundred television stations (from six under Suharto) and 2,600 radio sta-
tions by 2010. 113 
 Key to understanding the media’s role in democratization, however, is not the 
extent of liberalization, nor even legal guarantees for new freedoms, but what the 
media do with these freedoms. In Indonesia, the exercise of freedom served mul-
tiple functions, but the most consequential advanced democratization by expand-
ing the boundaries of permissible speech and, critically, provoking confrontations 
with the state. 
 In any society seeking to maintain freedom of expression, such pressure is vital in 
normalizing speech that is threatening to those in power. Without it, freedom itself 
becomes an abstraction. In democratic transitions, boundaries must be actively tested 
and stretched because the state will naturally push them back, often a precursor to 
reconstituted authoritarian rule. 
 Boundary testing that provokes confrontations with the state, however, can 
advance a transition beyond expanding de facto limits of tolerance to de jure protec-
tions more critical in establishing a legal framework that can permanently protect 
journalists. After decades of insufficient protection from the constitution’s vague guar-
antee of “freedom of expression” in Article 28, such clarity was particularly important 
as reformers set out to codify specific rights and responsibilities, such as the right to 
protect sources and the obligation to serve the public’s right to know. 
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 Tempo and  Dë TAK produced some of the most forceful reports pushing the lim-
its of government tolerance, especially  Tempo ’s October 1998 cover story on mili-
tary involvement in the rapes of ethnic Chinese women and  Dë TAK ’s November 
1998 investigation revealing high-level orchestration of the “ninja” murder spree in 
East Java. 114 In presenting carefully researched findings,  Tempo and  Dë TAK pulled no 
punches, almost daring officials, particularly military leaders, to react. Both publica-
tions recast a troubling narrative of past events, presenting evidence that seemingly 
spontaneous violence that had marred the democratic transition was elite-directed 
and designed to make Indonesia seem a cauldron of interethnic conflict requiring a 
return to authoritarian rule. Together,  Tempo and  Dë TAK helped prevent reversal by 
discrediting the military’s claims to be a defender of order and casting suspicion on 
attempts to use intergroup violence to slow reforms. 
 Despite the element of provocation in both reports and the disturbing implica-
tions of their revelations, neither produced an open confrontation with the state. 
Therefore, while both publications helped broaden the range of permissible speech 
beyond what had been conceivable under Suharto, the reports did little to institu-
tionalize these widened boundaries, and neither report triggered government back-
lash or became a major scandal. In short, these hard-hitting investigative reports 
momentarily expanded the de facto bounds of permissible speech, but in the absence 
of any confrontation, did not formalize these gains or force accountability on state 
actors. 
 Just a few months later,  Panji Masyarakat released its wiretap report, which accom-
plished what  Tempo and  Dë TAK had not, sparking a serious scandal that soon became a 
confrontation between the government and the print press community. Although the 
case never reached the courts, it produced new clarity in the battle for media reform, 
strengthening support among fellow journalists and sympathetic legislators for for-
mal recognition of specific rights, later codified in the 1999 Press Law. 
 The  Panji case did not impose legal accountability on actors, but it did impose 
political accountability. The controversy exposed the new regime’s continuity with the 
old, revealing Habibie’s collusion with his attorney general to protect the deposed dic-
tator and dispelling his image as a reformer, which had given legitimacy to his plans 
for a second term. It also inspired other media outlets to pursue related revelations 
and question Habibie’s fitness as a leader right when Golkar was floating potential 
presidential candidates for the next election, with Habibie at the top of the list. 115 In 
sum, the furor threw the ruling party off balance and put Habibie, its best hope for 
retaining power, on the defensive. 
 Critics of  Panji were correct that the wiretap story was neither investigative jour-
nalism nor even news. But its impact showed the importance of political scandal, even 
without the investigative reporting valued by media professionals and observers. 116 
Scandal commands sustained public attention by raising rather than answering ques-
tions, creating narrative tension, and inviting nonproprietary follow-up coverage by 
competing media outlets that can produce new revelations, multiplying the impact of 
the original story. 
 Though little more than a transcript, the  Panji report produced a series of reactions 
that extended the life of the original story and amplified damage to the legitimacy of 
Habibie’s continuation of the Suharto regime. At a delicate moment in Indonesia’s 
democratic transition, scandal served a function of central importance by breaking 
up collusive pacts suddenly made visible by the exposure of Habibie’s telephone con-
versations. Media-driven scandal thus checked a recurring inclination in democratic 
84 Chapter 4
transitions toward restoration of the old order by eroding the residual power of the 
superseded regime. 
 Following the  Panji report, Habibie suffered open speculation that he was too 
damaged to win the next election. 117 With such speculation, the scandal advanced the 
critical transformation described by Adam Przeworski: the normalization of contests 
with uncertain outcomes. 118 By their nature, scandals tend to heighten political uncer-
tainty. The wiretap controversy, by reducing the inevitability of a second Habibie term, 
added a new element of unpredictability to the electoral process. After nearly thirty 
years in power, Indonesia’s ruling party suddenly confronted the possibility that new 
leadership might take control. The wiretap revelation thus became a key test of Indo-
nesia’s progress toward democratization, generating unfamiliar uncertainty through 
this upset in the balance of power just as the country was preparing for the historic 
elections of June 1999. 
 The confrontation that the story provoked with the state served one final purpose: 
binding the press community together in defense of the public’s “right to know.” In 
the unity that Jakarta’s media showed in resisting government intimidation through 
summonses and interrogation, we see the media collectively asserting their right to 
protect the confidentiality of sources and defend a public right to information. But as 
 chapter 5 will show, even as media reformers worked to pass the 1999 Press Law that 
established a firm legal foundation for this right, the majority of news outlets would 
fail the next critical challenge: providing the public, in June 1999, with uncompro-
mised coverage of the nation’s first free parliamentary elections in four decades. 
 Chapter Five 
 Media in Retreat 
 It’s not the voting that’s democracy; it’s the counting. 
 —Tom Stoppard,  Jumpers 
 Two weeks after Indonesia’s fi rst free elections in forty-four years, in a Jakarta 
ballroom once packed with hundreds of reporters, a lone journalist rose to ask a ques-
tion. In the euphoria immediately after millions had cast their ballots, both domestic 
election offi  cials and international observers had crowded this same space to proclaim 
the elections “free and fair.” But now, after the observers had returned home, this last 
reporter from the  Jakarta Post asked, “At what point does the mounting evidence of 
fraud invalidate the elections?” 1 
 In Indonesia’s dramatic first year of transition, the culminating event was this 
June 1999 election of a new parliament that would select the next president, making 
its integrity critical to the nation’s future. As Indonesians registered to vote, expecta-
tions were high that these elections would produce a fresh start under a new slate 
of leaders. The earliest returns showed Megawati’s Indonesian Democratic Party of 
Struggle (PDIP), leading the incumbent, Golkar, encouraging a surge of optimism. But 
during the subsequent six-week count, Golkar’s position steadily improved until it 
became clear that the ruling party, although losing the popular vote, would dominate 
parliament and, through coalition-building, likely retain the presidency. Through sys-
tematic manipulation, the country’s first “free and fair” elections in over four decades 
saw the old guard reconsolidate power and produce an electoral outcome more art-
fully engineered than any under Suharto. Indonesia’s June 1999 elections and their 
aftermath revealed a reality facing democratic transitions worldwide—an inherent 
inclination toward reversal. 
 With election monitors and international observers lulled by peaceful voting and 
the opposition’s unprecedented lead, those best positioned to expose Golkar’s manip-
ulation were the domestic media. Yet in this critical test of a newly empowered fourth 
estate, most news outlets failed, downplaying signs of fraud and emphasizing the 
acceptability of the outcome over the integrity of the process, bringing Indonesia close 
to an effective reversal of the country’s transition. 
 Preceding, and underlying, the drama of these elections were two legislative ses-
sions, one public and contested and the other closed and consensual, that would 
greatly influence the future character of electoral contestation. Events unfolded in 
three stages, beginning when the Habibie administration commissioned a group of 
academics to draft new laws governing the transition and then convened a special 
parliamentary session in November 1998 to ratify their rules. During that session, 
reformers mobilized to eliminate the most formidable cog in the old guard’s rul-
ing machinery—the bloc of seventy-five appointive military seats (15 percent of the 
DPR) that reliably voted with Golkar. Activist students and their supporters seemed 
most fearful of the long-term consequences of compromise on this issue. After mass 
demonstrations and violent repression, a negotiated resolution reduced but did not 
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eliminate military representation. Parliament, led by Golkar, then spurned calls from 
student demonstrators for a reform body and asserted its prerogative to finalize these 
laws, including the new election rules. 
 Starting in January 1999, the new rules that parliament passed included recondite 
regulations that advantaged Golkar, allowing the party to set the terms for a referendum 
on its own rule. Facing little publicity, legislators debated on less dramatic but ultimately 
critical procedural issues whose closed-door resolution would facilitate Golkar’s sub-
sequent systematic electoral manipulation. In sum, through sustained bargaining, key 
institutional actors—the ruling party, the military, and some minor party politicians—
drafted a new electoral structure that reduced some endemic inequities of the past but 
overall let current stakeholders protect their positions. Finally, in June 1999, rules con-
trolling the parliamentary elections allowed the Golkar machine to implement a coun-
terintuitive strategy of “winning by losing” that positioned it to retain the presidency. 
 In furthering democratization, a key challenge for the media, as well as other 
actors, was to normalize and then institutionalize fair, open-ended, and inclusive 
contestation. At each stage, the media’s performance was decidedly mixed—at times 
aggressively insistent on promoting fairness and transparency, while at others self-
consciously compromised in the name of stability. In making these compromises, par-
ticularly during the long vote count of June and July, members of the media responded 
to the ruling party’s machinations and the complicity of other actors in ways consti-
tuting a critical departure from democratization. 
 A broader challenge that Indonesia faced, common to pacted transitions, was the 
need to rely on members of the ruling coalition to preside over reforms that could 
reduce their power or remove them from office entirely. Thus, the first question 
for reformers, and the media covering their demands, was not whether the Habibie 
administration would attempt electoral reform, but whether current power holders 
owing their positions to the patronage-based electoral process could be trusted to 
eliminate biases serving their interests. 
 Indonesia’s transition was at its most tenuous during this tumultuous period of 
electoral reform. While  chapter 4 describes the ways in which members of the media 
confronted threats to their own safety and freedom, what follows is an examination of 
their contribution to democratization itself in covering the rule writing and the elec-
tions’ implementation. During this structural change, from the earliest rule writing in 
September 1998 through the end of the ballot count in July 1999, the country oscil-
lated between progress and reversal, ending safely, albeit tentatively, on a path to con-
tinued reform. The oscillation reflected an inherent inclination toward reversal during 
democratic transitions and showed that, in the absence of aggressive media scrutiny 
and corresponding public pressure, there were few restraints on this inclination. 
 Reporting the Rule Writing 
 Indonesia’s democratic transition began in late summer 1998, when the Habibie 
administration commissioned a group of political scientists, Team Seven, to draft new 
bills replacing the New Order’s political laws. By shifting power away from the executive 
and liberalizing the party system, the drafts off ered limited structural changes to reduce 
the incumbency advantages enjoyed by Golkar. 2 This early stage of rule writing generated 
little criticism, and media coverage was largely stenographic. Nevertheless, this coverage 
imposed transparency, and some accountability, on eff orts to address past imbalances. 
 More critical reporting began in October when conflicts emerged over the bills 
submitted to the DPR. Main points of contention included the number of legislative 
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seats reserved for the military, which Team Seven’s bill set at fifty-five, and the use 
of a district system of representation, replacing the previous proportional system. 3 
Other unresolved questions included what percentage of seats each party must win 
to qualify for the next election cycle and whether civil servants should be active in 
political parties. 4 
 On television and in print, coverage of this stage mirrored debates among legislators 
fairly closely, focusing on the few issues preoccupying insiders. Complicating the media’s 
role, however, was pressure to cover those outside the process, some of whom rejected 
the existing parameters altogether. Most visibly, thousands of students rallied outside 
parliament to protest the upcoming legislative session that would cement the current 
leaders’ claim to power and their right to determine the rules governing the transition. 
 As the special session approached, actors fell into roughly two camps, labeled 
“insiders” versus “outsiders.” 5 The outsiders were pushing for major reform, led by 
students but supported by civil society groups, some retired military, and (with fluctu-
ating enthusiasm) opposition politicians. The group of insiders resisting such reform 
consisted of regime allies, military stakeholders, and much of the incumbent parlia-
ment, all coalescing within the ruling Golkar party. 6 Members of the media could be 
found across this spectrum, but all outlets faced pressure to “cover both sides,” a man-
tra repeated frequently in this period. Relative to the more independent print press, 
television stations, all owned by either the government or Suharto’s family and cronies, 
were more sympathetic toward the Habibie regime, the military, and their supporters. 
 In reporting student efforts to stop the session that would cede this control to the 
old guard, media coverage, on balance, neither condemned nor endorsed the students’ 
objectives. As the parliamentary session drew closer, however, tensions in Jakarta grew, 
and the impending showdown put news outlets in an increasingly difficult position. 
 The protests, inspired by belief that the current government was illegitimate, pre-
sented two major predicaments for news outlets. The first involved negotiating the 
physical risks in covering events on the ground. With tanks rolling through Jakarta’s 
streets and military-recruited civilians (Pam Swakarsa) attacking students, reporting 
on the demonstrations meant covering confrontations between protesters and secu-
rity forces and facing the possibility of direct assaults by soldiers and police. 7 
 The second predicament was more complex. Covering the protests meant cover-
ing the questions they raised: Was the session legitimate, and would the transition 
be compromised irredeemably if current legislators decided the rules for new elec-
tions? Much of the student movement objected to the incumbents’ involvement. At 
this early stage, even strictly factual reporting on the students tended to validate their 
agenda—including demands that Habibie resign, parliament be dissolved, and genuine 
reformers with no vested interests take over. The students were pushing for conditions 
more conducive to effective democratic reform, aiming to inhibit, rather than facilitate, 
incumbent manipulation of the process. A supportive media might have demonstrated 
equal passion through editorials challenging the parliament’s legitimacy or spotlight-
ing student leaders’ demands for a new interim government. Avoiding such coverage 
risked endorsing a biased process. 
 Yet encouraging the students’ idealism also carried risks, notably that of sanction-
ing an extraconstitutional resolution to their impasse with the state. The students’ 
preferred way forward was to establish a “reform council” to replace serving legisla-
tors. 8 As the session approached, however, a very different extraconstitutional out-
come seemed more likely. By November, Jakarta again looked like a city under martial 
law. Wire barricades reappeared, and soldiers returned to posts along the main roads. 
Thousands of Pam Swakarsa—young men bussed in by the military and armed with 
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knives and sharpened sticks—stood ready to confront student demonstrators, signal-
ing that the military had no intention of letting students force their demands. 9 
 As tensions grew with the approach of the special parliamentary session, so did the 
possibility that the standoff between students and state would end in an extrasystemic 
transfer of power, with a coup more likely than a people’s presidium. As the session 
started, journalists found themselves covering a situation similar to that of the previous 
May, which had ended in a takeover of parliament and a change of regime. This time, 
however, there was little support beyond student circles for repeating this earlier tri-
umph. The media’s challenge, once crackdowns on demonstrations began, was finding 
a way to support both the students and the parliamentary session they were opposing. 
 Media Tightrope 
 In the end, most news outlets supported the students as the nation’s conscience 
while dismissing their demand for an impartial process as impractical. 10 This stance 
was grounded in a logic that became prevalent in the following months, as concern for 
survival of the process increasingly trumped concern for its fairness. 
 The first defining moment in this balancing act was the media’s response to a 
declaration by four reform leaders on the session’s first day, November 10. When the 
session opened with none of the country’s main opposition leaders present, a student 
coalition representing over sixty Jakarta-area campuses made a last-ditch attempt to 
redirect events. After hours of negotiation, the group convinced the four leaders—
Megawati Sukarnoputri, Amien Rais, Abdurrahman Wahid, and the sultan of Yogya-
karta, Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono X—to meet at Wahid’s house in Ciganjur, South 
Jakarta. Students hoped to persuade them to establish a long-sought reform council, 
though all four were reluctant participants in this student-led convocation. Instead of 
supporting a transitional government, the “Ciganjur Four” issued a declaration listing 
moderate demands, including a shorter gap between the general and presidential elec-
tions and a six-year phase-out of the military’s presence in parliament. 11 
 The declaration, the Ciganjur Agreement, fell far short of students’ expectations. 
But its timely appearance at the session’s start gave news outlets a middle road, allow-
ing them to critique the session without supporting the students’ call for an extra -
constitutional transfer of power. Neither ignoring the declaration and affirming the 
status quo, nor treating it as a betrayal of the students’ demand for reform, most media 
showcased the Ciganjur Agreement as a monumental event—a tangible advance in 
the reform movement’s agenda. 
 This coverage did not challenge the parliamentary session’s legitimacy but did 
intensify pressure on legislators to meet reformers’ more modest demands. Sig-
nificantly, the session’s final decrees reflected all but one of the recommendations. 
The students, nevertheless, were disappointed. They continued to reject the session 
and escalate protests, still pressuring the Ciganjur Four to proclaim themselves the 
nation’s interim leaders. 
 Covering the Crackdown 
 Despite the Ciganjur Agreement, the media’s dilemma continued. Arising from 
the decision to support both the students and the session they rejected, this predica-
ment was compounded by growing security brutality against students and journalists. 
As events unfolded, media coverage of the standoff  between students and the military 
went through four distinct shifts in interpretation. 
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 Leading up to the session, print and broadcast coverage cast students as a moral 
force performing their historic role as the nation’s conscience. After the session 
began, however, coverage of the students’ standoff with security forces began to shift, 
particularly on television. Commentary and visuals combined to portray the students 
as unreasonably pushing the military into a corner. In this view, the problem was not 
that the country was already facing a crisis because current leaders were biased, but 
that students were creating a crisis by forcing their demands. 
 In the first shift, television newscasters began describing the military and police 
as public servants doing their jobs while falling victim, along with the students, to 
growing violence. Sympathy for security forces first emerged on the television station 
RCTI, partly owned by Suharto’s oldest son, and on the government-run TVRI. It was 
clearest in the November 11 reports on the military assaults on students and three 
photojournalists described in  chapter 4 . SCTV and ANteve led their evening news-
casts with the assaults, interviewing victims who gave gripping descriptions of sol-
diers beating students like “animals” and battering journalists with riot sticks before 
smashing their cameras. But RCTI and TVRI coverage was cursory, stating only that 
journalists “had been struck” before reporting at length on the soldiers’ injuries. 12 
 By November 12, sympathy for security forces increasingly dominated all televi-
sion stations, marking the second shift, and was most obvious in coverage of a sit-in 
protesting the assaults on journalists the previous day. On SCTV, the Antara state 
news agency’s Parni Hadi called for sympathy “yes, for the journalist and student 
victims, but also for [the military].” 13 On RCTI, Desi Anwar, sister of presidential 
spokeswoman Dewi Fortuna Anwar, encouraged Hadi to repeat this plea for broader 
sympathy but then pressed him, using leading questions, to shift blame for secu-
rity force violence onto the journalists themselves. Through a convoluted exchange, 
Anwar led Hadi to the desired, exculpatory conclusion that the shooting “was indeed 
a pure accident.” Anwar then pushed this interpretation of events further, asserting 
that the military was “cornered” both by the MPR fight over their parliamentary seats 
and “by public pressure from the military’s negative image.” 14 
 That evening, three student protesters died in clashes with security. The next 
day, November 13, newscasts were a jumble of breaking reports on developments 
inside and outside parliament, marking the third shift in the narrative. By midafter-
noon, tens of thousands of people had poured into Jakarta streets to join the students 
pushing their way toward parliament. Inside the main building, the five commissions 
worked to finalize the twelve decrees that would set the government’s agenda for the 
rest of Habibie’s term. 
 The commissions were deciding several contentious issues, and resolutions 
included limited victories for reformers. The decision to name Suharto in a decree on 
corruption, though short of ordering an investigation into his wealth, still represented 
a clear win over conservatives on a key issue. 15 Likewise, a decree mandating “gradual” 
elimination of the military’s appointive seats constituted a concession to the Ciganjur 
signatories, who had proposed a six-year phaseout. 16 Yet the compromises did little to 
appease student demonstrators, particularly those demanding the military’s immedi-
ate removal from parliament. 
 As pressure built, rumors began circulating that unnamed parties planned to 
use the students to unseat Habibie and install a military junta, making the students 
unwitting puppets in an extraconstitutional maneuver. 17 That afternoon, security 
forces fired into the crowds, killing three more students and injuring dozens. 
 Six months earlier, the shootings of four students at Trisakti University had so 
shocked the nation that even reporting by the television stations owned by Suharto’s 
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kin and cronies began to turn against his regime. 18 Now the same stations, though 
conveying condolences over the latest casualties, persevered in supporting both the 
students and the current regime, using variations of the dominant message celebrat-
ing students’ sacrifice while casting them as victims of larger forces. In one iteration, 
students were represented as well-meaning but overwhelmed by “brutal” stone-
throwing crowds and “uncontrollable masses” who provoked the crackdowns that 
claimed student lives. 19 In the darkest iteration, a shadowy third party was said to be 
manipulating the students and the masses in an effort, as President Habibie said, to 
“topple a legitimate government.” 20 
 This coverage was not uniform. While TVRI and RCTI were fairly consistent in 
sympathizing with security forces and parliamentarians, Indosiar, SCTV and ANteve 
aired more critical content favoring the protesters’ perspective. 21 On November 13, 
ANteve aired arguably the most damning portrayal of the assembly—a video montage 
showing legislators dozing off and chatting on their cellphones inside parliament while 
decrees were being passed and students were dying outside. 22 Yet even these stations 
reported that security forces had been “forced to fire shots” to disperse thousands of 
unruly students. 23 By evening, all stations used the dual theme of a military cornered by 
students and growing crowds who were, in turn, being exploited by some third party. 
 Constructing the students as victims of larger forces undercut their leadership in 
rejecting the session and their status as the voice of the reform movement. Newscasts 
further damaged students’ credibility through a fourth and final shift in the narrative: 
the claim that parliament was in fact heeding their demands, which made the session 
and its resolutions “legitimate.” 24 A key voice affirming these points, ironically, was 
Amien Rais—one of the Ciganjur Four, but also reliably pliant in concurring with tele-
vision interviewers, particularly those from RCTI and TVRI. On the session’s bloodi-
est day, TVRI announced that Rais had declared that the session’s results reflected the 
people’s aspirations, then warned students that attempts to repeat the events of the 
previous May would likely lead to a military takeover, “to the collapse of everything 
we have been building.” 25 
 That same night, RCTI cohosts Adolf Kusuma and Desi Anwar elicited more com-
mentary from Rais in which he discredited the ongoing demonstrations, prompting 
him first to describe a “mass hysteria that . . . produces a dissatisfaction, a feeling 
of disappointment, . . . maybe also a mass sadness now . . . exploding here in the 
capitol.” 26 When Kusuma remarked that “earlier provocation actually coming from 
the people” might have compelled the military to take “a repressive attitude,” Rais 
noted that blame also lay with the military-recruited civilian militia and their “orga-
nizers,” but ended by criticizing the students. “I think people like this don’t have . . . 
sympathy towards the military,” he said. “[The armed forces] also are children of this 
nation,” and if they suddenly lost all their seats, “they would . . . be angry because 
they would feel humiliated [literally, “knocked down”].” 27 Viewers were left with a 
message validating indignation at the students’ persistence, particularly their demand 
for the elimination of military seats. 28 
 Opinions of the other Ciganjur Four were noticeably absent from these inter-
views, as were those of the students, who received little airtime to defend their con-
tinued mobilization. 29 In one of the few opportunities students had, their logic became 
clearer. Responding to an SCTV reporter’s claim that the demand for elimination of 
military seats from parliament “has already been accommodated in an MPR decree,” a 
student countered, “In reality, [the military’s] presence as a percentage of parliament 
just increased from 7.5% to 7.68%.” 30 This, along with other reasons for rejecting 
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the session’s outcome, was left out of other television commentary. Instead, voice 
after voice declared the special session’s results legitimate, leaving viewers with little 
understanding of why protests continued. 31 
 Finally, in a broadcast carried by all stations, MPR Speaker Harmoko issued a 
formal announcement on the session’s final results, including Decree No. 14, which 
stipulated only a “gradual” reduction in military seats. 32 By the session’s close, the 
MPR had passed a total of twelve decrees establishing the agenda for the transition, 
including rules for the next election. 
 Two hours later, TVRI reported that three more students had died, concluding, 
“The demonstration that caused the casualties . . . is still in progress.” 33 Inside news-
rooms, staff were reacting to events on the streets whose implications were far larger 
than the violence they were reporting. In May, the Trisakti shootings had triggered 
protests, and the ensuing military-engineered violence that claimed over 1,200 lives 
had destroyed what remained of Suharto’s legitimacy. Six months later, the country 
again confronted news that the military had fired on university students, putting the 
government’s legitimacy in question. 
 The next day, November 14, signs of public anger were apparent throughout Jakarta 
as thousands marched in solidarity with the students and thousands more lined the 
streets to watch. Newspapers displayed graphic images of the previous night’s vio-
lence capped by bold headlines dripping with blood. Throughout the day, news outlets 
were barraged with phone calls, emails, and faxes from people expressing outrage 
over the student deaths. One of the smaller private television stations, Indosiar, aired 
statements by public figures Sri Bintang Pamungkas and Amien Rais (in marked con-
trast to his tone the previous day) calling on General Wiranto to resign. 34 
 Elsewhere on television, however, a different picture emerged. President Habibie 
appeared on all stations to reinforce the now-dominant message: third parties were 
manipulating the people. “There are movements and actions,” he explained, “being 
carried out by . . . groups that plainly are working to violate the law and the consti-
tution by mobilizing the masses to force their will in an effort to undermine . . . the 
special session’s results.” These results, he emphasized, “have . . . been decided dem-
ocratically and constitutionally.” TVRI followed with similar statements from other 
officials. 35 In contrast to print media reports on the dozens of groups demanding that 
Wiranto and Habibie resign, the station claimed, based solely on statements from the 
Indonesian Moslem Forum, there was widespread support for the session’s results. 36 
 The military, for its part, faced little scrutiny over its efforts to discredit the stu-
dents who had mobilized to remove them from parliament. There was remarkably 
little criticism of its insertion of Pam Swakarsa into the crowds, a move arguably 
destined to incite violence, or of its use of snipers and live bullets. As the body count 
mounted, the recurring message instead was that security forces were “cornered” by 
demonstrators, “forcing” them to shoot. This message went virtually unquestioned 
despite, as Wimar Witoelar noted, evidence “that numerous options came and went 
to stop the shooting or . . . prolong a bloodless standoff by using retreat points prede-
termined by riot control planning.” 37 
 None of the stations pursued this critique of military leaders. Instead, the domi-
nant image as the session ended was of Jakarta teetering on the brink of anarchy and 
soldiers working patiently to establish calm. Significantly, in a final bid to end the 
demonstrations, the military deployed the marines, a telegenic force in fuchsia berets, 
who deftly befriended student protesters, producing visuals of amity and acceptance 
used in coverage by all stations. 
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 Reinforcing what now appeared to be a media consensus, TVRI’s 7:00 p.m. news 
reported that while thousands of citizens sympathized with the students’ “moral 
movement,” “uncontrolled mobs” were engaging in burning and looting. A group 
of public figures, including Amien Rais, the report continued, had held a press con-
ference to urge all sides to restrain themselves to prevent more deaths. The head 
of the president’s think tank, the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals, 
appeared again, urging “all sides, including the mass media, to reassure the pub-
lic because the session’s results have been agreed on and accepted by President 
Habibie.” 38 After replaying General Abdul Haris Nasution’s earlier warning against 
“unconstitutional actions,” TVRI closed with a picture of order restored, function-
ally closing the media narrative and ending the crisis. “[T]housands of students, 
intermingling with masses” now sat quietly listening to orations outside parlia-
ment. 39 The orderly dispersal of the crowds after this broadcast signaled the end of 
the students’ demonstrations—and their last unified campaign to challenge incum-
bent control over the transition. 
 Only twenty-four hours after the violence of November 13, it was clear that Habi-
bie, his party, and military supporters had defeated the student-led bid to shift con-
trol over the transition to nonincumbents. The media, primarily television, assisted 
the regime in this development, in part by disregarding the demonstrators’ main 
contention—that letting the incumbent parliament write the rules for the country’s 
next elections was inherently unsound. With limited exceptions, coverage affirmed 
the legitimacy of current leaders’ command over the transition, reminding audiences 
of the danger that rejecting their leadership would pose to national stability. 40 
 Despite this outcome, the Habibie administration remained critical of TV coverage 
and, reprising Suharto’s standard tactic, moved to facilitate a government-led buyout 
of SCTV and Indosiar. 41 One official stated that the SCTV takeover would “be carried 
out to restore [the station’s] health.” But SCTV insiders asserted that the move was 
punishment for critical reporting on clashes between students and security forces. A 
press release reported pressure on the station “to change its news director as a pen-
ance for ‘mistakes’ committed . . . through its news reporting policy.” 42 If this charge 
was correct, the regime was seeking to skew the democratic process further in its favor 
by ensuring positive coverage for the president in the lead-up to the coming elections. 
 Final Negotiations 
 With the issue of who would decide the transition’s framework resolved, atten-
tion turned to fi nal negotiations over three political bills on elections, parties, and 
the legislature scheduled for passage in January 1999. The bills raised a question for 
both the media and the public: Would the new rules level the playing fi eld or simply 
perpetuate the distortions of the past? 
 As the majority party in parliament, Golkar dominated the new eighty-seven-
member committee charged with drafting these bills and pressed for an electoral sys-
tem that would advantage its political machine. In negotiating, the party confronted 
two main challengers: independent local leaders who could win by name recognition 
and minority parties that could aggregate votes at the provincial or national level. By 
contrast, opposition parties wanted to maximize their minority status and held mixed 
opinions on local politics. 
 The most contentious issues, however, were the allocation of unelected seats for 
the military and the activity of civil servants in political parties, given their access 
to the state bureaucracy. 43 A final question was whether to retain proportional 
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representation or switch to a district system in which voters would choose not from a 
slate of political parties but from among individual candidates. 
 The media, by following these three battles, bolstered opposition efforts to ensure 
a fairer process. Since civil servants overwhelmingly belonged to Golkar—a legacy 
of mandatory membership under Suharto—barring them from campaigning would 
limit the ruling party’s unfair access to state resources. Similarly, reducing the num-
ber of military appointees, whose interests and votes coincided with Golkar’s, would 
curb the party’s advantages in the legislature. Finally, concern for fairness emerged 
in debates over whether to use a district or proportional system of representation. 
Under the latter, voters choose from a list of parties rather than candidates, and 
parties receive seats proportional to votes won at the provincial level. Party leaders 
then select individuals to fill the seats. A district system, advocates argued, would let 
voters choose among party candidates in the country’s more than three hundred dis-
tricts and special municipalities, increasing the accountability of representatives to 
their constituents. But opponents worried that such a system might foster regional 
separatism, and incumbent legislators, who generally lacked connections to the areas 
they represented, feared competing against local personalities. 44 
 For multiple reasons, the drafting committee voted overwhelmingly to retain the 
proportional representation that advantaged incumbents, particularly Golkar. But 
they could not agree on whether to count votes at the provincial level (Level I), allow-
ing minority parties to preserve votes otherwise lost, or at the regency level (Level II), 
as Golkar representatives advocated. If votes were counted at Level II, a party could 
easily win a first-past-the-post victory in a regency or township without winning the 
majority of local votes. Anticipating the 1999 elections, an opposition party represen-
tative estimated that Golkar could win more than half the vote using a Level II system, 
versus no more than 20 percent if votes were counted at Level I. 45 
 Though these battles would affect how opposition parties would fare against 
Golkar’s nationwide machine, the arcane details received little media attention. Nev-
ertheless, pressure from other parties forced compromises. The drafting committee 
agreed to use a Level I system, and Habibie decreed that civil servants must take leave 
to support a political party. 46 
 These concessions suggest that this relatively democratic legislative process—
allowing open debate and giving voting power to all parties—had worked, reducing the 
media burden of critical analysis. But journalists failed to scrutinize other aspects of the 
new rules that would impact both the parliamentary and presidential elections, includ-
ing the disproportional allocation of seats favoring Golkar’s outer island strongholds. 47 
 Nor was there significant coverage of biases favoring Golkar in appointing non-
elective provincial representatives (Utusan Daerah) and sectoral group representa-
tives (Utusan Golongan), although these two hundred appointive seats, plus the 
thirty-eight appointive military seats, would make up a third of the new seven-
hundred-member MPR that would select the president in October. These biases 
would sow bitter controversies later, but as the January 28 deadline for the bills’ 
approval approached, the media’s dominant concern was whether they would be 
rejected and the elections canceled. This concern for the survival of the process 
over its integrity would emerge repeatedly in the months to come. 
 After the three bills passed, numerous print outlets focused briefly on Golkar 
engagement in “money politics” to influence members of the General Election Com-
mission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU). 48 As June 7 approached, however, such 
concerns were sidelined by stories anticipating violence and fears that the elections 
might not go forward at all. 49 In the following weeks, continued emphasis on possible 
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violence prevented scrutiny of the systematic electoral manipulation that would posi-
tion Golkar to retain its control over government. 
 Covering the Count 
 On June 7, 1999, after much speculation that Indonesia’s fi rst free elections in forty-
four years might collapse in violence, over 87 percent of the country’s 128 million eligi-
ble voters cast ballots. 50 In this landmark contest, overseen by the new KPU, forty-eight 
parties competed for parliamentary seats. When voting ended without major incident 
and early returns showed the popular opposition party PDIP in the lead, relief among 
local and international observers was palpable. The former US president Jimmy Carter 
called the elections a “festival of democracy” and declared the voting “fair and peaceful.” 
Carter added a cautionary note, saying he had “never seen so complicated a process to 
choose a president,” but the characterization “free and fair” circulated around the globe, 
virtually closing the books on the story for the international press. 51 
 Within Indonesia, however, euphoria soon faded, and the situation grew murky. 
There was little question that voting had been peaceful and, according to initial reports, 
conducted fairly in all but two provinces, Aceh and East Timor. 52 PDIP’s early lead, 
unimaginable in past elections, encouraged optimism that Indonesia was launched 
securely on a path to political change. But its strong showing distracted attention 
from Golkar’s manipulation of the process which, though more sophisticated, was as 
extensive—and successful—as in past elections. 
 The manipulation took place both through ordinary fraud and a strategy that one 
could call “winning by losing.” Unlike the simple majority needed to win a direct election 
for president, Indonesia’s indirect selection by parliamentary delegates provided multiple 
points for maneuvering that eluded most observers. Instead of blatant cheating to steal the 
elections, Golkar could adopt a more subtle strategy of limited fraud—in the voting and 
the count—to give its parliamentary delegation a less conspicuous second place and then 
build coalitions with smaller parties to elect its candidate from the floor of parliament. 
 Complaints over “ordinary fraud”—primarily poll violations—began coming in 
as soon as the polls closed on June 7. Only three days later, the Independent Election 
Monitoring Committee had already received reports of 19,504 violations from their 
observations at 79,000 of the country’s 250,000 polling centers. 53 
 Most violations involved Golkar, with the most serious in provinces where the 
party had fared best, particularly on Sulawesi, the president’s home island. In South 
Sulawesi, after Golkar took two-thirds of the vote, twenty-eight rival parties united 
to demand a recount, accusing the ruling party of handing out cash bribes. 54 In two 
regencies, thirty-five parties rejected the results wholesale, citing serious Golkar 
infractions. 55 By June 29, the Independent Election Monitoring Committee had con-
firmed over 9,800 violations in this province alone. 56 
 Controversy was greater in North Sulawesi, where Golkar won over half the vote. In 
mid-June, one observer wrote, “the entire province . . . decided in a tense meeting . . . to 
hold the entire election over again thanks to Golkar’s violations.” 57 Significantly, among 
the forty-eight parties contesting these elections, Golkar won a landslide 57 percent, 
gaining the party four of the province’s seven DPR seats. In Central Sulawesi, another 
site of myriad violations, Golkar won a crushing 70 percent of the national vote and half 
of the regional legislative seats. 58 
 The Golkar machine was equally strong in the remote eastern islands. In East 
Timor, where the party also took an early lead, election workers in three districts found 
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ballot boxes opened before they began counting. In another regency with only 30,028 
registered voters, workers reported receiving 160,000 ballots. Similarly, reports from 
West Nusa Tenggara implicated government officials, assumed to be Golkar members, 
in vote-tampering schemes. 59 
 Before the election, there were numerous signs of embezzlement, providing clues 
to much of the election fraud’s funding. In May 1999, evidence surfaced that nearly half 
of the Rp17.9 trillion ($256 million) that the World Bank had provided for Indonesia’s 
Social Safety Net program had been “misappropriated.” Election monitoring groups 
reported that some of this money had gone to Golkar campaigning in the outer islands. 60 
The same month, observers had estimated that Golkar’s campaign would spend at least 
one billion rupiah ($116,000) per electoral district—nearly $35 million nationwide. 61 
Despite clear indications that much of the money was obtained illegitimately, few ques-
tioned how party officials could accumulate such vast sums during an economic crisis. 
 Media Dilemmas 
 Before and after the vote, the media devoted little space to these reports. Their 
dilemma was now that reporting fraud risked discrediting the electoral process and 
derailing the transition; remaining silent risked undermining the transition less per-
ceptibly by allowing the perpetuation of engineered outcomes. 
 Biases in media ownership also discouraged critical coverage, particularly within 
television stations owned by Suharto supporters, where staff complained of strong 
pressure to favor Golkar. Yet as the nation began the long process of ballot counting, 
the historic nature of these events imposed caution on everyone involved, particularly 
news outlets. For the first time in decades, Golkar was not heading to another land-
slide victory. Early returns showed the once-entrenched ruling party trailing PDIP by 
double digits, suggesting that even if Golkar was subverting the process to stay in 
power, the strategy was failing. 62 
 This outcome, regardless of fraud, seemed synonymous with democratization’s 
triumph, making irregularities appear inconsequential. For the first time but not the 
last, a desirable outcome was equated with the advancement of democratization. Yet 
Golkar was not failing in its bid to retain power. There was another, less visible dimen-
sion to the story ignored by all but a few journalists—the party’s implementation of 
the second-place strategy of “winning by losing.” 
 As international observers declared the elections free and fair, two little-noticed 
trends signaled Golkar’s implementation of such a strategy. Advantages that the party 
had secured in the earlier rule writing grew more apparent—specifically, those allocat-
ing more seats per registered voter to outer island provinces (one per 172,750 voters) 
where Golkar support was stronger than to opposition bailiwicks on Java and Bali 
(one per 203,917 voters). 63 
 After the vote, returns from the outer provinces were coming in far more slowly than 
from Java and Bali—an apparent use of the machine strategy of withholding votes until the 
minimum number necessary for victory becomes clear. 64 By June 10, with just 16 percent 
of votes tallied nationwide, Megawati’s PDIP was winning 44 percent of votes cast for the 
five largest parties in the six most populous provinces on Java and Bali, building a wide lead 
over Golkar’s 12 percent (see  table 1 ). By contrast, in five outer-island provinces—
three on Sulawesi—Golkar was winning an average of 45 percent to PDIP’s 32 percent. 65 
 Golkar’s lopsided showing in these five provinces was not necessarily remark-
able, given the party’s strength and overall organization. More noteworthy was the 
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significantly faster rate of early returns from PDIP strongholds compared to those 
from remote provinces where Golkar was leading. In its stronghold Yogyakarta, 
PDIP held a substantial 23 percent lead over Golkar on June 10, with 32 percent of 
total votes counted. That same day, in the Golkar-dominated South Sulawesi, whose 
twenty-four seats were weighted heavily, at 176,000 voters each, returns were trick-
ling in with only 6 percent tallied. Significantly, though South Sulawesi was Habibie’s 
home province, Golkar and PDIP were in a dead heat, with 19 percent each. 66 Four 
days later, when excitement over PDIP’s early showing had faded, South Sulawesi’s 
unlikely neck-and-neck race of June 10 had disappeared, leaving Golkar with an over-
whelming 75 percent of the vote versus only 10 percent for PDIP. 67 
 Maps and tables downloaded at the KPU’s media headquarters in Jakarta on the seventh day of the 
count, June 14, 1999, showed a telling pattern indicating that the Golkar machine was withholding votes 
to allow a late-hour infl ation of the party’s returns. In the opposition district of Yogyakarta, where the 
insurgent PDIP had won 42 percent of the total, the numbers were pouring in, rising fast from a range 
of 42–78 percent tallied at 6:02 p.m. (map on left) to an overall 78.64 percent by 7:30 p.m. (table 2). By 
contrast, in South Sulawesi (map on right), where the ruling Golkar party was winning 75 percent of the 
total, by 11:25 p.m. on June 14, only 31 percent of the votes had been reported. 
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 On June 14, with 58 percent of votes counted nationwide, the pattern of slower 
returns from pro-Golkar regions became apparent (see  table 2 and  maps ). In Bali and 
the whole of Java (East, West, and Central), over two-thirds of votes were already tal-
lied, and PDIP’s lead had reached 50 percent. Yet in the eight provinces where Golkar 
had a double-digit lead, only two-fifths of returns had come in. There was a clear cor-
respondence between provinces with heavily weighted seats, a wide Golkar majority, 
and a slow rate of return—a situation indicative of manipulation through an electoral 
machine.   
 This discrepancy in return rates was the first indication that the Golkar machine 
might be holding back votes from provinces where the party was strong and there 
were more seats per registered voter—the formula Golkar had fought for earlier. 68 The 
second, little-noticed trend aiding Golkar was the slow but steady erosion of PDIP’s 
lead, also facilitated by the sluggish pace of outer island returns. While Golkar had 
 Table 1. Indices of electoral fraud, Indonesian elections, June 10, 1999. 
Votes counted: 16%. 







 PDIP (% 
of votes 












 Inner Islands        
 Bali  8  9,192  88  100,081  18  9  226,685 
 Jakarta*  12  93,463  41  322,333  18  18  281,792 
 C. Java  16  201,853  47  603,555  12  60  312,010 
 E. Java  14  372,548  40  1,050,108  20  68  320,759 
 W. Java  7  11,321  9  14,970  25  82  308,945 
 Yogyakarta  17  85,000  40  204,830  32  6  321,567 
 Outer Islands       
 Aceh  15  7,816  8  4,186  6  12  123,858 
 E. Kalimantan  31  63,184  39  80,006  25  7  190,763 
 Lampung  24  51,905  52  114,462  12  15  245,087 
 E. Nusa Tenggara  52  53,328  41  42,050  6  13  153,984 
 N. Sulawesi  50  59,268  32  37,648  11  7  248,346 
 S. Sulawesi  19  13,883  19  13,747  6  24  176,234 
 S. E. Sulawesi  69  61,337  17  14,920  11  5  180,166 
 E. Timor  34  15,032  53  23,291  12  4  105,024 
 * Includes overseas ballots. 
 Source: Joint Operations Media Center, Aryaduta Hotel, Jakarta, June 10, 1999. 
 Table 2. Indices of electoral fraud, Indonesian elections, June 14, 1999. 

























 Inner Islands        
 Bali (2:46 p.m.)  11  202,613  84  1,523,048  97  9  226,685 
 Jakarta (11:06 p.m.)*  12  297,800  43  1,020,130  60  18  281,792 
 C. Java (9:42 p.m.)  15  1,514,821  52  4,958,759  63  60  312,010 
 E. Java (9:44 p.m.)  14  1,436,047  39  3,929,818  52  68  320,759 
 W. Java (9:23 p.m.)  31  2,998,999  38  4,040,994  52  82  308,945 
 Yogyakarta 
(7:30 p.m.) 
 16  199,985  42  528,470  79  6  321,567 
 Outer Islands        
 Aceh (7:36 p.m.)  19  54,333  15  43,612  25  12  123,858 
 Bengkulu 
(11:25 p.m.) 
 36  129,262  39  138,769  62  4  202,016 
 Irian Jaya (7:18 p.m.)  51  89,169  39  68, 225  22  13  77,066 
 Jambi (11:16 p.m.)  40  118,100  34  98,194  27  6  228,785 
 C. Kalimantan 
(11:16 p.m.) 
 31  127,235  41  169,702  50  6  166,235 
 E. Kalimantan 
(9:37 p.m.) 
 32  189,755  40  228,199  54  7  190,763 
 S. Kalimantan 
(10:01 p.m.) 
 26  154,999  30  176,298  48  11  158,647 
 W. Kalimantan 
(9:33 p.m.) 
 34  104,769  35  107,631  20  9  230,506 
 Lampung (9:36 p.m.)  25  329,504  53  711,321  48  15  245,087 
 Maluku (9:01 p.m.)  34  79,696  39  93,626  29  6  170,955 
 E. Nusa Tenggara 
(7:27 p.m.) 
 23  268,779  23  269,499  35  13  153,984 
 W. Nusa Tenggara 
(6:29 p.m.) 
 56  378,085  21  140,110  49  9  231,363 
 Riau (9:18 p.m.)  35  345,246  32  312,149  50  10  254,358 
 C. Sulawesi 
(8:07 p.m.) 



























 N. Sulawesi 
(11:17 p.m.) 
 57  294,413  26  132,238  56  7  248,346 
 S. Sulawesi 
(9:09 p.m.) 
 75  765,070  10  101,026  31  24  176,234 
 S. E. Sulawesi 
(9:16 p.m.) 
 77  240,576  12  37,262  43  5  180,166 
 N. Sumatra 
(11:06 p.m.) 
 2  49,696  50  1,018,586  43  24  242,969 
 S. Sumatra 
(9:38 p.m.) 
 26  511,612  47  919,200  60  15  271,434 
 W. Sumatra 
(11:22 p.m.) 
 28  278,081  13  126,732  53  14  168,886 
 E. Timor (2:01 p.m.)  47  58,238  44  54,826  39  4  105,024 
 * Includes overseas ballots. 
 Source: Joint Operations Media Center, Aryaduta Hotel, Jakarta, 11:25 p.m., June 14, 1999. 
Table 2 (continued)
won up to two-thirds of the popular vote in past elections, such margins were no lon-
ger credible. Given support for PDIP, even engineering a more modest win would have 
risked rejection from the opposition, delegitimating the entire election. 69 However, by 
allowing PDIP a wide margin in the first volatile days after the voting and then closing 
this lead over time, Golkar avoided provoking a backlash against its eventual strong 
showing. 70 
 Although observers paid little attention and opposition parties appeared unaware 
or complacent, Golkar remained confident, a position that, in retrospect, was a har-
binger of a predetermined outcome. Three weeks in, the party chair, Akbar Tanjung, 
boasted that Golkar would narrow the gap with the front-running PDIP to just thirty-
five seats, allowing it to form a coalition government. 71 
 Tanjung’s prediction was eerily precise. In the near-final results released in mid-
July, Golkar had closed the gap with PDIP to thirty-four seats. Significantly, Golkar’s 
strongest showing was in the eastern islands, where the party won an average of 
36 percent of provincial seats compared to only 17 percent on Java and Bali. 72 Tan-
jung also predicted that PDIP would have trouble convincing Muslim parties to sup-
port a woman, Megawati, for the presidency, allowing Golkar to build coalitions with 
the three largest Islamic parties and gain another 105 seats. 73 He further speculated 
that by asking General Wiranto to be Habibie’s running mate when the presidential 
slates came before parliament, Golkar could ensure the votes of the MPR’s thirty-eight 
armed forces delegates in the final ballot. 74 
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 By mid-July, Indonesian observers began to see the prescience of Tanjung’s 
remarks. On the basis of a penultimate count, the  Jakarta Post projected that Golkar 
would win 120 seats, with roughly two-thirds from the outer islands. PDIP would 
secure 154 seats, with well over half from Java and Bali. The three putatively sexist 
Muslim parties had won 125 votes, giving a possible Golkar-Muslim coalition a total 
of 245 votes—a clear majority among parliament’s 462 elective seats. 75 Combining 
this majority with Golkar’s influence over the remaining 200 appointive seats, with 
or without the military’s 38 votes the ruling party was in a strong position to retain 
the executive in the October selection of the president by the plenary 700-member 
parliament (MPR). 76 
 Minimizing the Fraud 
 Although these observations are not defi nitive, this pattern should have raised 
questions for working journalists downloading up-to-the-minute tallies from comput-
ers at the election’s media headquarters in the Aryaduta Hotel. Yet in the following 
weeks, the dozens of local and foreign reporters crowded four-deep to print out these 
tallies failed to report the pattern. 77 Instead, coverage cited the KPU’s explanation that 
the slow count was the result of “technical problems,” such as assiduous reporting 
procedures and “poor transportation,” and relied heavily on statements from foreign 
election monitors, who consistently dismissed the violations as insignifi cant. 78 
 While news outlets publicly adopted a reassuring stance, Indonesian reporters 
privately indicated concern over discrepancies in the pace of the returns. Two days 
after the ballot, SCTV’s news director, Riza Primadi, noted that it seemed suspicious 
that counts from opposition strongholds in Bali and Java were coming in quickly 
while tallies from the outer islands were trickling in. 79 Later, however, he dismissed 
his observation, citing the KPU explanation that poor transport and communications 
had caused the slower returns. 80 But this justification failed to explain why fraud alle-
gations from the outer islands were also far more numerous and serious than those 
reported from Java and Bali, or why four of the outer island provinces experiencing 
the slowest returns were in Sulawesi, a well-developed island with relatively strong 
communications and transportation. 
 Primadi, with other members of the media, appeared reluctant to focus on dis-
tortions. Journalists found themselves in a difficult position. In conversations at the 
Aryaduta Hotel during the count, some explained their caution. Reporters from four 
regional Indonesian papers were among the most nervous, stating that “it was best 
not to look into evidence of cheating.” They added they “had a sense” such inves-
tigations were not what their editors wanted, and appeared relieved that little was 
expected of them on this subject. 81 
 During lunch with a Jakarta-based television crew two days after the vote, another 
journalist from SCTV, Raymond Kaya, was more candid, admitting he and others 
thought that the violations were possibly serious. But, he explained, they were wary of 
television’s power to incite the public and preferred to downplay the cheating to avoid 
sparking riots among opposition supporters that could invalidate the entire election. 82 
 Until the end of the count, “technical problems” explained the slow returns from 
outlying areas in commentary that relied on the KPU. 83 As the count dragged on, 
media attention waned. Over a month before the final tally, the Aryaduta ballroom, 
once crowded with journalists, had emptied out. At a last press conference, a lone 
journalist from the  Jakarta Post finally asked KPU delegates, “At what point does the 
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mounting evidence of fraud invalidate the elections?” The commission answered eva-
sively, leaving the question hanging. Whatever the official reply might have been, 
there were no other news outlets present to report it. 84 
 Explaining the Coverage 
 In the KPU’s fi nal tally, released in late July, PDIP won the elections with 33.74 
percent of the popular vote, a surprising plurality in a forty-eight-party contest, caus-
ing jubilation among supporters and a general sense among observers that the elec-
tions were a success. In what seemed a reversal of fortunes, Golkar received 22.44 
percent. 85 Yet while conceding to PDIP, Golkar had successfully secured a solid posi-
tion to form a government through coalition building. 
 Golkar’s subtle subversion of the electoral process to reach this end, aided by a 
disproportionate allocation of seats favoring the outer islands during the rule writing, 
went virtually unreported. Most coverage, both Indonesian and foreign, reiterated the 
message that the elections had been free and fair and the ruling party’s infractions 
were neither serious nor systematic enough to be significant. 
 There were exceptions to this reassurance, particularly among the Jakarta-based 
newsweeklies, whose election coverage included several investigative reports. 86 The 
most hard-hitting was an exposé published in the June 21–27 issue of  Tempo , accusing 
Arnold Baramuli, chair of President Habibie’s Supreme Advisory Council and Golkar 
party boss, of practicing “money politics” in North Sulawesi to swing the election in 
Golkar’s favor. 87 The next week,  Tempo published a ten-page investigation on electoral 
fraud nationwide. 88 The two reports cited evidence that Baramuli had funneled Golkar 
funds to religious organizations in North Sulawesi to influence the vote, and further 
implicated his company, Poleko, in two separate scandals. 89 
 Though damning, these reports attracted almost no follow-up and failed to garner 
attention that might have checked the cheating. 90 More media focus on irregularities 
might have induced the KPU to intervene in the outer-island provinces where Golkar 
was getting its strongest majorities. Had the KPU declined, public pressure might 
have forced the issue, imposing greater accountability on the commissioners. Without 
this pressure, they were free to turn a blind eye. 
 Also missing from most reporting was the relentless horse-race coverage all but 
inescapable in Western elections. Such coverage, though easily criticized for its reduc-
tive tendencies, would nonetheless have drawn attention—through daily or hourly 
coverage—to the shrinking gap between the top parties toward the end of the race. 
In Indonesia’s first post-Suharto elections, discussion of the closing gap was mini-
mal, and even the major opposition parties appeared to accept Golkar’s gains with 
equanimity. 91 
 How can we account for this seeming complacency? Fundamentally, there was 
relief that the elections had gone forward with almost no violence. Pragmatically, 
there was also a general understanding that Indonesia lacked the resources and the 
political will to invalidate the results and oversee a second vote. Though the elections 
were compromised, a consensus formed that the level of fraud was acceptable. Finally, 
as later reports revealed, the major opposition parties, numerous religious organi-
zations, and much of the media were being bribed for their discretion with funds 
from the swelling coffers of the state rice monopoly, Badan Urusan Logistik (the State 
Logistics Agency), known as Bulog. 92 
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 The one opposition leader who took a stand, Abdurrahman Wahid, did not get far. 
A few days after the June 7 vote, the Singapore-based  Straits Times reported that Wahid 
had met secretly with the army chief, Wiranto, on the eve of the elections to accuse 
the military of interfering in the balloting. The report said that soldiers “had insisted 
on accompanying the ballot boxes to their tally centres at various districts in and 
out of Java,” violating election rules banning both “military and civilian bureaucracy” 
from any involvement. Wahid then argued that because “Special Forces (Kopassus) 
soldiers were ‘meddling’ in the vote-counting process” on Golkar’s behalf, the ruling 
party needed to be removed from power and an emergency government established. 93 
 In the following weeks, Habibie’s government made it clear that it would not 
tolerate such challenges, particularly by people contesting election results on the 
streets. After the foreign press and most international monitors had departed, those 
who remained noticed the reappearance in Jakarta of the barbed-wire barricades, army 
tanks, and anti-riot troops that had all but disappeared after the November 1998 par-
liamentary session. 94 
 Daily protests began outside the KPU, at first met with only light security. But 
on July 2, a group of students, joined by the People’s Democratic Party, squared off 
against dozens of riot police outside the KPU’s complex. Mobilizing to prevent rigging 
of the country’s elections, they demanded that Golkar “be disqualified for . . . cheating 
by rigging the vote count and using its . . . cash reserves to buy votes in the outlying 
provinces.” 95 In response, police began firing into the crowd and beat protesters back 
from the building with rattan riot sticks. 96 
 As the count dragged into July, cynicism over the delays rose, along with unease 
among PDIP supporters who had, like much of the media, equated a win of the popu-
lar vote with an eventual Megawati presidency. Even Desi Anwar (RCTI news anchor 
and sister of Habibie’s spokeswoman Dewi Fortuna Anwar) admitted, “It is fortunate 
that . . . Indonesians are getting used to dashed hopes and unfulfilled promises,” since 
“with every delay,” the democratic process was further “usurped by Machiavellian 
political intrigues.” 97 
 When the KPU announced the final results after six weeks, over half the election’s 
forty-eight parties refused to sign off on the final tally, citing 120,000 “unresolved 
violations,” while much of the media treated the complaints as politicking by small 
parties disgruntled by their failure to win seats. 98 
 The KPU responded by handing the election results to President Habibie, who 
issued a decree validating the final outcome, and thus the allocation of seats among 
parties. On August 9, Indonesia’s poll supervisory committee, Panwaslu, seconded 
the president’s decision, stating that the decree “should be considered as a collective 
validation that the election was relatively free and fair.” 99 In effect, Habibie’s decree 
ended the popular phase of the elections and shifted focus to parliament, where del-
egates would elect the next president. 
 Adding to Golkar’s advantages in the maneuvering that followed, there was another 
MPR block likely to be weighted in the party’s favor—the two hundred appointive 
representatives with seats in the seven-hundred-member body that would elect the 
president. These would consist of 135 Utusan Daerah, or provincial representatives, 
and 65 Utusan Golongan, or delegates from interest groups representing “non-political” 
sectors of society, such as women’s organizations, “youth and students,” civil 
servants, and various religious blocs. Theoretically, the Utusan Daerah and Utusan 
Golongan blocs would “comprise personalities . . . not involved in political parties, 
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i.e., neither a member on the board of parties nor a party candidate in the general 
elections.” 100 In practice, the two groups were far from nonpartisan. 
 Two months after the election, officials still had no clear criteria for choosing the 
two hundred representatives, much less a formula to ensure their neutrality. Election 
commissioners were considering two alternatives for deciding the 135 provincial rep-
resentatives, and both favored Golkar. 101 By August, it became clear that the process 
for selecting the sixty-five sectoral members was strongly weighted toward the ruling 
party. 102 
 As the media remained quiet on these critical issues, the only protest came from 
a group of some two hundred student demonstrators who rallied on August 9 outside 
the KPU headquarters over the selection of sectoral representatives, slaughtering a 
white goat with the initials “KPU” painted on its side. The students demanded that 
the commission dissolve the “Team of Fifteen” selecting the sixty-five interest-group 
delegates, charging that it lacked independence and that members were abusing their 
authority to serve partisan interests. 103 
 Press in Parliament? 
 Ironically, even as news outlets downplayed electoral manipulation, leaders of the 
twenty journalists’ associations were fi ghting to protect their industry’s new indepen-
dence. Among the sixty-fi ve interest-group seats in the MPR, the KPU was planning 
to reserve at least one for “the press.” As Golkar maneuvered to increase seats for its 
loyalists, the Indonesian Journalists’ Association (PWI) put forth their Jakarta branch 
head, Tarman Azzam, a Golkar supporter who had helped blacklist members of the 
Alliance of Independent Journalists (AJI) after the 1994 bans. 104 
 In response, AJI head Lukas Luwarso expressed hope that his organization would 
also win one of the sectoral MPR seats. But when AJI convened a meeting with four 
other journalists’ associations, all present concluded that they should oppose the 
appointment of any member of the media to parliament. 105 Somewhat unexpectedly, 
the group that articulated the winning argument against media representation was 
the Indonesian Television Journalists Association, whose head, Haris Jauhari, was a 
lead contender for one of the sectoral posts. 106 Jauhari argued that MPR membership 
would compromise the standards of professionalism that his association espoused. 107 
How could the media report objectively on the MPR if they became part of the MPR? 108 
Other attendees agreed that the media should not be represented in the legislative 
body that decided the next president. 109 
 In an effort to block a seat for the pro-Golkar PWI, Jauhari, host of the talk show 
 Partai-Partai , invited the main actors to discuss the issue before a live audience. 110 By 
the end of a spirited debate, opponents of media representation made it clear that 
such participation in government would compromise media independence. Two days 
later, the television journalists’ association and AJI invited all twenty new journal-
ists’ associations to a meeting that ended in unanimous opposition to any media 
representation in the MPR. 111 The next day, August 11, their leaders appeared before 
television cameras to present their rejection of media representation to the chair of 
the KPU. “[Since] journalists are required to always guard [their] independence,” the 
statement said, “with involvement in the MPR it is feared that journalists will become 
caught up in politicking that could undermine their independence.” 112 
 A week later, KPU members favoring media representation fought to appoint a 
PWI delegate to what was now the only sectoral seat for the media. “Fortunately,” 
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noted Jauhari, “at a critical moment,” journalists covering the meeting decided to 
intervene. Shifting roles from observers to participants, they drew up a petition pro-
testing the seat’s award to the PWI, circulated it among reporters present, and inter-
rupted the meeting to deliver it. 113 After this development, the commission finally 
voted to eliminate the media seat from the Utusan Golongan. 
 The associations’ success had significance beyond its partisan context. They could 
claim victory in blocking Golkar from installing a supporter in parliament since secur-
ing an MPR post for the PWI, an instrument of Suharto’s control, would have cost 
the media professional distance and restored the PWI’s position as the official repre-
sentative of all journalists. More broadly, the battle united the jumble of new journal-
ists’ associations around a common goal clearly articulated in their statement to the 
KPU: “The journalistic profession constitutes a fourth power (‘fourth estate’) that is 
expected . . . to perform the function of control over the other three powers: execu-
tive, judicial, legislative.” 114 
 “Today, whether history takes note or not,” Jauhari said, “we have launched an 
effort of no small significance to work together . . . to situate the press in its proper 
place, that is, free from the three [branches of government].” Whether the media’s 
sectoral seat would be granted to another Golkar supporter was also irrelevant. “What 
matters,” Jauhari argued, “is that we have advanced one more step in our efforts to 
position the media as the fourth estate in our democratic nation.” 115 
 This victory bore little relationship to actual reporting practices that, by default, 
had helped skew the parliamentary elections toward Golkar. But it did draw a clear 
dividing line between the news media and the state, which would become critical in 
the final phase of the 1999 elections—the selection of the next president. 
 
 On the eve of Indonesia’s fi rst democratic elections in over forty years, many saw 
Suharto’s successor, B. J. Habibie, as a weak, transitional fi gure, and his party, Golkar, 
as a discredited, fading force. Yet together they came remarkably close to retaining the 
presidency and perpetuating Golkar’s lock on power. As the electoral process moved 
into selection of the president, the ruling party enjoyed advantages in the appointive 
bloc, strengths in coalition building, and pluralities in the outer islands. 116 By the fi nal 
ratifi cation of the count on July 28, Golkar—though trailing the top opposition party, 
PDIP, in the popular vote by double digits—seemed poised for its seventh presidential 
win. With little violence or visible fraud, the party had manipulated the parliamentary 
elections, widely hailed as “free and fair,” to produce an outcome as carefully engi-
neered as any under the New Order. 
 Throughout this period, Indonesia’s media bore witness to an extraordinarily 
contentious process—from the incumbent parliament’s debates over the transition 
rules to their implementation in the June 1999 ballot. During the long count that fol-
lowed, the media, influenced by factors ranging from owner biases and the seeming 
complacency of opposition leaders to fears of invalidating the elections and thereby 
sparking riots, downplayed reports of irregularities that were indicators of systematic 
fraud. 117 
 In the realm of electoral politics at least, Indonesia, with its newly freed media, 
appeared to be back where it had started, tacitly accepting a rigged process in the 
name of stability and compromise. This caution aided Golkar’s manipulation, threat-
ening the gains of a year of democratic reform, including progress in institutional-
izing the uncertain outcomes inherent in fair and open contestation. After a year of 
electoral reform and, at times, reckless experimentation with their new freedom, the 
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Indonesian media succumbed to pressure to ignore the cheating to save the elections, 
and in doing so, failed to guard the integrity of the electoral process. 
 Yet as the  following chapter shows, the country was not right back where it had 
started, largely because the media had, in fact, undergone a fundamental change. 
From the rule writing through the count, outward manifestations of this transforma-
tion remained largely superficial, filling the public sphere with bluster, sensational-
ism, and some critical debate but effectively ignoring the fraud that compromised the 
country’s first post–New Order elections, tilting the transition toward reversal. In the 
next stage, however, the run-up to the October selection of the president, the power 
of Indonesia’s newly liberated media to block this same reversal became clear with a 
campaign finance scandal that jolted them into action, setting off a competitive frenzy 
among news outlets, each vying to break the next development. The revelation and 
counterrevelation that followed would pitch Indonesia into a maelstrom of factional 
infighting and partisan warfare that, surprisingly, made continued democratization 
possible. 
 Chapter Six 
 Baligate and All the Gates 
 Everybody’s for democracy in principle. It’s only in practice that the thing gives 
rise to stiff  objections. 
 —Meg Greenfi eld, “The People’s Revenge” 
 At the close of Indonesia’s fi rst post-Suharto elections in July 1999, the top oppo-
sition party, PDIP, had won the popular vote, beating the ruling Golkar party by double 
digits and leaving its supporters confi dent of capturing the presidency. Over the next 
few weeks, however, the position of PDIP and its presidential candidate, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, only grew weaker as Golkar and its allies outmaneuvered them on 
every front. “Now, as her political rivals dance rings around her, building coalitions in 
rooms heavy with the stale smoke of kretek cigarettes,” wrote journalist David Jen-
kins, “Megawati may be in danger of losing the presidency, the greatest prize in Indo-
nesian politics.” Newspaper executive Sabam Siagam warned, “We could end up with 
the party that has managed to win the largest number of seats in the house fi nding 
itself outside the system. If that happens,” he added, “I don’t know what democracy is 
about. Never mind that there will be riots outside. It will mean that the largest party 
in the system is marginalised—not speaker of the house, not chairman of the MPR, 
not president.” 1 
 As observers noted these ironies for the transition, the government prepared for 
anticipated riots, deploying tens of thousands of soldiers to contain demonstrations 
and pushing a state security bill through parliament to give the executive emergency 
powers to ban protests and seize control of the country’s communications. 2 At this 
point in Indonesia, there was a palpable threat of authoritarian reversal manifest in 
the massing of troops, passage of a bill that authorized repression, and continued 
electoral maneuvering to block the rotation of power. 
 Apparently designed to ensure, if not impose, public acceptance of a second Habi-
bie presidency, these developments posed a serious challenge to Indonesia’s transi-
tion at several levels. Returning to Adam Przeworski’s conceptual framework, they 
constituted a clear setback in the institutionalization of the uncertainty of open-
ended contestation central to democratization. 3 Indonesia was confronting the pos-
sible emergence of at least two conditions, or “perverse elements,” that the theorist 
Samuel Valenzuela identifies as incompatible with or subversive to democratization: 
the existence of tutelary powers and the absence of “meaningful turnover in leader-
ship via elections.” As Chileans had done in their country’s earlier transition, Indo-
nesians faced maneuvering by the departing regime to “establish the institutional and 
organizational basis” for the possible exercise of “military tutelarity over the demo-
cratic process.” 4 Fear of military intervention gave the regime’s incumbents lever-
age in advancing their own interests. Furthermore, the looming prospect of Golkar’s 
continued control over both the legislature and executive threatened to reverse the 
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progress toward democratization promised by the opposition’s victory in the June 
elections. There were clear signs that Indonesia could be heading the way of Chile and 
other nations where democratic transition had stalled. 
 Complicating this incipient reversal, however, a campaign finance scandal broke, 
striking mortal blows to President Habibie’s candidacy and throwing his party’s deal 
making into disarray. While this scandal, dubbed “Baligate,” did not force Golkar to 
give up any seats won with fraudulent funds, its impact was profound. The same news 
media that had been so cautious in reporting fraud during the elections in June and 
July seized upon these new revelations, splashing them across front pages and evening 
newscasts for weeks. In the months leading to parliament’s selection of the president 
on October 20—the final phase of the 1999 elections—it was the media’s sustained 
attention to the scandal, and protests mobilized in response, that returned the uncer-
tainty of open-ended contestation to Indonesia’s electoral process and facilitated a 
meaningful circulation of leadership. 5 
 More broadly, if Golkar’s successful engineering of the 1999 legislative elections 
examined in  chapter 5 demonstrates democratization’s inherent inclination toward 
reversal, the convergence of a media-driven electoral scandal and Habibie’s final bid to 
retain the presidency illustrates the central role that a competitive media, combined 
with civil society, can play in blocking this same reversal. Moreover, close examination 
of Baligate offers insight into the phenomenon of political scandal itself, helping to 
explain why some stories surface only to disappear, while others escalate to produce 
political change. 
 Baligate 
 A month after  Tempo ’s close-grained investigative report on Golkar’s systematic 
campaign fraud in Sulawesi faded with little impact, a similar story of electoral cor-
ruption snowballed into a full-blown scandal reconfi guring the country’s political 
landscape. 6 The story began in late July 1999 with an unexpected disclosure at a bank-
restructuring seminar in Jakarta’s Millennium Hotel. During this otherwise sedate 
event, a fi nancial analyst named Pradjoto [one name] exposed a dubious transaction 
between the private Bank Bali and a fi nance company with ties to Golkar. That same 
day, the former underground email list SiaR broke the story to its limited readership. 7 
The following day,  Kompas reported it in its English edition. 8 By August 3, it was 
headlined by most of the major news outlets (print and broadcast) and even the gov-
ernment-run news agency, Antara. 9 The story and subsequent revelations rocked the 
nation, capturing media and public attention to an extent not seen since Suharto’s fall. 
 In a political environment where, as the  Straits Times observed, “one scandal a 
week [was] the new yardstick,” the Bank Bali story dwarfed everything to date, over-
shadowing nearly all other issues for weeks. 10 “Even if all the country’s top young 
models appear naked on the front pages of local newspapers tomorrow,” commented 
the  Jakarta Post , “they couldn’t top the latest bank scandal to have hit this country.” 11 
 The scandal had its origin in the banking collapse triggered by the 1997 Asian 
financial crisis. As part of a $130 million bailout, Indonesia’s bank restructuring 
agency (Badan Penyehatan Perbankan Nasional, BPPN) had taken control of the pri-
vately held Bank Bali. More than a year later, in the middle of the night, an unknown 
source dropped a package of documents on Pradjoto’s doorstep. In response to a ques-
tion during the July seminar about holdups in foreign investment, this banking law 
expert shared the documents’ revelation that Bank Bali had paid the Golkar-connected 
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firm Era Giat Prima (EGP) a whopping fee of nearly $80 million to facilitate payment 
from BPPN of $120 million as compensation for defaulted loans. 12 
 These negotiations were curious from the start since a blanket government guar-
antee already covered Bank Bali’s claims to BPPN’s rescue funds, obviating the need 
for any third-party involvement. 13 More surprising still was the size of the debt-
collection fee, which amounted to 60 percent of the loans recovered. Pradjoto said 
the amount sounded so “crazy” that at first he did not believe the transaction could 
have happened. He discarded the documents left at his door, forcing the anonymous 
whistle-blower to leave another copy a few days later. 14 
 Media Coverage and Political Interests 
 Instead of downplaying the story, news outlets pounced on it, plunging headfi rst 
into the factional warfare it brought to the surface. Almost immediately, observers 
drew parallels with the United States’ Watergate scandal that brought down Richard 
Nixon’s presidency. As with Watergate, the suspense that built with each new revela-
tion stemmed from the question, How high did responsibility reach? The scandal 
quickly implicated increasingly prominent fi gures. Its rapid escalation, fed by leaks 
and political infi ghting, would both reinvigorate the Jakarta media and eff ectively 
check the reversal of the country’s democratization threatened by the corrupt bar-
gains and media reticence of the transition’s fi rst year. 
 After the initial burst of media coverage of Pradjoto’s revelation, Baligate expanded 
as news outlets reported increasingly dramatic allegations. Among the most sensa-
tional came from a report that the head of EGP, the company that received the $80 
million fee, was Golkar’s deputy treasurer, Setya Novanto. This revelation prompted 
allegations that the money had ended up in the coffers of a special “Habibie Success 
Team” created to assure the president’s victory in the 1999 elections. 15 
 Further leaks sustained the scandal’s momentum, spurred in part by the release of 
new information by sources. When mounting pressure prompted the police to name 
nearly a dozen suspects, officials shared only the initials of those named, heightening 
suspense by shifting focus to the media, who now scrambled to guess the full identi-
ties. 16 On August 8, Golkar’s treasurer, Fadel Muhammad, told SCTV that “provi-
sional evidence in the case showed suspect practices.” 17 Then, on August 12, Marzuki 
Darusman, Golkar’s deputy chair, called a press conference at which he offered no 
new information but directed the media to ignore red herrings and find the real per-
petrators. 18 This seemingly deliberate blow to fellow Golkar members set off a new 
flurry of speculation. 19 
 On August 15, the magazine  Gamma published the transcript of a leaked phone 
exchange between Novanto, a central figure in corruption scandals for years to come, 
and the Golkar leader Arnold Baramuli, who coached Novanto on how to speak to 
the media about the high fee EGP had charged Bank Bali. 20 Unlike reaction to  Panji 
Masyarakat ’s similar report in February of a phone exchange between President Habi-
bie and Attorney General Ghalib, the focus of both media and government remained 
on the wiretap’s revelations rather than shifting to  Gamma ’s ethics, reflecting support 
for the public’s “right to know” guaranteed in the pending 1999 Press Law. 21 The 
scandal widened further to implicate officials at BPPN, including the agency’s deputy 
chair, Pande Lubis. 22 
 At each stage, as headlines promised new revelations, editorials expressed out-
rage. “There is nothing more obscene than people stealing large sums of money from 
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people who are in dire poverty,” said the  Jakarta Post , “[which] is what the story of the 
Rp546 billion heist at Bank Bali essentially boils down to.” 23 The country’s paper of 
record,  Kompas , breaking from its usual muted style, warned parliamentary investiga-
tors that “disastrous indications with negative effects to the rupiah” would result if 
they failed to find “an open and total solution.” 24 
 The broadcast media turned Pradjoto—who had first exposed the dubious EGP 
fee—into a minor celebrity. Pradjoto embraced the spotlight and continued giving 
speeches and interviews even after Habibie supporters staged hostile rallies outside 
his house and threatened “to shoot his infant daughter in the head.” 25 
 As Pradjoto faded from view, further leaks and counterleaks reflected a widen-
ing rift inside Golkar between two factions that the media dubbed “Black Golkar” 
(Habibie’s supporters) and “White Golkar” (his opponents). 26 Most sensational was 
a rumor circulated by the Habibie camp that the original whistle-blower, the “Deep 
Throat” who had dropped the critical documents on Pradjoto’s doorstep in July was, 
in fact, Golkar’s deputy chair Marzuki Darusman. 27 
 Partisan warfare also escalated as rival factions began buying television airtime to 
further competing agendas. Talk show host Wimar Witoelar described this strategy 
as part of a growing use of such shows as “political weapons.” When TVRI denied 
airtime to a group wishing to debate the Bank Bali scandal, the group bought a slot 
on the private station SCTV. The discussion also addressed the military’s bloody ram-
page following East Timor’s independence referendum. “The joke was,” Witoelar 
recounted, “that when Suharto moved up to be the chairman of the board, he assigned 
the violence division to Wiranto and the corruption division to Habibie. And this was 
elaborated on in the panel discussion.” 28 
 In mid-August, the Habibie government, under pressure from the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), hired PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) to conduct an audit of 
the institutions implicated in the scandal. On September 6, PwC stated that it had 
found “numerous indicators of fraud” in the transaction between Bank Bali and EGP. 29 
On September 9, parliament opened hearings on the Bank Bali case. Imposing unprec-
edented transparency on legislative proceedings, two private television stations gained 
access and broadcast the entire proceedings live, gavel to gavel. 
 Though the members of the parliamentary commission were generally ill pre-
pared, the case produced Indonesia’s first televised hearings of an investigation into 
official malfeasance. Recalling his time as a student in the United States in the 1970s, 
Witoelar said the impact of this coverage for Indonesians “was exactly like watching 
the congressional hearings or Senate investigation of Watergate.” He described audi-
ences as “glued to their TV sets for hours and some people are remembering all the 
names [of Watergate defendants] like Gordon Liddy. . . . And we had Setya Novanto, 
Baramuli, Tanri Abeng.” The result was that people became “so involved . . . that 
when the public discussion actually came to the parliament, the public pressure [was] 
very significant.” 30 
 The novelty of front-row access to televised parliamentary deliberations attracted 
audiences. In contrast to the silencing of the parliament that had elected Suharto 
to a seventh term, the microphones in front of legislators this time were switched 
on, broadcasting their voices—and opinions—to the entire country. MPR members, 
moreover, were acutely aware that their sessions were airing live nationwide, prompt-
ing some delegates to remind colleagues repeatedly of their public responsibility. 31 
 The media’s role expanded again when PDIP leaked a private journal detailing 
meetings between Bank Bali’s president, Rudy Ramli, and members of Habibie’s 
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“inner circle” and between party boss Baramuli and a former director of Bank Bali. 32 
Amid his denunciations of Ramli as a “liar” and a “drug addict,” the DPR parlia-
mentary investigating team summoned Baramuli for questioning, insisting that he 
was “clearly” involved. 33 Journalists and observers packed into the gallery, cheering 
and applauding, while parliamentarians grilled Ramli for four hours, all of which was 
watched by audiences across the archipelago. 
 When Ramli began naming top Golkar leaders on national television, pressure for 
resolution appeared to have reached an unstoppable momentum. But then the pros-
ecution began to stall. When members of the DPR demanded access to key sections of 
the PwC audit—most critically, a “flow of funds” report—the state audit body refused, 
arguing that the report revealed personal bank account information and its release 
would violate bank secrecy laws. 34 On September 20, the  Jakarta Post described those 
investigating the case as “impotent and incapable in pushing through the investiga-
tion to its conclusion.” One legislator said, “I have a feeling, a political one, that this 
commission will never succeed.” 35 
 The danger for the transition in this stalemate was twofold. It postponed the 
reckoning Habibie would face once implicated directly in Baligate, the likely culmina-
tion of continued investigation. Indeed, in the final days before the parliamentary bal-
loting, Habibie reportedly was “trying to move the investigation from the politicized 
parliament to the more pliable courts, which are likely to delay hearings until after 
the elections.” 36 In turn, this end run risked an extraelectoral outcome if protesters 
flooded the streets prompting military repression, even martial law. That same week, 
opposition leaders threatened such demonstrations to break the deadlock while inter-
national donors froze further aid disbursements, hoping to force “full and prompt 
disclosure” of the PwC report. 37 
 During these events, a synergy developed between the media and international 
donors, particularly in the print press through editorials calling the stalled investi-
gation a government “cover-up.” 38 Rather than rail against foreign interference, the 
papers used the freeze on international aid to argue for a quick resolution. In an inter-
view with the  Jakarta Post , economist Tony A. Prasetyantono warned that the donors 
“are not playing around” and that cancellation of aid “would make the wheels of the 
economy stop.” 39 
 Kompas took a similar tack, stating in an uncharacteristically blunt editorial, “It 
has become clear that facts have been covered.” The paper then warned of the dangers 
that a cover-up posed to investment, twice emphasizing the importance of pursuing 
an immediate resolution “regardless [of] personalities” involved. 40 
 During the standoff, on September 23, media reformers secured the passage of a 
new law protecting press freedom and the public’s “right to know.” 41 Yet even as sup-
porters hailed this victory, countermaneuvers to keep Habibie’s damaged candidacy 
alive continued to threaten a reversal of democratization that might have reduced 
these legislative reforms to irrelevance. 
 The Military’s Campaign 
 At this juncture, the military reappeared as a dominant player. With thirty-eight 
seats in the parliament and numerous ways to infl uence Indonesia’s political elite, 
military leaders, when they took a clear position, could have a decisive political 
impact. Aware of this reality, Habibie’s team courted General Wiranto, commander 
of the newly renamed Indonesian National Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, TNI), 
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to stand as their vice-presidential candidate. 42 As the presidential race moved to the 
fl oor of parliament, the critical question became, Would the military again back Gol-
kar, as they had in the last six elections, or would they allow a transfer of power to a 
new party? 
 After the humiliating referendum in East Timor that ended the military’s quarter-
century occupation, President Habibie had numerous enemies in army circles. PDIP’s 
presidential candidate, Megawati, by contrast, had a solid core of support among the 
generals. Even in his own party, Habibie was seen increasingly as a sinking ship. 43 Yet 
rather than working to ensure an alternative outcome that might be acceptable to the 
78 percent of Indonesians who did not vote for Golkar, military leaders prepared to 
quell the protests that would likely follow a Habibie victory. In short, TNI appeared 
to be getting ready for the incumbent, Habibie, rather than the opposition leader, 
Megawati, to win, bracing to defend an outcome that much of the public was likely to 
view as illegitimate. 
 In a development potentially even more threatening to the transition, several 
sources indicated that some within TNI were preparing to take control of the execu-
tive themselves—either indirectly, with General Wiranto as president, or directly, via a 
state of emergency. Most significantly, in the final days of the incumbent parliament’s 
term, before newly elected legislators could take office, military leaders and Golkar 
allies began pushing for the passage of a new security bill, the polar opposite of the 
liberal 1999 Press Law. 44 
 The State Security Bill, originating in the Ministry of Defense, would have granted 
TNI broad emergency powers to assume the duties of civilian government, ban public 
protests, impose curfews, conduct investigations and raids, seize private property, and 
take control of the country’s communications. As opposition built, critics, including 
students who again filled the streets, declared it more draconian than the recently 
revoked Anti-Subversion Law. 45 
 During these weeks of lobbying, TNI was working the system from two direc-
tions. If Habibie won with Wiranto as his running mate and the country accepted 
this outcome, TNI would have the vice presidency. If Habibie won and the public did 
not accept him, the unrest would provide an opportunity to take power more directly. 
Either way, a Habibie win with the new security law in place would greatly strengthen 
the military’s position. 
 TNI faced pressure to get the bill passed quickly before more independent legisla-
tors could take office. A corresponding sense of urgency grew among opponents who 
feared that the military would try to provoke violence to justify the bill’s passage and 
then use it to cancel the next session of parliament. 46 
 The prospect of military control over communications gave members of the media 
particular cause to fight the bill’s passage. Intentionally or coincidentally, news cov-
erage and sharpening editorials greatly amplified public opposition as the measure 
made its way through the legislative process. When protesters finally took to the 
streets, legislators responded, adding a requirement that the president seek legislative 
approval before declaring a state of emergency. 
 This concession was substantial, showing the continued power of public protest to 
shape the transition. Nevertheless, critics doubted that legislators would have either 
the will or the ability to prevent such a declaration, and observers predicted that the 
bill would pass easily. 47 In a last-ditch effort, members of the media assumed a more 
activist role. On September 18, as journalists joined the swelling demonstrations, 
their editors organized a strategy meeting, pressing party leaders to take a formal 
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stand against the bill. In a move indicative of their influence, the following day Gol-
kar’s deputy chair, who had attended the editors’ meeting, announced that legislators 
were inclined to delay passage “until the new House convenes.” 48 Two days later, 
however, all four parliamentary factions voted to pass the bill. 
 Confrontation 
 On September 23, 1999, a day before its term ended, the outgoing legislature 
passed the state security bill by unanimous “acclaim.” 49 In a report on the vote, 
one newspaper highlighted “a widely-held perception that the new legislation was 
approved under pressure from the [Habibie] government, and the military in particu-
lar.” 50 Ironically, while the government, backed by the military, pushed through this 
legislation that would have empowered it to ban public demonstrations, it was mass 
protest magnifi ed by media coverage that blocked the fi nal step in the bill’s passage. 
 Before the bill could become law, President Habibie needed to sign it. On Sep-
tember 24, observers still expected him to do so. At this point, however, students 
who had been massing since the day of the vote stepped up their rallies. As dem-
onstrations intensifi ed, thousands of protesters, joined by city residents, converged 
outside the parliamentary complex. 51 Similar rallies sprang up in other cities, and by 
that evening there were reports of demonstrators throwing stones and detonating 
fuel bombs, soldiers beating protesters, and police fi ring tear gas and rubber bullets 
into the crowds. 52 Seven people died, including a fourteen-year-old and a university 
student shot in the head by a sniper while sitting with friends on a curb. 53 
 The protesters’ key demand was that legislators rescind their approval of the bill. 
Military officers responded by challenging the authenticity of the protests, claiming 
they were instigated by provocateurs employing ruffians to disturb public order. 54 
Others, particularly General Wiranto, argued that the public simply lacked sufficient 
understanding of the bill. 55 
 The crackdowns ignited a fierce public backlash. On September 25, twenty-nine 
student groups and civic organizations issued a statement condemning Habibie and 
Wiranto for the deaths. The statement demanded both revocation of the security bill 
and Wiranto’s resignation. Significantly, it also “called on Indonesians not to support 
Habibie’s bid for another term as president.” 56 
 While outgoing legislators had ignored the mounting opposition, pressure on 
Habibie was more direct. At the height of the protests, he tried to defuse tensions by 
announcing that he would delay signing the bill. A military spokesperson explained, 
“The delay is to allow the dissemination of information on the bill so that people 
will be able to understand and accept this bill.” State Secretary Muladi [one name] 
explained that the delay would last only seven to ten days, long enough for the gov-
ernment to “socialize” the law. 57 By the next afternoon, September 26, Habibie went 
further, stating that he was ready to give up the presidency, though only through con-
stitutional means, and was “willing to accept criticism through demonstrations and 
other public protests.” 58 
 This announcement was arguably one of the most critical moments in Indonesia’s 
break from authoritarian rule. In any democratic transition, there is one paramount 
question: Will the ruling party give up power? Until that moment when Habibie 
expressed willingness to concede the presidency it was not clear, with the military 
preparing for a state of emergency, that the new legislature would ever get the chance 
to vote him out of office. In short, Habibie’s announcement marked the first real 
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indication that Golkar would accept defeat in an electoral contest and relinquish its 
long control of the executive. It signaled, moreover, a real restraint on the ruling 
party’s capacity for maneuver—a counterforce created by a more independent media, 
a vocal public, and empowered elements in opposition parties. 
 Habibie’s Final Bid 
 None of these events eliminated President Habibie from the race, much less assured 
an opposition party’s win. Megawati and her cadres still lacked the will and the skills 
to build coalitions with other parties, and without such support, neither PDIP nor any 
other party would be able to form a government. 59 This situation left the door open for 
rivals, including Golkar, to strengthen their own positions via coalition building. 
 Once the new parliament convened to elect Indonesia’s next president on October 1, 
just four days after Habibie’s announcement, other parties started horse-trading, and 
PDIP’s vulnerability soon became clear. Within days, Megawati’s party lost two top 
posts in a deal between Golkar and the Central Axis coalition of Muslim parties. 
While Golkar threw its support behind the leader of the Central Axis, Amien Rais 
(head of the National Mandate Party), winning him the powerful position of chair of 
the parliament, his followers, in turn, helped Golkar’s Akbar Tanjung become Speaker 
of the DPR. 60 
 With these two damaging defeats showing PDIP’s weak position, Habibie, despite 
all that had come before, remained the front-runner. But on October 14, before his 
long-anticipated accountability speech to the MPR, much of the new assembly stayed 
seated when he entered the hall, and some even booed—shows of disrespect incon-
ceivable in Suharto’s time. 61 The speech that followed failed to win the assembly over. 
“As expected,” David Jenkins wrote, “speaker after speaker rose to assail the Presi-
dent, zeroing in on the Suharto, East Timor and Bank Bali issues.” 62 
 Simultaneously, public pressure on delegates—from media coverage and the cell-
phone-toting protesters who were following events via live broadcasts—was also 
far more direct than any previous session. At least four times during the president’s 
speech, Wimar Witoelar recounted, “Parliament members interrupted the proceed-
ings saying that they [had] just received cell phone calls that students were being 
clobbered and Pak [Mr.] Wiranto can you please tell your guys to lay off.” 63 
 While the country followed the deliberations on television and radio, delegates 
found it hard to ignore the expectations that were building. “For the first time,”  FEER 
correspondents said, “national television [was] broadcast[ing] party factions’ sharp 
criticism of a sitting president, as the cameras watched Habibie’s face for reaction.” 
One Golkar legislator close to Habibie added, “It was shocking . . . but I think this is 
really good for democracy.” 64 
 As it grew clearer that Megawati might not get the presidency, Witoelar recalled, 
“a lot of people . . . questioned how backroom politics could alienate the politics of the 
streets.” This disconnect “wouldn’t have been on the public’s mind if the media were 
not there to follow every step of the debates in the MPR.” He compared the imme-
diacy of this feedback to the insulated MPR session the previous November “when 
people were actually getting killed, and it was only Wiranto who I knew was talking 
on his handphone to his snipers up in the Hilton apartments.” During the “Black Fri-
day” crackdown that had followed, the MPR session had been “totally secluded from 
the outside.” In this 1999 general session, by contrast, the two “melted” together. 
“The catalyst” for this change, said Witoelar, “is again [broadcast] media.” 65 
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 The National Democratic Institute noted another development critical to the 
new accountability and public engagement the media introduced into these debates. 
In contrast to previous parliamentary sessions, “the general public was much more 
attentive to this General Session because, unlike in the past, its outcome had not 
been scripted in advance.” 66  Asiaweek ’s Jose Manuel Tesoro noted, “Nor were delegates 
beholden to a single party, the long-ruling Golkar, as they were when the MPR met 
again last November.” 67 In short, events created a better chance for an open-ended 
contest. 
 Despite the barrage of criticism, Habibie’s bid for the presidency was still viable. 
“In addition to Golkar’s 120 elected seats,” one journalist explained, Habibie was 
believed “to have bargained for the loyalty of 50 regional delegates.” 68 With his advan-
tage in the Islamic anti-Megawati block, plus the thirty-eight TNI votes Golkar hoped 
to win by adding Wiranto to its ticket, Habibie still held a winning margin. “Habibie 
is actually politically dead,” an insider commented. “But Indonesian politics seem to 
be very much lacking an ethical and moral [dimension].” 69 
 Once again, however, public opinion, now openly displayed, had created new 
checks on what MPR members could do. Even those in elected posts, emboldened 
by a popular mandate, could not ignore signs that the country was unlikely to accept 
another Habibie presidency.  Kompas , providing one of these signs, conducted a poll 
finding that an overwhelming 70 percent of respondents “rejected” Habibie’s speech 
outright, faulting his performance in almost every area. 70 
 Louder still was the message from more than ten thousand protesters who gath-
ered outside parliament as Habibie delivered his speech—a message punctuated by 
Molotov cocktails and violent clashes with police. 71 Simultaneously, at the Hotel Indo-
nesia traffic circle, thousands of Megawati’s supporters threatened unrest, even “revo-
lution,” if she did not win the presidency. And at the Jakarta Stock Exchange, one 
thousand people from the business community staged an anti-Habibie protest. 72 That 
same day, the military faction tipped the scales against Habibie when Wiranto decided 
not to join his ticket. 
 By the time that Habibie had finished his speech, the public display of opposi-
tion overwhelmed plans to keep him in the presidency for another term. On October 
19, the day before the presidential vote, MPR delegates formally rejected Habibie’s 
speech, an act tantamount to a no-confidence motion. Later that day, Habibie bowed 
out of the race. 
 In the end, stacking the parliamentary vote in Golkar’s favor turned out to be 
easier than controlling a liberated media and the response of a galvanized civil society. 
As one Golkar analyst explained, “[I]t is not such a difficult thing to get the numbers 
for Habibie in the MPR.” It would have been “quite another thing,” however, “to get 
public acceptance for a five-year Habibie presidency.” 73 
 Election Minus Habibie 
 Habibie’s exit ended—for the time being—the shift toward democratic rever-
sal, clearing a path for the chief opposition candidate, Megawati Sukarnoputri, to 
capture the presidency. Even before the MPR rejected Habibie’s speech, observ-
ers were predicting that a Megawati victory was “the most likely . . . outcome.” 74 
After Habibie’s exit, moreover, and a failed attempt to fi eld Akbar Tanjung that 
prompted one legislator to pull a gun, Golkar was struggling to fi nd a viable presi-
dential candidate. 75 
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 At this point, the election was, by most accounts, Megawati’s to lose. But both she 
and her party, PDIP, were still reluctant to forge alliances. Going into the MPR vote, 
PDIP’s largest ally was the National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa, 
PKB), controlling fifty-one seats and led by Muslim cleric Abdurrahman Wahid. Gol-
kar, by contrast, had formed a coalition with the Muslim parties of the Central Axis 
group, who together controlled 150 seats and were determined to keep Megawati 
out of the presidency. On the eve of the ballot, as delegates bustled around making 
deals, the 695 members of the MPR remained roughly divided between the these two 
opposing alliances, with the thirty-eight representatives from the military sitting on 
the fence. 
 With Habibie out and Megawati stalemated, the only remaining viable candidate 
was Wahid himself. But few viewed the near-blind, outspoken cleric as a serious con-
tender. His PKB had won only 10 percent of the 462 DPR seats, or 7 percent of the 
wider 695-member plenary parliament (MPR). Even if Wahid garnered additional 
support for his own candidacy, insiders still expected him to end up throwing his 
votes behind Megawati. 76 
 PDIP’s delegates seemed confident of victory. According to one correspondent, 
their “earlier secret deals with [Akbar Tanjung’s] wing of Golkar, and their firm 
belief that Mr. Wahid [would] back down,” led PDIP leaders to believe they had 
well over the 348 votes needed to win the presidency. They retired for the night on 
October 19, apparently unconcerned by the ongoing negotiations among the other 
parties. 77 
 When PDIP’s delegates arrived at the MPR complex for the scheduled presidential 
vote the next morning, the situation took them—and nearly everyone else—by sur-
prise. During the night, Wahid had formed an alliance with the head of the National 
Mandate Party, Amien Rais, and other Central Axis leaders. Fifteen minutes before 
the vote, he struck a bargain with the dominant Golkar faction, gaining “at least 150 
votes in return for [his] support for their vice-presidential candidate.” In exchange, 
he reportedly promised Golkar “10 seats in his 35-member cabinet.” 78 With this final 
burst of lobbying, and some last-minute politicking with the minor Bulan Bintang 
party, Wahid won the presidency by a comfortable margin of sixty votes. 
 Megawati accepted her former ally’s surprising win without complaint. Outside, 
however, the news set off a fresh wave of protests as thousands of her supporters 
stormed through the streets surrounding parliament, burning tires and stoning secu-
rity forces. 79 After losing the MPR chair to the National Mandate Party, the position of 
DPR Speaker to Golkar, and now the presidency to Wahid, PDIP—although the win-
ner of the popular vote—was almost completely marginalized in the new government. 
The situation had troubling implications for both the credibility of the 1999 elections 
and the legitimacy of Wahid’s new administration. 
 The MPR’s next vote would decide the vice presidency, already promised by Wahid 
to Golkar. Once again, however, concern over the reaction of the demonstrators out-
side their windows—and the public they represented—limited legislators’ freedom to 
maneuver. After twenty-four hours of debate, they decided, with Wahid’s backing, to 
make Megawati the new vice president. Celebrations broke out among her support-
ers. The oath-taking ceremony was a triumph for  reformasi , as the MPR, now chaired 
by the opposition leader Amien Rais, swore in two of the other main leaders in the 
opposition movement that ousted Suharto—Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati 
Sukarnoputri. After a quarter-century in power and months of skillful maneuvering, 
Golkar had lost its lock on executive power. 
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 The contrast could not have been more striking between this presidential election 
and March 1998, when Suharto ran unopposed to win his seventh term in a unani-
mous vote by a Golkar-led legislature. In only eighteen months, the election of the 
Indonesian president had swung from a ceremonial exercise yielding predetermined 
outcomes to a highly competitive contest impossible to call right up to the moment 
of the vote. 
 At the same time, as Wahid settled into the presidency, one could argue that the 
bizarre frenzy of horse-trading that wrested the position from Megawati, a popu-
lar opposition leader and the daughter of a revered former president, was an even 
greater distortion of the voters’ intent, as expressed in the June ballot, than a Habi-
bie win would have been. Golkar had at least placed second, in a forty-eight-party 
contest, claiming 22 percent of the popular vote. Wahid’s PKB had earned only 10 
percent. 
 From a populist perspective, the victory of a small minority party in a series of 
backroom deals may seem a shallow triumph for Indonesia’s  reformasi movement. Yet 
whatever one might say about Wahid’s closed-door maneuvering, the process that 
ended with his victory was not predetermined. If we return to Przeworski’s uncer-
tainty frame, this development becomes critical. More broadly, the substitution of 
Golkar’s rigged outcomes with an open-ended parliamentary contest that led to the 
election of a long-shot opposition leader represented, on balance, significant progress 
in Indonesia’s transition. 
 Dynamics of Scandal 
 The key development that derailed Golkar’s manipulation and made this out-
come possible was public disclosure of the party’s campaign fi nance fraud. Yet rev-
elations of embezzlement alone were not what made the ensuing Baligate scandal 
signifi cant. The country had already been alerted to widespread electoral malfeasance 
by  Tempo ’s June 1999 exposé of systematic fraud in Golkar’s campaign on the island 
of Sulawesi. 80 
 In both cases, through disclosure of fraud, the media were playing the watch-
dog role arguably central to their function in supporting democratization, imposing 
transparency on the electoral process and forcing accountability on the nation’s lead-
ers.  Tempo ’s report, for example, pressured the Central Election Supervising Com-
mittee (Panwaspus) to recommend legal action against Golkar. 81 But while some 
outlets reported this development, none conducted their own follow-up investiga-
tions. 82 Consequently, few reported the Sulawesi fraud, and little came of the case. In 
short,  Tempo ’s revelations, though authoritative, eye-opening, and damning, did not 
garner the widening attention necessary to produce a “scandal,” a phenomenon that, 
by definition, involves “causing general public outrage.” 83 By contrast, the Baligate 
revelations set in motion a media “feeding frenzy,” that is, a sudden barrage of non-
proprietary follow-up coverage whose sum was a  grande scandale d’État that, in the end, 
brought down the president. 
 Explanation for the different trajectories of the stories lies in key distinctions 
between the potential of the two journalistic genres employed—the investiga-
tive report and the insider leak—to produce political scandal. Unlike  Tempo ’s well-
researched probe into election fraud in Sulawesi, it was not investigative reporting 
that launched Baligate, but instead documents leaked to a financial analyst, Pradjoto, 
by an inside source—most likely Golkar’s own deputy chair. 84 
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 As partial, partisan, and often speculative stories that raise more questions than 
they answer, leak-based reports, unlike well-researched investigations, generate nar-
rative tension as rival outlets rush to fill these gaps with their own coverage. Even 
though this follow-up may not promote reform or correction, it still serves to keep 
the story alive and stoke public outrage, or at least interest. A key internal dynamic in 
Baligate (and later election scandals) was this building of narrative tension, especially 
acute as evidence of malfeasance emerged piece by piece through strategic leaks and 
the partisan pursuit of revenge. 
 Tempo ’s exposé of fraud in Sulawesi was, by contrast, a self-contained narrative. 
Even when the requisite inquiry by Panwaspus provided corroboration, the story still 
lacked tension, and thus momentum. 85 The narrative tension in Baligate, by contrast, 
seemed escalating and endless as mysteries unfolded, attention grew, and reporters 
cultivated new sources. 
 In sum, the Baligate revelations were in no way more spectacular than the findings 
of  Tempo ’s exposé. But the peculiar journalistic genre that carried them, the insider 
leak, had embedded within it internal imperatives that drove news outlets to follow it 
doggedly to its denouement, regardless of political consequences. 
 
 When Indonesia’s newly elected parliament met in October 1999, the 695 delegates, 
representing dozens of political parties, were deciding not only the outcome of the 
presidential election but also the country’s political future. The advent of enduring 
democracy in Indonesia required, symbolically and substantially, that the Golkar party 
lose the presidency for the fi rst time in three decades. If Golkar had retained the 
executive, the June elections would not have been the start of genuine democracy, but 
simply the seventh in a succession of rigged electoral rituals ending with Golkar back 
in power—legitimacy affi  rmed, collusive pacts renewed. 
 Through the confluence of new political laws and Golkar’s skillful manipulation 
of the electoral process, the balance of parties in parliament left the country poised 
for just such a scenario. This manipulation and the broad complicity of other actors, 
including much of the media, had effectively perpetuated the engineered outcomes of 
the Suharto era. 86 
 After a year of revolution and reform, Indonesia’s political process seemed, on the 
surface, little changed. Thousands of demonstrators had filled the capital streets. A 
powerful autocrat had fallen from power. The country had held its first open elections 
in more than forty years. Yet Golkar was set to retain control of the presidency. Not 
even solid investigative reporting revealing major electoral fraud had slowed this tra-
jectory. But just weeks before Habibie’s expected triumph, the media-driven Baligate 
scandal broke the ruling party’s hold on power. More critically, it began to unravel the 
fabric of collusion underlying Golkar’s careful negotiations with other political parties 
who, as later revelations showed, had also reaped the rewards of embezzlement and 
electoral manipulation. 87 
 The media’s overall influence in this period was complex, even contradictory, 
reflecting this sector’s dual character as both self-interested and civic-minded in 
checking the power of other players. Media outlets profited from sales and advertising 
revenues through sensational coverage, whether of intraelite backstabbing or seri-
ous political controversy. Even at the peak of media independence during the Bank 
Bali scandal, journalistic commentary on the push for a full investigation of the case 
was mixed. Nevertheless, at critical junctures, members of the media, individually 
and collectively, appeared to be self-consciously forcing accountability on officials and 
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defending the transition. Equally central to the checking of reversal were the syner-
gies between the media and civil society groups, still including thousands of students. 
These synergies and increased transparency, furthered to a surprising extent by baser 
forces, would become critical again in the future, each time helping to block a threat-
ened reversal of democratization. 

 Chapter Seven 
 Scandal and Democratic 
Consolidation 
 Under democracy one party always devotes its chief energies to trying to prove 
that the other party is unfi t to rule—and both commonly succeed, and are right. 
 —H. L. Mencken,  Minority Report 
 After over four decades of dictatorship, the unexpected election of Abdurrahman 
Wahid to the presidency in October 1999 was a remarkable, albeit ambiguous, devel-
opment. Wahid’s win, if nothing else, allowed a new party to take control of the coun-
try’s powerful executive. It did not, however, undo the compromised outcome of the 
June parliamentary elections. Compounding the symbolic damage to the democratic 
process, systemic fraud had helped the old regime’s Golkar party capture enough leg-
islative seats to slow, if not stop, political reform and secure impunity for leaders of 
the old regime. 
 In the face of this political paralysis, the mass media served as the most critical 
force for moving the transition forward. Although the Baligate scandal was a spectacu-
lar controversy that had mesmerized the nation and discredited Suharto’s handpicked 
successor, the use of press scandal as political weapon was not a one-time phenom-
enon. Just as Baligate broke Golkar’s lock on the presidency, so a succession of new 
scandals would tar all the major parties and unleash cycles of retribution through 
revelation. 
 These media clashes would pitch Indonesia into a maelstrom of factional infight-
ing that, perhaps paradoxically, helped put the transition back on track. The media’s 
role at this juncture affirmed the importance of sober analysis and carefully researched 
investigative journalism, but also demonstrated that media tendencies often faulted 
for degrading public debate in advanced democracies can play an emergent function 
in warding off the reversal of democratic transitions. The resulting confrontations 
began to shatter collusive arrangements that continued to compromise the country’s 
electoral, judicial, and economic contests. As intraelite conflict intensified from 2000 
to 2004, the media would become the main arena for its mediation, launching an era 
of politics by scandal that marked a turning point in Indonesia’s transition and made 
the media central to the next phase of democratic consolidation. 
 Wahid’s Presidency 
 When President Wahid began his term in November 1999, little had changed in 
Indonesia’s balance of political forces despite eighteen months of reform. Baligate had 
ended President Habibie’s political career, but even without the executive, his Golkar 
party remained in a strong position. Thanks to its solid showing in the June elections 
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and the skewed distribution of parliamentary seats, the former ruling party controlled 
a quarter of the DPR—more than double the seats won by the new president’s own 
National Awakening Party (PKB). With thirty regional branches, moreover, Golkar’s 
reach extended far beyond any other party. Most importantly, the powerful post of 
DPR Speaker now belonged to its chair, Akbar Tanjung. 
 Ironically, as head of the legislature, Tanjung also controlled access to the Price-
waterhouseCoopers (PwC) audit that investigated Habibie’s and Golkar’s role in the 
Bank Bali scandal. A summary of the audit had been released, but the more revealing 
full report, documenting the transfer of Rp15 billion to the Golkar Election Commit-
tee, was being held back. 1 Though Tanjung was not implicated directly by the audit, 
he was still Golkar’s chair and a key fundraiser, which gave him cause to avoid releas-
ing the full report. On October 19, 1999, the day before the presidential election, the 
Supreme Court ordered that the document be handed over to parliament. But the 
court’s decision did not mention any public right to access. In the following weeks, 
Tanjung was still refusing to disclose the full report—even to the joint DPR commit-
tee charged with investigating the affair. 2 
 It was at this point that the executive turnover that brought a new party to power 
proved significant in Indonesia’s democratic transition. It seems likely that, had Gol-
kar maintained control of the presidency, the full PwC audit would have remained 
locked away, safe in the hands of the same party implicated by its findings. A Wahid 
presidency, however, led not by Golkar but by his PKB, shattered the decades-long 
partnership between the executive and legislature that allowed those in power to sup-
press damaging information. 
 Upon assuming office, Wahid began pushing for the release of the full PwC report. 
The IMF added to this pressure by continuing to withhold $4.7 billion in loans pend-
ing disclosure of the full four-hundred-page audit. 3 Members of the media, the public, 
and leaders of rival parties joined this chorus. In November 1999, Tanjung finally gave 
in, only weeks before the parliament’s deadline for the Bank Bali committee to com-
plete its investigation. 
 Subsequent legal proceedings, however, proved disappointing. Attempts to pros-
ecute the principals led to acquittals or outright dismissals. After a year of investiga-
tion, the government failed to produce a single conviction in one of the most carefully 
documented scandals in the republic’s history. While Baligate had been key in derail-
ing Golkar’s campaign to retain the executive, the judicial process responsible for its 
prosecution remained hostage to political manipulation. 
 Nonetheless, the Wahid government’s initial demand for the PwC report’s 
release was promising for the transition. Upon taking office, the new president told 
journalists to be tough on his administration, affirming his commitment to press 
freedom and democratic reform. 4 In November, Wahid went further, dissolving the 
once-feared Ministry of Information that had controlled the media for four decades. 
In mid-February 2000, Wahid skillfully pushed the former Indonesian National Army 
commander, General Wiranto, out of his cabinet, winning commendation from reform 
factions and political observers. Fikri Jufri of  Tempo said the president was moving 
like “a knight in chess” and praised him for being “consistent in his inconsistency.” 5 
Likewise, the  Jakarta Post said, “Indonesians would do best to get used to [Wahid’s] 
peculiar style of leadership,” and called Wiranto’s peaceful removal “a great achieve-
ment and a giant step in the right direction for the country.” 6 
 Overall, Wahid’s reform agenda, though widely applauded, did not go far enough 
for some and went too far for others. Thus his honeymoon with the media and the 
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multiparty coalition that brought him to power was relatively brief. During his first 
six months he managed to alienate much of the new legislature, in part by repeat-
edly snubbing the two largest parties, Golkar and PDIP, in endless cabinet reshuffles. 
By January 2000, rumors about growing tensions between the new administration 
and military leaders prompted US officials to warn the military “not to try to seize 
power.” 7 
 By April, patience with Wahid’s erratic ways ran out, even among reform forces, 
when he abruptly fired two prominent members of Golkar and PDIP from his coali-
tion cabinet. When he refused to offer sufficient justification, legislators summoned 
him to a hearing, bringing the president into open conflict with the two largest par-
ties in parliament. 8 Wahid’s interference in the prosecution of three business tycoons 
who refused to repay state loans also generated widespread criticism. 9 Perhaps most 
disappointing for ordinary Indonesians, however, were the administration’s failures 
in handling corruption cases against former president Suharto and his son Tommy. 
 Some legislators began proposing impeachment hearings. Representatives of the 
Crescent and Star Party were at the forefront, calling for an emergency parliamentary 
session to remove Wahid for trying to lift the government’s thirty-four-year ban on 
Communism. 10 Critics complained about many other aspects of Wahid’s presidency, 
from nepotism and overseas junkets to increasingly autocratic leadership. 11 But when 
his enemies finally moved to push him from power, they focused on two scandals that 
set off a new media feeding frenzy and implicated Wahid in the same corruption he 
had vowed to eradicate. 
 Concatenation of Scandal 
 While the Bank Bali case was sputtering along in a string of acquittals, mem-
bers of the media were “having a fi eld day” over a new scandal involving Wahid and 
Bulog, the state’s rice distribution agency. 12 The case centered on a $4.1 million loan 
that the foundation overseeing Bulog’s pension fund had granted to Wahid’s personal 
masseur, Alip Agung Suwondo. The story broke in May 2000, when the head of the 
nongovernmental organization Government Watch called a press conference to accuse 
Suwondo of channeling these funds to four private bank accounts. 13 The scandal then 
widened over revelations that Suwondo and others involved were shareholders in 
Wahid’s airline, Awair, causing speculation that the missing Bulog funds were fi nanc-
ing this new company. 14 Suwondo’s disappearance overseas added to the drama. 15 
 The flight of the masseur sparked immediate interest, but misuse of Bulog funds 
had been going on for so long and involved so many people that it was hard to imagine 
this incident could evolve into a major scandal. As observers pointed out, Suwondo 
had taken “lunch money” compared with the amounts involved in other scandals—
Baligate, Suharto’s accumulation of $45 billion, and countless abuses of Indonesia’s 
other cash cow, the state oil company Pertamina. 16 
 Disappointment over the government’s handling of other cases also made observ-
ers cynical about the Bulog scandal’s potential to escalate, particularly since it involved 
an incumbent administration. As the  Jakarta Post explained, “The scandal is develop-
ing into an all too familiar pattern where a simple issue is made so complicated and 
hazy . . . that the guilty parties will eventually escape prosecution.” 17 Similarly,  Tempo 
concluded that its investigation “could ultimately just end in political horse trading.” 18 
 But the scandal, dubbed “Buloggate,” did snowball, in part because its origin 
as a leak produced a natural press drama, replete with the narrative tension of an 
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unfolding story that rival media could pursue. 19 As  Detikworld said, “Jam-packed with 
all the twists and turns of a good thriller, the case just gets more interesting.” 20 Above 
all, its pursuit served President Wahid’s political opponents. 
 At the center of the scandal was Bulog, a much-abused vehicle for funding cor-
ruption, found that same May to have leaked Rp2.7 trillion (approximately $30 mil-
lion) from its nonbudgetary funds over the previous five years. 21 Given the scale of 
the leakage and Golkar’s long control over Bulog, it was surprising that Golkar would 
choose corruption involving the agency to attack Wahid. Yet Golkar leaders publicly 
lambasted Wahid as if their own party somehow held the high ground in managing 
Bulog’s accounts. Leading the charge was the DPR Speaker and Golkar chair Akbar 
Tanjung, who had announced in May that the president must disclose all he knew, 
warning that any failure on Wahid’s part to provide “a satisfactory explanation” would 
damage his credibility. 22 
 Using Bulog to attack Wahid set in motion a cycle of reciprocal revelations that 
ultimately would escape Golkar’s control. But for the present, the party’s influence 
in parliament protected it from repercussions. In June 2000, Wahid’s PKB retaliated, 
initiating a probe into the suspected Rp2.7 trillion leak from Bulog under Golkar’s 
earlier administration. PKB targeted Tanjung directly, faulting him as state secretary 
under Habibie for allowing Bulog to keep these discretionary funds separate from its 
official budget, despite directives from the IMF to integrate the two. 23 In July, PKB 
demanded investigation into irregularities cited in an audit of Taperum, the Civil 
Servants Housing Savings program in operation during Tanjung’s term as minister 
of public housing. When the media confronted him over “Taperumgate,” Tanjung, 
according to an observer, “could not conceal his ire.” 24 
 On September 21, Indonesia Corruption Watch added its own evidence to the 
allegations mounting against the DPR Speaker. 25 As both scandals widened, in January 
2001 PKB legislators renewed their demand for a probe into Taperum while lodging 
another complaint against Tanjung—this time, concerning financial leakage from an 
Inter-Parliamentary Union conference held the previous September. 26 A few days later, 
the National Ombudsman Commission recommended investigation into allegations 
from Tanjung’s own nephew that he had forged documents in a 1995 land sale when 
serving as minister of public housing. 27 
 On February 2, 2001, Wahid’s party, PKB, announced that they had submitted 
three separate proposals, signed by 110 legislators, demanding inquiries into these 
and other scandals implicating Golkar, including a massive hemorrhaging of funds 
from the Central Bank’s liquidity assistance scheme (Bantuan Likuiditas Bank Indo-
nesia, BLBI) and additional losses from Bulog’s nonbudgetary funds. 28 If these charges 
were accurate, the sums disappearing from Bulog’s accounts were substantial by any 
standard, but the leakage from BLBI’s accounts was staggering. A PKB leader noted 
that as much as “96 percent . . . of the Rp144 trillion BLBI funds have been embez-
zled, and none of the 157 persons [implicated] have been jailed.” 29 
 Yet even the BLBI revelations failed to generate anywhere near the attention 
given the scandals implicating Wahid. In the midst of his attacks on Tanjung, three 
magazines— Gatra ,  Panji Masyarakat , and  Forum Keadilan —published cover stories 
alleging that Wahid had once had an illicit relationship and offered as evidence an 
incriminating photo. 30 It was only when Wahid’s minister of defense, Mohammad 
Mahfud, began using the media to fight back that the president’s party found the 
means to regain leverage against Golkar. That same February, Mahfud leaked informa-
tion to the media indicating that Golkar had siphoned off Rp90 billion from Bulog’s 
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nonbudgetary funds to finance its 1999 election campaign. 31 Less than two weeks 
later, the PKB faction demanded a special DPR investigation into “Golkargate.” 32 
 Although these latest allegations seemed to promise a “Buloggate II,” none of 
the accusations against Tanjung and his party produced official investigations. Nor 
did they take the heat off the president. Not long after Buloggate I broke, Wahid suf-
fered another blow from revelations that he had accepted a $2 million donation from 
the sultan of Brunei, Hassanal Bolkiah. This new scandal quickly became “Brunei-
gate.” Though he denied any wrongdoing in the Bulog case, Wahid did admit to taking 
money from Brunei but claimed to have donated it all to humanitarian causes. 33 
 On August 28, 2000, a coalition of 237 legislators from six parties voted to estab-
lish a parliamentary committee to investigate the president’s role in the two scandals, 
Buloggate and Bruneigate. 34 On October 28, police officially cleared the president of 
wrongdoing related to Bulog. But three months later, the investigating committee 
reported that Wahid had knowingly “avoided legal procedures” to raise funds for 
Indonesia’s war-torn provinces, using Bulog funds and the sultan of Brunei’s $2 mil-
lion gift. 35 
 Wahid refused to recognize the legality of the committee, viewing its probes as a 
ploy to push him from power. On February 1, 2001, the Golkar-dominated DPR passed 
a resolution to censure the new president. The following month, Wahid had his minister 
of justice read a fifteen-page speech to the DPR apologizing for “any possible unpleas-
ant or unacceptable behaviour.” Yet the president maintained his innocence, calling the 
charges against him “baseless” and challenging the legitimacy of the investigations. 36 
 Wahid’s Turn against the Media 
 Throughout his two-year term, Wahid maintained an ambiguous relationship 
with the media that grew steadily worse in the period preceding his downfall. On 
National Press Day in February 2000, only months after taking offi  ce, the president 
gave journalists what  Kompas called “a special present” in the form of a lengthy cri-
tique. He complained about both Indonesian and foreign reporting on East Timor 
and Aceh. But his main reproach was that domestic media reports magnifi ed confl icts 
between him and other national leaders, particularly General Wiranto and Vice Presi-
dent Megawati. At the same time, he emphasized that his critique came out of a deep 
sense of camaraderie with the media, claiming to have long been a  wartawan tanpa 
surat kabar , or a “journalist without a newspaper.” 37 
 In mid-April, Wahid’s defense minister, Juwono Sudarsono, lambasted Indone-
sia’s private television stations for inflaming provincial conflicts. He acknowledged 
the necessity of press freedom in a democracy but suggested that the cost was becom-
ing too great. Comments on talk shows “have worsened . . . social conflicts,” he said. 
“Politicians’ rhetoric has incited their own supporters to attack each other.” 38 
 When the Indonesian media began pursuing Buloggate I, turning the story of 
Wahid’s scheming masseur into a serial drama, Wahid’s defenders began to see a 
darker agenda behind their coverage. In October 2000, the deputy secretary general of 
Wahid’s party, Chotibul Umam Wiranu, accused the press of cooperating with “politi-
cal forces . . . inside and outside the legislature” to overthrow his government. In a 
speech on October 6 before the Muslim association, Nahdlatul Ulama, he announced 
that “60 percent” of the nation’s publications were part of this “print media con-
spiracy.” He added, “In the near future, two electronic media will appear to join the 
anti-government strength.” 39 
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 In November, Wahid attacked the international media for alleged misrepre-
sentations, accusing “a foreign television station” of reporting that “millions” 
had attended a pro-independence rally in Aceh, when “[i]n fact, less than 100,000 
people turned up.” 40 In January 2001, members of Wahid’s cabinet began calling 
the media “anti-government” and “over-critical” of government policies. One said, 
“freedom of the press is being ‘overused’ by most media.” Further faulting their 
coverage of Aceh, the defense minister, Mahfud, said that the media “seem to enjoy 
gore, revealing exactly how rebels are killed and the gruesome details of local people 
killed in crossfires, ignoring mounting TNI and police dead.” 41 The Ministry of For-
eign Affairs then announced that foreign journalists were now required to obtain 
special permission to visit Indonesia’s “hotspots”—notably, Maluku, West Papua, 
and Aceh. 42 
 That same week in the province of Riau, the paramilitary wing of Nahdlatul 
Ulama, once headed by Wahid himself, and his supporters from the Cirebon City 
People’s Forum in East Java forced their way into the offices of three newspapers to 
demand public apologies for publishing photographs of posters caricaturing the presi-
dent. The caricature—the president’s head affixed on a baby’s body—had been on 
posters captioned “No Worries” waved by demonstrators outside the parliamentary 
complex in January. Nahdlatul Ulama’s paramilitary “Banser” forces occupied one 
newspaper office and smashed furniture until editors agreed to print page-one apolo-
gies for several days running. Wahid did not respond directly, instead claiming that 
the media had been using events, such as bombings in Jakarta on Christmas Eve, “for 
their own interests.” 43 
 A meeting in mid-February with the managing director of the government-
owned TVRI added a new dimension to the growing similarity between Suharto’s and 
Wahid’s tactics for handling negative reporting. According to  Tempo , Wahid “urged 
TVRI to stop broadcasting any reports critical of the presidency.” His logic, reminis-
cent of Suharto’s standard justification for censorship, was that “such reporting could 
potentially trigger mob violence” among his supporters, particularly in East Java, 
where there was already unrest. Allegedly threatened with dismissal, the managing 
director, Chaerul Zen, ordered TVRI “to immediately brief news editors . . . to comply 
with [the president’s] appeal.” The editors were also instructed “to stop broadcast-
ing reports” on calls for a special session of parliament. 44 On March 25, while twenty 
thousand “radical” Muslim students were shouting outside the palace demanding that 
the president resign, Wahid announced, “The media have been making slanderous 
accusations against me.” 45 
 At this point, Wahid said that he remained “reluctant to bring newspapers to 
court because it would create a depressing effect on press freedom.” 46 In May 2001, 
however, he began threatening criminal prosecution against media outlets for “defa-
mation,” a violation still punishable under the criminal code by six years’ imprison-
ment. 47 The same week, officials acknowledged that the government had established 
a “media monitoring team” with the aim, said Wimar Witoelar, who was by then a 
presidential spokesperson, of checking misleading information and preventing offi-
cials from making “careless statements [that] will cause unrest.” 48 
 As tensions rose, Wahid showed signs of desperation in the face of a looming 
showdown between his supporters and the forces preparing to unseat him. On May 
28, 2001, he cited media irresponsibility to justify issuing an executive order granting 
emergency powers to his minister of security, later characterizing the directive as a 
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step to prevent a “catastrophe.” 49 The same day, Wahid’s attorney general, Marzuki 
Darusman, announced that his office had found no evidence implicating the president 
in either Buloggate or Bruneigate. 50 
 The next day, violent demonstrations in support of Wahid broke out in East Java 
but did not dissuade the MPR from voting for a special impeachment session. In 
response, four thousand Wahid supporters stormed the parliamentary compound. On 
June 1, the president dismissed his attorney general and security minister, to whom 
he had just granted emergency powers. Two days later, he suspended the chief of 
police for opposing a state of emergency. Several cabinet reshuffles followed, and on 
July 6, Wahid again threatened a state of emergency. 51 
 On July 21, the MPR began impeachment proceedings by summoning the 
president to deliver an accountability speech. Wahid refused, appearing instead on 
national television to denounce the parliament’s actions as illegal and argue that 
only a new round of elections could resolve the current crisis. 52 Two days later, Wahid 
issued a decree “freezing” both the entire parliament and the former ruling party, 
Golkar, and promising new elections within the year. 53 The decree also ordered the 
military to stop the impeachment proceedings, prompting the armed forces com-
mander to announce the military’s unified opposition to the president’s directive. 
That same morning, Indonesia’s Supreme Court ruled the president’s decree illegal. 
Within hours, Wahid’s vice president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, became Indonesia’s 
fifth president. 54 
 One could argue that Wahid’s turn against the media, a precursor to prorogu-
ing parliament, reflected a development common in fragile democracies—a growing 
conviction among leaders that they must defer democracy to save it. Instead of exer-
cising his “right of reply,” Wahid justified his plan to impose emergency powers in 
part by asserting that controls on the media were necessary to head off destabilizing 
intergroup conflict. 55 At the same time, his turn against journalists, as one editorial 
noted, was “completely out of character.” 56 Wahid was, after all, a leader who prided 
himself on advocating free speech and, despite fierce backlash, had fought to end the 
country’s three-decade ban on Communist writings and ideas. His volte-face raised 
serious questions about the depth of the country’s democratization and showed that 
the executive branch itself remained inclined, even under the progressive politics of a 
new president, toward restraints on public speech. 
 By this point in the transition, members of the media were prepared to resist 
executive pressure, but they were also trying to survive in a newly competitive envi-
ronment that could give scandals, in a sense, a life of their own. Media ownership 
remained an important factor in decision-making. But even after publishing the 
alleged Wahid mistress story, editors of  Gatra , owned by Suharto’s crony Bob Hasan, 
confessed that a primary motive had been to boost circulation. 57 This competitive 
environment, as much as journalistic commitment to a watchdog role or even politi-
cal bias, drove the coverage that helped bring Wahid down. In a media arena now 
dominated by market forces, once a news story gained momentum, particularly if 
triggered by a leak, narrative tension and the pressure of competition tended to 
push it forward, even if individual outlets wished to ignore a revelation damaging 
to the president or another public figure. Though an advocate of press freedom in 
opposition, Wahid developed an antagonistic, increasingly intolerant stance toward 
negative reporting as president, viewing critical coverage, whether negative or con-
structive, as essentially adversarial. 
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 Buloggate II 
 Wahid’s moves to rein in the media were a natural response to his fear of los-
ing public support that ironically cost him the very allies he needed to fend off 
impeachment. They were also a precursor to his eventual declaration of the state 
of emergency that precipitated his fall. But events might well have gone the other 
way, returning the country to autocratic rule. His successor, Megawati Sukarnopu-
tri, was more cautious, though both her administration and the political parties 
that put her in power were, from the outset, even more uncomfortable with the 
country’s noisy, meddlesome, and “irresponsible” media. Yet even as news outlets 
navigated this continued hostility, they were becoming a primary, if not  the primary, 
mediator of the intraelite confl ict that was now a defi ning feature of the country’s 
politics. 
 As Megawati began her term in July 2001, Golkar’s second-place strategy in the 
1999 elections appeared to have paid off. Under Wahid, the former ruling party had 
seemed almost impervious to the corruption charges leveled against it by rival parties 
and civil society groups. After Wahid’s fall, Golkar had sufficient seats to continue 
obstructing democratic reform and evade accountability for its 1999 electoral fraud. But 
this influence began to fray when charges over Golkar’s use of Bulog funds suddenly 
resurfaced in October, putting Golkar on the defensive and transforming Mahfud’s 
press leak of the previous February into a full-blown scandal. Though this second 
Buloggate did little to slow Wahid’s steady slide toward impeachment, it nonetheless 
changed the course of Indonesia’s transition. 
 While the rest of parliament had ignored the PKB’s demands to investigate Gol-
kar’s chair, Tanjung, for misuse of Bulog funds, Wahid had not. Just before he fell, 
he had his attorney general open a probe and declare former Bulog chief Rahardi 
Ramelan an official suspect. Ramelan left the country, and Megawati’s new govern-
ment did nothing, reportedly observing an agreement with leaders of several factions 
“to avoid cross-party political aggression.” 58 
 A flaw in this agreement was its failure to include other key players set on oust-
ing Tanjung from his Golkar leadership. These included Wahid’s party, PKB, which 
was “determined,” said journalist John McBeth, “to exact revenge for Tanjung’s role 
in ousting Wahid in August.” 59 Legislators representing the provinces of Irian Jaya, 
Maluku, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan reportedly also began plotting to rid the party of 
Tanjung in early October. 60 Most critically, as it turned out, leaders of the Indonesian 
Association of Muslim Intellectuals, a think tank founded by the former president 
Habibie, “recruited” Ramelan to their own mission to rid Golkar of Tanjung, convinc-
ing him to return to Indonesia for questioning. 61 
 Ramelan’s return revived the government’s investigation. On October 9, during 
an interview at the attorney general’s office, he “spilled the beans,” announcing that 
in March 1999 he had given Rp40 billion from Bulog’s nonbudgetary funds directly to 
Tanjung. 62 During questioning, Ramelan explained that President Habibie and certain 
members of his cabinet had allocated the money for use, under Tanjung’s supervision, 
as aid to people hurt by the economic crisis. 63 To make sure the revelation reached the 
public, Ramelan repeated his explanation to reporters. 
 This revelation became the moment when the long-observed code of silence 
in Golkar’s ranks cracked. Even so, the state prosecutor’s office, now controlled by 
Megawati, did not act. But the revelation received wide media coverage, stirring the 
public, particularly students, to turn on Tanjung. Then, on October 23, fifty legislators 
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from five factions submitted a petition to the DPR leadership demanding a parliamen-
tary probe into the affair, proposing formation of “Special Committee Buloggate II.” 64 
 Golkar’s leaders had already acted to counter such a move, demonstrating the 
power they still wielded. Tanjung’s first response to Ramelan’s disclosure was to 
admit the transaction but deny any impropriety. He insisted that he had not diverted 
any funds to Golkar’s election coffers, but had channeled them directly to a charity for 
food distribution under the government’s Social Safety Net program. 65 Next, the Gol-
kar legislator Ferry Mursyidan Baldan spoke out, warning those contemplating a DPR 
investigation: “Don’t push Akbar to play his trump card, it would affect many people, 
including the current government.” Tanjung then approached Megawati’s husband, 
Taufik Kiemas—who was himself vulnerable to Tanjung’s “trump card” threat—to 
pressure Kiemas to help block the special investigation. 66 
 Megawati was in a difficult position even without Tanjung’s threat to her hus-
band. She had already alienated her one-time ally, PKB, by backing Wahid’s impeach-
ment. Her administration relied on a fragile coalition with former enemies in Golkar 
and the same Muslim parties who had stridently opposed her candidacy back in 1999. 
Her own vice president, Hamzah Haz—leader of the largest Muslim party, the United 
Development Party—was now a vocal detractor and among those most eager to see 
her government fall. As one insider explained, “The hardline Muslim parties are now 
backing the investigation into [Tanjung] because they feel it will weaken Megawati’s 
powerbase and make her easier to overthrow.” 67 
 Yet PDIP could not ignore mounting public pressure, led by student groups 
demanding Tanjung’s punishment, for action on this latest Bulog fraud. 68 On October 
16, 2000, the coalition of four civil society organizations that had filed suit against 
Golkar in June met with officials at the attorney general’s office to demand a formal 
inquiry into Ramelan’s allegations. 69 Tanjung responded by daring them to continue 
their pursuit, claiming that there was no evidence of his “misappropriating” Bulog 
funds. 70 
 The state’s poor record in prosecuting high-profile corruption cases helped 
explain Tanjung’s confidence. In case after case, including the famous Bank Bali trials, 
defendants had received acquittals after prosecutors filed flimsy cases and neglected 
to present evidence that had already been gathered. Though the causes of this dys-
function were widely known, the media nevertheless leaked an external audit reveal-
ing that the attorney general’s office was riddled with institutionalized corruption. 
Influenced by bribes or political pressure, prosecutors routinely distorted due process, 
most frequently by filing weak charges or burying evidence. 71 
 At this sensitive juncture, the news media became a remedy for the problem this 
leaked report exposed, doing the job state prosecutors would not. As it turned out, 
the critical evidence that moved the case would come the following October from an 
exposé by the once-banned magazine  Tempo . In its cover story of October 29, 2001, 
 Tempo reported “the involvement of senior Golkar officials” in the diversion of Bulog 
funds—officials who were “apparently working hard to cover their tracks.” Effectively 
foiling this cover-up, the magazine dissected Tanjung’s story of forwarding Bulog 
funds to an unnamed foundation. According to this investigation, a Golkar insider 
had learned from Tanjung’s lawyers that a “foundation that could be used as ‘camou-
flage’ had been found” with links to Golkar’s deputy treasurer. The source added that 
Tanjung’s lawyer had then “boasted that he had successfully lobbied senior officials 
of the ‘Round Building’ [the attorney general’s office] to go along with this plot.” The 
conspirators had finally settled on a third scheme that hinged on the assumption that 
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Bulog’s former deputy financial chief under President Habibie, Achmad Ruskandar, 
would back their story by testifying that he had “witnessed the money being handed 
over directly to a charity called ‘institution RJ.’” The source who had provided the 
confidential file said, “This is the final plot that Akbar is going to play” at the attorney 
general’s office. 72 
 When Tanjung finally talked to state prosecutors, his story matched this third 
scheme. After two weeks of escalating, if contradictory, pressures, President Megawati 
gave legal clearance for her attorney general, M.A. Rachman, to question Tanjung. On 
October 31, Tanjung obeyed a summons to the attorney general’s office as a “witness” 
in the case. During questioning, he stuck to his story that the Rp40 billion had gone 
to a charity for food distribution, and finally produced a name—the Raudatul Jannah 
Islamic Foundation, the same “RJ” named in  Tempo ’s exposé. 73 
 The scheme was proceeding as planned until the Bulog deputy Achmad Rus-
kandar unexpectedly deviated from script, giving damaging testimony on November 
20. He not only failed to mention the involvement of a Raudatul Jannah foundation 
but also admitted placing three checks totaling Rp40 billion into Tanjung’s hands, 
thus contradicting Tanjung’s earlier claim that he had never received any money 
directly. 74 
 Tempo also reported that Bulog officials had withdrawn ten checks totaling Rp40 
billion from two banks, citing evidence that these had gone to two Golkar treasurers 
and “members of the Golkar General Election Victory Board,” and were “intended 
for campaign needs in the regions.” The most incriminating part of  Tempo ’s report, 
however, was documentation that Golkar’s treasurers had issued receipts for half of 
the Rp40 billion. “Later,” said  Tempo , “Akbar took back the original receipt[s] for Rp20 
billion, promising to replace [them] with a new one for the entire sum: Rp40 bil-
lion.” The replacement never happened. “Fortunately,”  Tempo added, “a photocopy 
was safely kept in secret by a key player in the affair.” 75 The key player later turned out 
to be Ruskandar, the very man who was turning state’s evidence. 
 Media’s Role 
 For the fi rst time, Golkar’s chair appeared cornered—“trapped,” in  Tempo ’s assess-
ment. 76 He also found himself on the wrong side of media publicity, just as President 
Wahid had. The print press, particularly the newsweeklies, had been pursuing Bulog-
gate II doggedly since early October, when Rahardi Ramelan fi rst made his sensational 
disclosure of paying Rp40 billion to Tanjung. Radio and television talk shows likewise 
fi lled the air with lively discussion of the case, giving instant celebrity to Tanjung’s 
critics. 
 By late October, members of Tanjung’s party were using the media to distance 
themselves from their chair. Golkar official Muchyar Yara, looking “for the entire 
world like someone preparing Tanjung for a ritual sacrifice,” speculated on Metro-TV 
that Tanjung had probably “fudged the truth” in his story about the Raudatul Jannah 
foundation. 77 Others lobbied to remove Tanjung from party leadership. 78 
 The media were now critical to the unfolding scandal in other ways. When Tan-
jung finally arrived at the attorney general’s office for questioning, the foreign press 
reported that he went not to explain Ramelan’s disclosure but to respond to “[domes-
tic] media questions about what exactly he did with $4 million in government funds 
in 1999, on the eve of the last election.” 79 On November 19, the state news agency, 
Antara, confronted Tanjung about “media reports” that he had issued the two receipts 
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highlighted in  Tempo ’s exposé. Tanjung denied the charge, stating, “There were no 
such receipts.” 80 
 That same week,  Tempo devoted its cover to a picture of Tanjung with a Pinoc-
chio nose and his mouth papered shut by a check. The Pinocchio cover prompted “an 
angry visit by incensed Golkar officials to the magazine’s office.”  Tempo responded 
“that Golkar had not cared less when the magazine dished out equally harsh coverage 
to ex-president Abdurrahman Wahid over the first so-called Buloggate scandal [that] 
eventually led to his downfall.” 81 
 Again, on December 1, Tanjung’s friends in Golkar fought back, threatening, via 
the media, to establish a “rival” parliamentary committee to investigate the misuse 
of Bulog funds by other political parties. 82 A  Jakarta Post editorial accused Golkar of 
“hold[ing] the entire nation hostage,” arguing that “the Buloggate II inquiry should be 
started precisely because Golkar has resorted to blackmail [and] threats” to block it. 83 
 Tanjung’s—and Golkar’s—credibility hinged on the claim that the Rp40 billion 
went to the Raudatul Jannah charity, and not, as  Tempo ’s exposé indicated, to Gol-
kar’s election activities. But the Indonesian media openly challenged Tanjung’s story, 
reporting that the charity had been formed only recently and was, moreover, headed 
by Golkar executives. 84 Under this pressure, even the attorney general’s office and 
Antara began probing the story’s inconsistencies. 
 By early 2002, the tide appeared to have turned against Tanjung. On January 7, state 
prosecutors named the Golkar chair an official suspect, charging him with impropri-
ety in authorizing as state secretary the disbursement of Rp40 billion from Bulog’s 
nonbudgetary funds. 85 Though Tanjung’s friends lobbied heavily to allow him “an 
honorable retreat,” President Megawati herself rejected his request that the attorney 
general’s investigation be dropped. 86 
 Tanjung’s image suffered further through ridicule in the press, with more wither-
ing caricatures and photo captions. 87 Following the Pinocchio edition,  Tempo ’s cover 
showed Tanjung cowered in a corner biting his thumb. 88 A few weeks later, he appeared 
in a bright yellow matador costume waving a symbol of his fabricated “RJ” foundation 
before an angry bull, the symbol of the ruling party, PDIP. 89 
 Now embattled on all fronts, Tanjung lashed out at the media. He had steered 
clear of direct confrontation with  Tempo , whose reports arguably had done him the 
most damage. But when the small daily  Rakyat Merdeka published a caricature of him 
bare-chested and sweating as an official “suspect,” he filed a libel suit. 90 
 After Megawati refused Tanjung’s request to drop the attorney general’s investiga-
tion, Tanjung, according to Golkar insiders, had no choice but “to feed information” to 
the media that “would implicate other leading politicians in a variety of scandals” and 
thereby force a compromise. 91 The threat apparently had some impact. Though the 
attorney general’s office seemed to be pursuing its investigation, observers believed 
that naming Tanjung a “suspect” was part of a cover-up to save him by avoiding a 
parliamentary inquiry. By the end of January, legislators from PDIP reported that they 
were being coerced into following the party’s position on the case. 92 
 Tanjung was exploiting two weak spots in PDIP’s armor. The party’s flurry of back-
pedaling, said the  Asia Times , was “an about-face triggered by Akbar’s [dual] threat to 
withdraw support for Megawati and make public alleged corruption by her husband.” 
Moreover, it was widely believed by this time that all the major political parties, PDIP 
included, had accepted money from Bulog before the 1999 elections. 93 Since Golkar 
had control over Bulog’s accounts during their diversion, this wide dispersal among 
major parties seemed clever foresight that protected Golkar from future fallout for 
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this graft. Indeed, by March 2002 only PKB and the “Reform Faction” (Partai Amanat 
Nasional and Partai Keadilan) remained committed to a DPR investigation, but they 
held just ninety-two of the DPR’s five hundred seats. 94 Some feared that a series of 
scandals implicating all the major parties in Bulog corruption would simply make vot-
ers cynical. “The real casualty,” said the  Economist , “may be democracy itself.” 95 
 By February 25, interest in Buloggate II had “waned,” seeming to vindicate these 
concerns about a surfeit of scandal. 96 Nonetheless, Tanjung had already been con-
victed in the court of public opinion. 97 In March, pressure on Megawati’s PDIP began 
to build again, made more acute by internal dissatisfaction and, perhaps most criti-
cally, threats from international donors to withhold billions in aid. 98 University stu-
dents once again took to the streets, demanding a parliamentary probe into Buloggate 
II. “More student protests are expected to come,” the  Asia Times predicted, “which 
means Indonesia is facing yet another turbulent, uncertain year [that] could mark the 
beginning of the end to the leadership of Megawati.” 99 
 The other major parties were equally reluctant to anger the public by voting 
against the probe. Instead, as DPR leaders decided in early March to postpone the 
decision for a parliamentary investigation, the media again became the wild card, 
reporting PDIP leaders’ paralysis and maintaining pressure for some resolution. 100 
 In a turn of events that caught nearly everyone off guard, especially the DPR 
Speaker Akbar Tanjung, the attorney general had him arrested and placed him in 
detention. On the morning of March 7, 2002, Tanjung arrived at the attorney gen-
eral’s office for his third interview, “beaming” and shaking hands with reporters. 101 
Seven hours later, he emerged, jumped in his black Land Cruiser, and sped toward the 
compound gate, nearly mowing down an official in his path and stopping only when 
blocked by a police truck and an armed barricade. “Under flash bulbs and cameras,” 
 Tempo wrote, “the famous figure stooped weakly. He was Akbar Tanjung, and his face 
looked glum and dejected.” 102 The head of the party that had ruled Indonesia for more 
than three decades was under arrest. 
 This dramatic denouement was a strong indication that the cycle of media exposé 
and political scandal that had brought down President Habibie and his successor 
Wahid was a key driver in post- reformasi politics. But two days later, in a telenovela 
twist in this cycle of revenge, the attorney general’s office suddenly disclosed that 
one of Tanjung’s codefendants, a “contractor” named Winfried Simatupang, had just 
“returned” most of the Rp40 billion allegedly diverted from Bulog into Golkar’s cam-
paign coffers. 103 On March 12, Simatupang handed over the final Rp7.5 billion. He 
claimed he had simply been hiding the money “under his mattress” for the past three 
years, producing the clearest proof yet that had it not gone to any food distribution 
activities, but also supporting Tanjung’s claim it had not gone to Golkar. 104 
 Most significantly, the return of the money helped Tanjung deny that he had per-
sonally profited. Things starting looking up for the Golkar leader. When he now refused 
to relinquish his authority as party chair, calls quieted for an extraordinary conference 
to name a successor. 105 Consequently, on March 26 as his trial on graft charges got 
underway, the DPR voted to back Tanjung’s continued tenure as Speaker. 106 
 Golkar’s Comeback via Scandal 
 From the outset, political interests compromised the case against Tanjung, who 
remained, as DPR Speaker and Golkar head, the second most powerful person in 
Indonesia. On March 16, 2002, the  Jakarta Post reported, “Eff orts to salvage corruption 
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suspect Akbar Tanjung became increasingly transparent when [the] Attorney Gen-
eral’s Offi  ce investigators suddenly declared the Golkar chairman’s dossier complete,” 
taking only a few hours to study the fi les before handing them over to the court, a step 
that usually “takes at least two weeks.” 107 
 On March 25, Tanjung’s trial began. The court charged him with “directly or indi-
rectly causing financial or economic loss to the state.” 108 Although a close relationship 
between the chief justice and another Golkar party boss reduced the trial’s credibility, 
Tanjung’s indictment was still unprecedented. No official at his level had ever faced 
such proceedings. 109 
 But that same week, a group of Golkar legislators went back on the offensive, 
fighting scandal with scandal. Shifting attention from Tanjung’s trial, they began 
lobbying to summon President Megawati to explain an extrabudgetary Rp30 billion 
donation made on February 25 to a military housing project, a scandal later called 
“Banpresgate.” 110 Under such pressure to compromise with Golkar, on April 2 PDIP 
appeared to have resolved its internal debate over Buloggate II. In public statements 
clearing Golkar of connections to the diverted money, party leaders who had once 
been among the loudest in demanding a DPR probe now announced that the money 
had gone to “individuals” and “private institutions”—in other words, not to any polit-
ical parties. 111 
 Amid media charge and countercharge, Tanjung’s trial was under way. The 
prosecution had a strong case, armed with fifteen cashed checks amounting to 
Rp40 billion and solid leads to trace the money to Golkar accounts. 112 But the pub-
lic prosecutor, Fachmi [one name], seemed more intent on clearing Tanjung than 
indicting him; Fachmi directed most charges at Tanjung’s hapless codefendants—
Simatupang (who had returned the stolen money) and Dadang Sukandar (Raudatul 
Jannah’s alleged founder). Both appeared willing to take the fall for the party’s 
chair. At this critical juncture, however, the media, led by  Tempo, openly challenged 
Fachmi to stop stalling. In its detailed coverage,  Tempo revisited evidence already 
gathered, including documentation that Golkar treasurers had cashed two Bulog 
checks for Rp10 billion apiece. 113 But the attorney general’s office dismissed this 
documentation because the magazine only had photocopies of the endorsed checks, 
not the originals. 114 
 On April 6, the attorney general’s office suddenly released Tanjung on the personal 
guarantee of his wife, who wanted him home to celebrate her birthday. 115 Despite 
strong evidence to support their case, prosecutors had already given Tanjung sev-
eral gifts—notably, incompetence in the form of “vague” charges, and “careless” and 
“confusing” dossiers providing the defendant cause to demand dismissal. 116 Tanjung’s 
prosecutors, moreover, aimed their case mainly at the Raudatul Jannah foundation, 
setting the stage for his codefendants to take the fall and thus clearing Tanjung and 
Golkar of any wrongdoing. 117 On the trial’s first day, it seemed Tanjung’s prosecution 
was heading for the same denouement as defendants in the Bank Bali scandal—
exoneration on grounds of prosecutorial incompetence. 118 
 A week later, however, Tanjung and his party were blindsided from another direc-
tion when the separate trial of former Bulog chief Rahardi Ramelan took an unex-
pected turn. On April 23, Ramelan’s defense counsel, Trimoelja D. Soerjadi, uncovered 
details of a plot to conceal Tanjung’s involvement in the diversion of Bulog funds. 
While questioning Tanjung as a witness in Ramelan’s trial, Soerjadi revealed that 
at a meeting back in October 2001, Tanjung and his lawyer, Hotma Sitompul, “had 
attempted to persuade Ramelan to lie to investigators.” 119 Significantly, the justice in 
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Ramelan’s trial was Lalu Mariyun, famed for excusing the former president Suharto 
from standing trial and later for acquitting his son Tommy in a land scam case. 120 
 In the middle of Soerjadi’s unexpected line of questioning, Justice Mariyun 
abruptly announced an early lunch break. Soerjadi, however, preempted any such 
maneuver by using the media to make his revelations public, relating details of the 
scheme to reporters and producing sensational headlines, such as “Akbar Tried to 
Make Me Lie.” 121 As the press kept up its coverage,  Tempo was still leading, with a 
feature headlined “Buloggate II: Forty Billion Lies.” 122 On June 4, hundreds of demon-
strators from civic and student organizations renewed pressure on PDIP to support a 
parliamentary probe of Buloggate II, forcing party leaders to move a planned meeting 
to another location. 123 
 Ongoing testimony against Tanjung in his own trial also continued to hurt his 
case, particularly Simatupang’s confession on May 7, 2002, that his return of the 
Rp40 billion in March had only been a part of a “scenario” to clear Tanjung. 124 Then on 
May 20, former president Habibie inflicted further damage, sending written testimony 
with incriminating details from his home in Germany. 125 
 On July 24, the Central Jakarta District Court convicted Tanjung for his part in 
Buloggate II. The prosecution asked for the minimum four-year jail term, but the 
court decided to be even more lenient, sentencing him to only three years. After filing 
an appeal, Tanjung remained at liberty and retained both his leadership positions. 126 
Two years later, in February 2004, the Supreme Court ended the controversy by over-
turning Tanjung’s conviction, freeing him to run for president in future elections. 
 Throughout these cycles of media-driven scandals, Golkar’s use of political black-
mail to avoid investigation and threaten other parties, particularly PDIP, was a set-
back for democratization. Tanjung’s tenacity in holding on to his two political posts 
became a triumph for him and, in many ways, his party. Yet his ability to influence 
court proceedings was checked by the new transparency the media were imposing on 
the judicial process. With this transparency, even his ultimate success in the Supreme 
Court could not undo the damage to his political career. Before Buloggate II, Tanjung 
was a serious contender for the 2004 presidential election; by the time the election 
campaign got underway, in the aftermath of all this critical coverage, he could not 
even win his party’s nomination. Golkar was also tarnished, faring poorly in the 2004 
elections with its new candidate. Two years into the transition, powerful interests still 
wielded influence, but the political contests between elections, rocked by media scan-
dals and revenge politics, became increasingly difficult to control. 
 Megawati and the Press 
 As the daughter of Indonesia’s fi rst authoritarian president and heir to the cor-
poratist principles of his reign, President Megawati responded to media criticism 
with the reimposition of controls in the name of public order. The administration’s 
record on democratic reform was, therefore, mixed—marked by a weak commitment 
to freedom of speech and an underlying hostility to the media that surfaced in various 
manifestations. 
 One of Megawati’s first acts as president in 2001 was to reestablish the Min-
istry of Information, a key artifact of authoritarian rule abolished by her predeces-
sor, renaming it the Ministry of Communications and Information. She appointed the 
Golkar leader Syamsul Mu’arif to head the revived agency but, to appease her crit-
ics, limited his power to the rank of “state minister.” Mu’arif justified the ministry’s 
 Scandal and Democratic Consolidation 135
reinstatement by arguing that “all citizens in remote places should have the opportu-
nity to obtain information.” 127 
 The decision provoked a barrage of protest from journalists, artists, students, 
nongovernmental organizations, and professional media associations, including the 
government-sponsored Association of Indonesian Private Radio Stations. 128 Their 
main concern was that the Ministry of Information’s return would lead to a revival of 
the New Order’s heavy-handed controls. As subsequent events showed, this threat 
was real. While the media and parliamentary advocates would continue to contest 
these controls, scandal itself re-entered the arena almost as an independent force, 
damaging Megawati’s chances to retain the presidency and undercutting her attempts 
at repression. 
 In December 2001, Megawati’s new information ministry vindicated critics’ fears 
by proposing to add thirty-seven articles to the 1999 Press Law, one of  reformasi ’s 
signature reforms, to curb “excessive freedom of the press.” 129 The proposed amend-
ments would have empowered the courts and police to take action against media 
outlets and individual journalists who appeared to violate professional or ethical 
standards. Before the DPR Commission I, Mu’arif explained that his office was more 
focused on educating the media and public on existing provisions in the Press Law 
than pushing for major revisions. But he again stressed that the police would have the 
power to punish violators under the criminal code. 130 
 This proposal to reinforce the police role in arbitrating disputes over media con-
tent marked a departure from the model developed during  reformasi that instead had 
empowered the newly independent National Press Council to mediate. To mute criti-
cism, Mu’arif announced that his “information campaign would be conducted in coop-
eration with the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and the Press Council.” But the 
National Press Council’s executive director, Lukas Luwarso, expressed strong disap-
proval, stating, “I don’t think it would be wise to use the Criminal Code to settle any 
dispute involving the press.” 131 
 This negative reaction to amending the Press Law forced Mu’arif to abandon his 
proposal. 132 But then on March 2002, the government denied a work permit renewal 
to Australian journalist Lindsay Murdoch. The denial set off new alarms that the 
government was returning to the capricious media controls that had characterized 
Suharto’s New Order. Murdoch’s articles had angered officials, particularly a report 
that nearly two hundred East Timorese children had been taken from their families 
in West Timor’s refugee camps since 1999 and placed in orphanages and “privately 
owned dormitories.” 133 Another article revealed that Indonesian soldiers, during a 
hunt for separatist leaders in Aceh, had poured boiling water over a four-month-old 
baby to elicit cooperation from his mother before going on “a killing, looting and 
burning spree through the village.” 134 
 The foreign ministry characterized the denial of Murdoch’s visa extension as a 
technical matter. But the head of the Alliance of Independent Journalists, Solahuddin 
[one name], said, “this incident has signaled a journalist could be punished without 
any reason.” 135 The  Wall Street Journal editorialized that “if the authorities in Jakarta 
can now refuse to renew the visa of a foreign correspondent who was allegedly ‘caus-
ing too much trouble,’ then it will not be difficult . . . to move against . . . domestic 
journalists.” 136 
 As ominous as these statements sounded for journalists, President Megawati’s 
hostility underscored the risks the new president herself faced, in a postauthori-
tarian context, as she worked out her relationship to the press. In stark contrast to 
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the relaxed media relations of her predecessor, Wahid, and regular meetings with 
“ordinary people,” Megawati, from the start, worked to avoid all direct contact with 
journalists and any situation involving unscripted public discussion. 137 One of her 
first acts was to eliminate the post of presidential spokesperson. Then in late January 
2002, the palace issued a formal ban on “door-stop interviews” with their impromptu 
questioning of the president and vice president. Instead, journalists wishing to ask a 
question would now have to submit a formal request in advance. 138 
 Commenting on the ban, communications professor Muhammad Budhyatna 
said, “If she thinks she does not need the press anymore, the media will not help 
her when she makes a wrong move that could be fatal. They will have a field day 
deriding her.” 139 At a March seminar, former  Tempo editor Goenawan Mohamad pre-
dicted, “I am afraid another attempt will be made to reduce press freedom.” But the 
same media that had once scurried for safety “like a crab” under Suharto’s rule had 
since undergone a fundamental transformation. If the government were to attempt 
a crackdown, Mohamad warned, “there is no alternative but to fight again, and we 
are ready.” 140 
 Instead of direct confrontation, the media pursued a succession of financial scan-
dals that slowly transformed Megawati’s public image from  reformasi hero to grasping 
politician. In contrast to the high drama of Baligate and Buloggate II, which combined 
wholesale theft with electoral manipulation, Megawati’s administration featured mid-
range graft for personal gain. 
 Typical of these controversies was the Banpres scandal, or Banpresgate, which 
emerged in February 2001 when Megawati’s rivals raised questions about a Rp30 bil-
lion “donation” to a military housing project. Djamal Doa of the opposition United 
Development Party, who served on the DPR’s budget and finance commission, 
had been the first to raise questions, taking the matter directly to the press. 141 
On March 26, Doa told the entire press corps of his plans to submit a summons 
request to DPR leaders. 142 The following day, however, after consulting with col-
leagues in his party, Doa spoke to the media to do damage control for Megawati in 
close collaboration with PDIP. The state secretary, Bambang Kesowo, explained that 
the Rp30 billion donation had come out of a “defunct” presidential assistance pro-
gram called Banpres (Bantuan Presiden). With this explanation, Doa withdrew his 
summons request. 143 Nonetheless, questions reverberated in the media, tarnishing 
Megawati’s reputation. 
 Two years of such coverage eroded Megawati’s political capital. In the run-up 
to the July 2004 presidential election—the first direct election of a president in 
the country’s history—one op-ed observed, “A day does not go by without [media 
attacks on the shortcomings] of Megawati’s administration ranging from alleged 
corruption to treacherously neglecting the reform movement.” 144 Consequently, in 
the April 2004 parliamentary elections, Golkar made a surprising comeback, taking 
the lead at nearly 22 percent of the vote, with Megawati’s PDIP following at a close 
second at 18.5 percent. But with the switch to a direct presidential election, strong 
showings for individual parties no longer translated into a clear lead for a party’s 
chosen candidate. 
 By the time of Indonesia’s presidential election in July, a dark-horse candidate, 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono from the small party Partai Demokrat, President Wahid’s 
former security minister, surged ahead of rivals, winning in a run-off race that Octo-
ber and delivering “a shocking defeat” for Megawati and her party. 145 For a fourth 
time during these first five years of transition, media exposure of scandal had played 
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a central role in precipitating a major turnover in executive leadership—this time, 
defeating President Megawati, the former dictator’s daughter who had reimposed 
restrictions on media freedom. 
 
 Looking back on the events of Indonesia’s second year of democratic transition, 
Suharto’s old party remained a powerful force in parliament even after losing the 
presidency. Despite strong evidence of its reliance on fraud, Golkar did not lose any 
parliamentary seats to compensate for unfair gains. Instead, the party gained control 
of more than a quarter of the DPR. It then used this dominance to obstruct investiga-
tion into scandals that damaged its reputation while pursuing those that furthered its 
interests. Other parties, also vying for position, joined Golkar in using these scandals 
to bring down the new president, Abdurrahman Wahid. 
 Behind these games of political survival lay a web of collusive arrangements 
as pervasive in post-Suharto Indonesia as they had been under Suharto. The prev-
alence of such arrangements—implicating all three post–New Order presidents, 
their families, and all but two of the forty-eight parties that contested the 1999 
elections—threatened to stall, if not reverse, the democratic transition as Wahid’s 
enemies collaborated to protect themselves and block reforms that threatened their 
interests. 
 The media also played a key role in Wahid’s fall through both principled investiga-
tions of financial fraud and unprincipled insinuations of personal impropriety moti-
vated by profit and political bias. Wahid’s turn against news outlets was a logical 
reaction to attack by and through the media and a larger campaign to force him from 
power. Nevertheless, his attempted crackdown put the transition at risk as much as 
any comparable government repression in a struggling democracy—whether perpe-
trated by Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, Mohamed Morsi in Egypt, or most 
recently Recep Erdogan in Turkey. 
 Though orchestrated by partisans defending the old guard, Wahid’s ouster 
reflected a pivotal change in the country’s politics. For good or ill, the new presi-
dent’s fate demonstrated that, in post–New Order Indonesia, the executive no lon-
ger controlled the other branches of government. Of equal import was the media’s 
new power, through negative coverage and National Press Council pressure, to block 
Wahid’s plan to use emergency powers to control public speech. 
 On balance, however, the use of corruption scandals for political attack was the 
more significant development in Indonesia’s democratic transition. During Suharto’s 
long reign, as much as under Wahid’s short-lived presidency, intraelite conflict had 
been a constant in the country’s politics. Under Suharto, however, such infighting was 
resolved behind closed doors with outcomes fixed by executive fiat to avoid threaten-
ing the interests of the ruling regime. In the new era, conflicts now played out in pub-
lic, adding a much higher degree of uncertainty to their resolution and their impact on 
the prevailing balance of power. 
 This increasingly public resolution of conflict reduced the viability of elite pacts, 
breaking down collusive arrangements that had earned Indonesia its status as the 
world’s most corrupt economy. 146 Indeed, Golkar’s ability to block a serious probe 
of the Buloggate II scandal by threatening to expose similar crimes by other parties 
demonstrated its continued influence. In the end, however, the party failed to negoti-
ate a resolution that could protect Akbar Tanjung, its chair and, before this scandal, 
its best hope for winning the presidency in 2004. Nor could Golkar operatives find a 
way to remove Tanjung from the party to contain the ensuing damage. The country 
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had changed from the days of Suharto’s New Order, and there were now too many 
elements beyond Golkar’s control. 
 Megawati confronted the same problem and found her attempts to rein in journal-
ists blocked by both media and public backlash. In a parallel development that gains 
greater significance in the  next chapter , before leaving office, Megawati also inadver-
tently helped create another vehicle for imposing accountability, the Corruption Erad-
ication Commission, which further complicated the maintenance of collusive pacts. 
 The story of the commission’s emergence provides another window into the odd 
synergies generated in the mix of pressure for reform, often magnified by the media, 
and the unpredictable unfolding of intraelite conflict. In it, civil-society mobilization 
and self-serving political maneuvering converge to impact events where either alone 
might have failed. More broadly, in the  reformasi period, the media became players in 
the twists and turns of elite maneuvering that now unfolded in public, adding a much 
higher degree of uncertainty to competitions over power, patronage, and public opin-
ion. And this uncertainty in the smaller political contests between elections helped 
ward off a return to the fixed outcomes of electoral contests under authoritarianism. 
In this struggle, the press and public would develop a growing alliance with the Cor-
ruption Eradication Commission that would not only inject recurring flux and com-
petitiveness into electoral contests but also institutionalize the regular imposition of 
the transparency required for democracy’s consolidation. 
 Chapter Eight 
 Media and Civil Society 
 To live in freedom one must grow used to a life full of agitation, change and 
danger; to keep alert the whole time with a restless eye on everything around: 
that is the price of freedom. 
 —Alexis de Tocqueville,  Journeys to England and Ireland 
 By 2014 Indonesia was coming to the end of a twenty-year period of politi-
cal change that off ers insights into the precarious process of democratization. The 
country’s successful postauthoritarian transition raises a key question: How does 
democracy—from the cultivation of norms to the maintenance of institutions—
become self-perpetuating, or at least resilient, over the longer term? Societies aspir-
ing to this stage of democratic consolidation face a near-universal challenge from 
democratization’s inherent inclination toward reversal. As Indonesia’s experience 
during the post- reformasi decade of 2004 to 2014 illustrates, a nation’s media can 
play a signifi cant role in breaking up the collusive intraelite pacts whose sum is 
often reversion to authoritarianism or a slide into pseudodemocracy. 
 During this transitional period in Indonesia, contending forces were arrayed, 
despite changes in composition over time, between two broad sectors. One was estab-
lished elites who had accrued assets or systemic advantage during the long Suharto 
era and had much to gain from reversal. The other was a coalition of prodemocracy 
forces who drew institutional strength from reform-oriented government agencies 
and enjoyed periodic mass support, often mobilized by the still-independent actors 
in the media. 
 If democracy is, as the former US secretary of state Madeleine Albright argues, 
“among the most fragile” forms of government, then this fragility is even more pro-
nounced in postauthoritarian nations where entrenched elites have ample resources 
to push for a restoration of the old order. 1 In Indonesia’s protracted transition, we 
see constant pressure by reactionary elements, first, to discredit, dismantle, or co-opt 
the agencies promoting the integrity of the democratic process, and second, to enact 
legislation that would privilege and protect colluding elites. 
 As an established economic bloc, Suharto’s family and cronies retained enormous 
wealth in cash and corporations that could readily fund lawsuits, legislative initia-
tives, and electoral campaigns to accelerate this tendency toward reversal. By contrast, 
prodemocracy forces were a mass movement taking crisis-driven action to defend 
progress already achieved. The nation’s media played a mixed role, but overall fur-
thered democratic consolidation by serving as not only vehicles of reform-oriented 
mobilization, but also purveyors of scandal and sites of heated, at times vituperative, 
contestation. 
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 Dynamics of Indonesia’s Democratization 
 While press freedom is commonly used as a barometer for democracy’s health, 
Indonesia’s experience demonstrates the need to understand how media outlets per-
form that freedom, facilitate its exercise for others, and thereby become key actors 
in sustaining democracy’s robustness over time. This assertion raises two questions: 
How did Indonesia’s media, in serving their own interests and those of others, impact 
the country’s democratic transition? And how does Indonesia illuminate the possi-
bilities of comparable change elsewhere around the globe? 
 Applying Adam Przeworski’s concept of “uncertainty”—the inherent unpredict-
ability of fair and open contestation—to the problem of democratic consolidation 
indicates that a free and competitive media can serve as a main vehicle in breaking up 
elite collusion. More specifically, the media’s regular showcasing of scandal can be a 
key driver in promoting the transparency and the circulation of elites that are central 
to a functioning democracy. Focusing on this undertheorized role of the media pro-
vides insight into why some democratic transitions succeed, leading to consolidation, 
while others either fail or settle into a chronic state of pseudodemocracy. 
 During the first stage of Indonesia’s transition, members of the mainstream and 
underground media facilitated a historic political opening and challenged the legiti-
macy of the Suharto regime. But it was in the immediate postauthoritarian period, 
from 1999 to 2014, that these actors made their most critical contribution through 
the more difficult process of consolidation. The Indonesian case thus sheds light on 
the media’s centrality in furthering what Przeworski calls the institutionalization of 
uncertainty—that is, the process by which the unpredictability of democratic contes-
tation comes to be tolerated and ultimately defended, functioning as both a force for 
consolidation and a key deterrent to reversal. 2 
 Though Indonesia’s transition began on a hopeful note after Suharto’s forced 
resignation in 1998, its prospects for consolidation were tenuous from the outset, 
threatened by numerous factors that left the country vulnerable to reversal. Most 
of the conditions that had sustained authoritarianism under Suharto’s thirty-two-
year reign—judicial corruption, electoral fraud, and a politicized military—remained 
in place. Executive abuse of discretionary powers, moreover, persisted long after his 
fall, perpetuated via practices that helped players manipulate the outcomes of public 
contests. 
 If such practices persist in any transition, circumstances will be ripe for a return 
to authoritarian rule or, at best, the emergence of a hybrid regime akin to the scholar 
Larry Diamond’s “pseudodemocracy,” where formal democratic institutions, such as 
multiparty elections, mask “the reality of authoritarian domination.” 3 Under Suharto, 
Indonesia had long cultivated its own “Pancasila democracy,” since recognized as 
thinly veiled authoritarianism. The veil that allowed the regime to call the country 
democratic was its routine exercise of multiparty elections that ended predictably in 
victory for Suharto’s Golkar party. 4 
 With this history in mind, Indonesians pushed forward with electoral reform in 
1998–99 to foster genuine competition among the new array of political parties. When 
the country held its first postauthoritarian elections in June 1999, the unprecedented 
win by an underdog opposition party, PDIP, appeared to be a significant achievement. 
But as subsequent events showed, elections—even those that bring new leadership—
are not necessarily sufficient to consolidate democracy. Despite the fact that observers 
declared these parliamentary elections “free and fair,” their results were as expertly 
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engineered as any under Suharto, designed to give a symbolic victory to the opposi-
tion while keeping the old ruling party in power. 
 Critical media coverage might have restrained the ruling party’s manipulation, 
but nearly all Indonesia’s news outlets downplayed reports of electoral fraud. Despite 
the victory of an opposition party and the media’s liberation, the 1999 elections pro-
duced a partial reversal in the country’s democratic transition through a return to the 
manipulated outcomes and restrained journalism typical of Suharto’s New Order. The 
electoral manipulations, the media’s reticence in challenging them, and the failure of 
reform in other arenas made it difficult to see where democratization, particularly the 
institutionalization of uncertainty, had made significant headway. 
 The transition regained its foothold only after these elections were ratified in July 
1999 and the media switched gears, exposing some of the fraud that had compro-
mised the voting and thereby derailing the old guard’s campaign to keep Suharto’s 
hand-picked successor in office. It was at this sensitive point that the internal trans-
formation of the media began to have a significant external impact. Another Habibie 
presidency, won via electoral subterfuge or collusive compromise, would have sub-
verted both the spirit and the logic of democratic reform, regardless of any progress 
an opposition party’s lead in the June elections might represent. 
 But the subsequent exposure of campaign finance fraud in the Bank Bali scandal, 
amplified by the media to become “Baligate,” halted this slide toward reversal. The 
damage to Habibie’s candidacy blew the presidential race wide open for the first time 
in over thirty years. The contest that then unfolded was anything but predictable, and 
its outcome anything but predetermined. It was, instead, taut with uncertainty right 
up to the final parliamentary tally that repudiated Habibie and selected a reformist 
opposition leader, Abdurrahman Wahid. In short, Baligate, and the media’s relentless 
coverage of it, helped set the democratic transition back on course, not by invalidat-
ing the June ballot and forcing new elections but by injecting uncertainty at the next 
stage—the parliamentary selection of the president. 
 One could view the opposition’s upset victory more skeptically, as a fluke produc-
ing a mixed victory for democratic forces. While Golkar’s maneuvering to retain the 
executive failed, the final result—Wahid’s win in the parliamentary vote for president—
was still little more than a backroom deal among the major Muslim parties designed 
to keep both Habibie and the winner of the popular vote, Megawati Sukarnoputri, 
out of the presidency. But whatever the election’s ultimate significance, the media’s 
saturation coverage of Baligate was not an anomalous phenomenon yielding a one-
time impact. This controversy that upset the balance of elite bargaining was, instead, 
the first in a long series of media-driven scandals, each of which rocked the country’s 
political equilibrium and revealed deals and betrayals taking place in the highest cor-
ridors of power. From Baligate onward, these exposés launched an era of politics by 
scandal that made the media a lead player within intraelite conflict, unleashing cycles 
of revenge and making unpredictability a constant in Indonesian politics, while intro-
ducing new elements of transparency and circulation of leadership. 
 Over the next five years, from 2000 to 2004, there was a relentless cycle of attack 
and counterattack mediated, and sometimes instigated, by the media. Media con-
troversy in itself was not new. Since the country’s independence in 1949, the news 
media had often been used for political revenge. Indeed, Suharto’s last minister of 
information, Alwi Dahlan, observed in 1999 that pitting people against each other 
is the nature of the news media. Under Suharto, Dahlan added, this tendency was 
overwhelmingly one-sided as the ruling regime used news outlets “to get” those in 
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disfavor and mediate score settling not as a neutral conduit but as an adjunct of execu-
tive power. 5 
 In the less centralized politics of the post-Suharto period, autonomous elite rival-
ries, shaped by media exposure and civil-society response, increasingly decided who 
would rise and fall. As mediators of intraelite conflict, the nation’s media, now more 
detached from state power, acted both independently and as vehicles for rival politi-
cal forces, adding a much higher degree of uncertainty to competitions over power, 
patronage, and public opinion. 
 This loss of executive control over the outcomes of intraelite conflict was most 
evident in the succession of scandals from Baligate to Banpresgate. The former rul-
ing party, Golkar, used media-driven scandals to impeach Abdurrahman Wahid. 
Then difficulties in containing scandal and conflict began to impact the same actors 
who had helped orchestrate Wahid’s fall, particularly Akbar Tanjung, Golkar’s chair 
and best hope for retaking the presidency in 2004. Throughout these controversies, 
there was also ample evidence that major players from all the political parties were 
trying, as Tanjung had, to rig the system, colluding to cancel out their respective 
political sins and maintain their current positions. But collusion and cover-up became 
more difficult as the media, driven by market competition and partisan maneuvering, 
began to impose greater transparency. 
 As revelations set off cycles of revenge, scandals began fracturing elite pacts and 
taking on a life of their own in ways impossible under the New Order. Each time such 
arrangements broke down, Indonesian political life became more fluid and more open, 
moving democratization forward. Most critically, the media—now greatly expanded, 
more amorphous, and highly competitive—could no longer simply broker cynical 
deals for elite benefactors. As warring factions used the media to maneuver against 
each other and as news outlets weighed in independently, media exposés and con-
tentious public discourse began to play a central yet unpredictable role in mediating 
these proliferating intraelite conflicts. It was the playing out of political conflict via 
the media, more than any other change associated with the transition, that allowed 
Indonesia to move away from authoritarian stasis and closer to the institutionalized 
uncertainty of democracy. 
 A Decade of Consolidation, 2004–2014 
 In the decade of democratic consolidation after 2004, the fi tful struggle between 
a prodemocracy coalition comprising elements of civil society and certain members 
of the media, on the one hand, and an ad hoc alliance of actors favoring reversal, on 
the other, culminated in the 2014 presidential campaign, which became, in eff ect, a 
showdown between these contending forces. During the same decade, the overall 
trend toward transparency and open political contests continued, reinforced by con-
stitutional amendments passed in the fi rst years of  reformasi that strengthened par-
liament, removed nonelective legislative seats, established new protections for civil 
liberties, and introduced direct elections for president and vice president. Through 
these changes, reformers revised Indonesia’s constitution to invest citizens with the 
right to freedom of speech and a free media, and to draw clearer divisions among gov-
ernment institutions, imposing checks on their jurisdictions and powers. 
 Each of these developments also advanced democratic consolidation by making it 
more difficult to game the system and block the circulation of leadership. Contests for 
the executive became more transparent and competitive as direct elections and new 
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mechanisms of accountability, particularly the introduction of “quick counts” on poll-
ing day, curtailed manipulation. Freed in 2006 from the threat of criminal penalties for 
insulting the president and vice president, the media became increasingly aggressive 
in pursuing stories that implicated incumbents, which in turn undermined the ability 
of ruling parties and their coalitions to maintain control of the executive. 6 As Indone-
sian democracy struggled toward a slow consolidation during this critical decade, the 
media became vehicles of proreform mobilization, as well as sites of partisan contes-
tation and personal vendetta, together maintaining the transparency and uncertainty 
necessary for further democratization. 
 Despite these advances, the transition continued to face an unremitting pull 
toward reversal. Even as democratic attitudes and media practices took root and 
unpredictability became the norm, political actors continued to maneuver to insu-
late themselves from the uncertainty of fair and open contestation. This decade saw 
a notable increase in cross-party alliances among legislative candidates that led the 
country into a state of political development that Daniel Slater and Erica Simmons call 
“collusive democracy.” Such a system, they argue, is marked by the effective merger of 
all major parties into a cartel, as actors try to reduce the uncertainty of genuine com-
petition, entering into “promiscuous” power-sharing arrangements that make elected 
representatives virtually interchangeable. This collusion also forecloses the possibility 
of a viable political opposition, as legislators undermine democratic accountability by 
making themselves “collectively irremoveable through the ballot box.” 7 
 If democratization requires widespread acceptance of competitive contests and 
their uncertain outcomes, efforts by Indonesia’s representatives to insulate them-
selves between elections were a serious setback. Through such power sharing and 
lack of transparency in legislative decision-making, parliament became, by 2009, 
largely unaccountable to voters. 8 Much of the country’s judiciary also colluded to pro-
tect themselves (and their financial patrons) from exposure and accountability. 9 Even 
as media revelations of malfeasance and chains of reciprocal incrimination began to 
expose individual wrongdoing, institutional accountability remained minimal. 
 Members of the judiciary and the legislature also colluded in 2004–14 by using 
new and old laws to discourage the airing of criticism that could damage their reputa-
tions or threaten their incumbency. Among these regulations, the most chilling were 
the country’s plaintiff-friendly defamation laws. Despite abolition of the New Order’s 
notorious “hate-sowing articles,” passage of the 1999 Press Law, and enactment of 
constitutional amendments protecting free expression, a maze of civil and criminal 
defamation statutes remained in place to allow litigation against reporters and ordi-
nary citizens for speech nominally protected by these higher laws. 10 
 Journalists charged with libel under the criminal code petitioned the courts to use 
the Press Law, which, they argued, should override legislation from the colonial and 
authoritarian eras. Accordingly, in 2006 the Supreme Court overturned the conviction 
of  Tempo ’s chief editor, Bambang Harymurti, for a report suggesting that the business 
magnate Tomy Winata had been responsible for a textile market fire in 2003. The 
court ruled unanimously that the defendant should have been tried under the Press 
Law, not the criminal code. 11 It stopped short, however, of issuing a blanket injunction 
barring the use of the criminal code against journalists in such cases. Since Indonesian 
higher court rulings do not serve as binding precedent for lower courts, this decision 
offered journalists little protection from future criminal convictions in similar cases. 12 
 These defamation laws protected politicians who used them to avoid scrutiny. 
In 2008, parliamentarians went further, passing five new laws to silence critical 
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speech. The Information and Electronic Transactions Law, for example, allows courts 
to imprison anyone accused of defamation via the internet or other digital media 
(such as cell phone texting) for up to six years. 13 With these laws readily available 
to aggrieved business owners and officials, corruption exposés, letters to the editor, 
customer service complaints, and even private emails have all provoked lawsuits that 
have landed people in prison. 
 In the post-Suharto era, the internet, the twenty-first century’s primary driver of 
modernization, also came under increasing attack by Islamic conservatives who por-
trayed it as a hydra-headed threat to public morality. In their effort to impose religious 
controls over public expressions of sexuality, which they branded “pornography,” such 
groups villainized the internet to reestablish moral standards. After three years of 
deliberation, a parliamentary committee released draft legislation in 2006 proposing 
bans on suggestive dancing, public kissing, wearing scanty apparel, and any other act 
that could “arouse desire.” 14 The proposal set off protests among critics worried that 
its language, encouraging the public to “participate in the prevention of the produc-
tion, dissemination, and use of materials of pornography,” would empower groups 
such as the Islamic Defenders Front in their campaigns to police public morality. Such 
groups, for example, had already carried out attacks on nightclubs they regarded as 
“dens of sin.” 15 
 Shortly before its passage in October 2008, its sponsors claimed that an amended 
version of the antipornography bill “accommodated all interests in society.” Even after 
revisions, however, many believed that the bill’s prohibitions were untenably broad 
and vague, defining pornography as all “pictures, sketches, illustrations, photographs, 
articles, sounds, voices, moving pictures, animations, cartoons, conversations, body 
movements or other forms of messages . . . that contain obscenity or sexual exploita-
tion.” 16 Although over one hundred legislators walked out on the proceedings in pro-
test, members of conservative Islamist parties held sway, and the legislation passed 
into law. 17 
 Deeper Transformation 
 Even with the antipornography law’s passage, conservative alarm over the 
nation’s impending moral crisis continued, with rhetoric reaching beyond the nation 
to invoke a higher order. In retrospect, it seems that the country’s relative stability 
since 2004 had fostered a resurgence of the corporatist values of integralism across a 
widening spectrum of Indonesian society. Not only did orthodox Islamic groups seek 
rigid controls over gender and a purge of heterodox Muslim believers, even journal-
ists’ associations, once strong advocates of civil rights, moved to exclude entire media 
genres, particularly “infotainment,” from legal protections. 18 The continuing appeal of 
integralist ideology, reinforced by Muslim mass mobilization, provided a strong politi-
cal foundation for future attacks on freedom of expression. 
 Mitigating these trends, however, a new logic transforming the country’s political 
culture began competing with and even replacing New Order perceptions of normality 
and deviance. For a half century under both Sukarno and Suharto, the corporatist doc-
trine of integralism had assumed an underlying congruity in the interests of citizens 
and rulers that provided the rationale for the curtailment of civil rights. From this idea 
of essential harmony, Suharto’s later enforcement of “positive interaction” among the 
media, state, and society helped his regime stigmatize the airing of conflict and jus-
tify closing off channels of dissent. In effect, this doctrine rejected the individualism 
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and confrontational politics associated with Western democracy and encouraged an 
unquestioning faith in those in power. Following Suharto’s ouster,  reformasi advocates 
were generally successful in repudiating this doctrine, although its tenets retained suf-
ficient appeal to fuel conservative attempts at rolling back media freedoms. 19 
 Also mitigating retrogressive pressures, the transformative impact of the media’s 
new role in Indonesia went beyond the expansion of public discourse, and even 
beyond the restoration of uncertainty to political contestation. In any transition, the 
media can help ward off reversal in part by reinforcing perceptions among those in 
power that a majority of the public, if not unambiguously supportive of democratic 
governance, at least would not favor a return to authoritarianism. In post-Suharto 
Indonesia, members of the media were often their own best advocates in reinforc-
ing impressions of public support for media freedom. When asked how Indonesians 
would respond to a crackdown on speech in 1999, government figures responded that 
neither the media nor the “people” would allow it. 20 As the transition progressed, 
opinion polls periodically confirmed similar perceptions. 21 
 A case that confirmed ordinary Indonesians’ support for freedom of speech and 
their antipathy to laws protecting the powerful culminated in a digital cause célèbre. 
In May 2009, a nursing mother of two, Prita Mulyasari, was subjected to three weeks 
of pretrial detention after Omni International Hospital charged her with defamation. 
Her crime: she had sent an email a year earlier to about twenty friends, complaining 
that the hospital’s doctors had badly misdiagnosed her symptoms and given her den-
gue fever shots when she actually had the mumps. 22 
 While Prita was in jail awaiting almost certain conviction, an angered internet 
community launched an intensive online campaign in her defense, establishing a 
Facebook group that quickly gained several hundred thousand supporters. Politi-
cians running for office, including former president Megawati, visited her in prison, 
and members of parliament pressured the hospital and the public prosecutor for a 
quick resolution. 23 When a court fined her nearly $22,000 and sentenced her to six 
months’ incarceration, supporters formed the Help Prita Movement to collect coins 
in a dozen Indonesian cities. 24 Politicians, businesspeople, cab drivers, street vendors, 
grade-school children, and even scavengers were active in raising money. Through this 
unprecedented outpouring of public concern, the campaign collected nearly $90,000. 25 
Finally, on December 29, 2009, the Tangerang High Court reversed Prita’s conviction. 
After being tried, acquitted, retried, then acquitted again, she became an international 
celebrity who eventually brought Omni and its lawyers to their knees, lodging a coun-
tersuit against the hospital for $106 million. 26 
 Prita’s case resonated with widespread anger at a legal system that, in the words 
of one observer, “tends to side with the powerful and crush the weak into pieces.” 27 
Support for her provided a vehicle for holding the powerful to account—in this case, 
not only Omni but also the police, the courts, and parliamentarians complicit in main-
taining this unbalanced system. Yet in the end, victory for Prita meant defeat in key 
ways for freedom of expression. Because of the Indonesian legal system’s ambiguous 
sense of precedent, the case overturned Prita’s conviction but spared the country’s 
defamation laws. Ultimately, it did not empower her followers so much as drive home 
the lesson that freedoms brought by the transition remained tenuous, enforced or 
abrogated at the whim of the powerful and still demanding crisis-driven defense via 
mass mobilization. 
 This criminalization of criticism, fostered by collusion in all three branches of 
government, was a blow to democratic consolidation, giving the more powerful the 
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means to punish both media and citizens for imposing accountability. Fear of reper-
cussions, in turn, constrained efforts to reduce the country’s pervasive corruption, 
recognized as a major impediment to economic development and an indicator that 
democratic transition was stagnating. 
 Despite setbacks for transparency and free speech, Indonesia’s ranking on the 
Corruption Perceptions Index improved steadily over time, suggesting some long-
term impact from reformists’ efforts, particularly those of the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi, KPK), established six years earlier. 28 
Somewhat surprisingly, not long after its inception in 2003, this body evolved into 
an effective institution—an anomaly among other government bodies and a notable 
break from a string of toothless predecessors. 29 
 Though its origins lay in demands from  reformasi activists, passage of the 
legislation that brought the KPK into being was influenced as much by intraelite 
conflict as any desire for reform. Back in 1998, when anti-Suharto momentum 
had been at its peak, pressure from students, journalists, international donors, 
and nongovernmental organizations had forced Indonesia’s highest legislative 
body, the MPR, to pass a decree, “Clean Governance Free from Corruption, Col-
lusion and Nepotism,” that directed the DPR to fulfill its anticorruption man-
date. Several initiatives resulted, but each failed from a lack of powers, funding, 
or both. 30 
 Nonetheless, one such initiative created in 2000 under President Wahid, the 
Wealth Audit Board, began imposing limited transparency. When it started investi-
gating wealth held by Megawati’s family, the new president was quick to replace it 
with a body she believed she could control. In short, though Megawati gained credit 
for signing the 2002 bill that created the KPK, her motivations were both “politi-
cal vengeance” and self-protection from the very scrutiny the KPK was designed 
to impose. 31 Yet armed with surprisingly strong powers, including surveillance, 
wiretapping, access to bank and tax information, the authority to arrest suspects, 
and an unprecedented requirement to pursue all cases to prosecution, the KPK ulti-
mately became a powerful ally of independent media and civil society, and a thorn 
in Megawati’s side. 32 
 Through its ongoing investigations of official malfeasance, the KPK also mitigated 
the criminalization of critical speech by allowing journalists more leeway to report on 
official corruption cases and provide the commission with information gathered from 
their own investigations. Political rivalries and self-serving motives also facilitated the 
KPK’s collection of evidence. 
 By July 2009, the KPK claimed a 100-percent conviction rate in eighty-six brib-
ery and graft cases. 33 With these successes and an apparent commitment to pro-
tecting the public interest, the KPK won strong support among the Indonesian 
middle class, even though the total of eighty-six cases over a six-year period was 
hardly significant in a country ranked at the time among the most corrupt in the 
world. 34 As political observer Aristides Katoppo noted, “You know, with corrup-
tion in Indonesia, if you start operating on this patient, you will have nothing left 
on the body.” 35 
 The KPK’s record nevertheless helped General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono build 
his reform credentials after his election to the presidency in 2004, propelling him to 
reelection five years later. But like Megawati, President Yudhoyono was guilty of cor-
ruption, including campaign finance fraud, prompting the KPK to investigate him and 
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his family. As the commission gained more enemies, Yudhoyono reportedly turned his 
back when it came under attack. 36 
 The most dramatic instance of this backlash against the KPK came in early 2009, 
when several top police officials colluded to disgrace two of its key members. Starting 
just after Yudhoyono’s reelection, when he had little incentive to defend the commis-
sion, the attack threatened to stall, if not reverse, the fight against corruption. The 
KPK’s vulnerability without high-level support highlighted the continued fragility 
of democratic consolidation. Yet another crisis elicited mass mobilization, this time 
through a civil society campaign called Save the KPK. 
 The controversy arose over an apparent conspiracy by the chief of detectives, 
the attorney general’s office, and the brother of a fugitive businessman to frame 
two KPK deputy chairmen, Chandra Hamzah and Bibit Samad Rianto. Acting on 
charges of extortion and bribery, police arrested the two in July 2009, igniting dem-
onstrations in several Indonesian cities by protesters who took this as an effort to 
undermine the KPK. Using their wiretapping powers, however, KPK officers fought 
back by monitoring the conspirators’ phones. After insiders leaked some of these 
tapes, the media became central actors by airing recorded conversations between 
senior police, prosecutors, and the brother of the fugitive businessman who had 
fled KPK prosecution in 2008. The tapes revealed an explicit conspiracy to save 
the fugitive’s brother by accusing Chandra and Bibit of soliciting bribes from him. 
Adding to the drama, other taped conversations contained claims of Yudhoyono’s 
involvement. 37 
 Within weeks, the ensuing controversy, known as Cicak vs. Buaya (Gecko versus 
Crocodile), grew to Baligate proportions. Even media outlets compromised by busi-
ness interests jumped into the fray, driven, as in Baligate, by a mix of competitive 
pressures and civic duty. Following patterns first evident in the alliance between 
media and civil society that had defeated the 1999 Security Bill and its martial law 
provisions, this new battle required a sustained public mobilization. Members of the 
media promoted this turnout, but the critical development that empowered citizens 
and the media was their new ability to use the internet to pressure officials. 
 As the new Constitutional Court opened its hearings on the case, television sta-
tions broadcast excerpts from the tapes and riveted the country with hours of live 
proceedings. But the most critical development came when Bibit and Chandra’s sup-
porters launched a Facebook campaign, similar to that in the Prita case, with a target 
of one million members. 38 An earlier statement by the police chief implicated in the 
case (“How dare a gecko [the KPK] challenge a crocodile [police and prosecutors]?”) 
provided both the nickname and the visual icon of the fight, inspiring a flood of gecko-
and-crocodile images on websites, magazine covers, T-shirts, and bumper stickers. 39 
By early November, the Facebook campaign had passed its million-member target. On 
December 1, the attorney general’s office dropped its charges against the KPK deputy 
commissioners, Bibit and Chandra. 40 
 Their release likely saved the KPK itself, whose legislative mandate might not 
have been renewed by the president. The KPK continued to face near-constant siege, 
as those benefitting from corruption, in the words of one journalist, tried to “sabo-
tage [its] reputation, tie its leaders up in bogus legal cases, cut its financing or 
legislate it out of existence.” 41 Despite ongoing attacks, the KPK would survive as 
an institutionalized force for transparency, backed by sympathetic news outlets and 
public pressure. 
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 The 2014 Presidential Election 
 Five years after the KPK’s public exoneration, the contending forces of democrati-
zation and reversal were suddenly embodied in the two leading candidates in the 2014 
presidential election: Joko Widodo (Jokowi), a small business owner who championed 
democratic reform, and Lieutenant General (Ret.) Prabowo Subianto, Suharto’s for-
mer son-in-law, who advocated a return to a more authoritarian order. 
 After a succession of electoral victories that carried him from the mayoralty of 
Solo in 2005 to the governorship of Jakarta in 2012, Jokowi started the 2014 campaign 
with a strong lead. 42 His high popularity stemmed from his modest beginnings and 
his success in enacting populist reforms, expanding health care and education while 
reducing corruption through transparency. 43 Four months before the election, how-
ever, Jokowi began losing ground to Prabowo, who employed a militant nationalism 
while deriding Jokowi’s moderation as weakness. Prabowo also capitalized on public 
frustration with corruption, blaming democracy while promising to abolish direct elec-
tions for regional heads and repeal post-Suharto constitutional amendments. Appeal-
ing to nostalgia for the country’s authoritarian past, he appeared at campaign rallies 
on horseback surrounded by uniformed supporters, sporting Suharto-style dress and 
Sukarno-style rhetoric. 44 
 In the midst of this campaigning, Prabowo’s team began disseminating disin-
formation that Jokowi was Communist, Chinese-Singaporean, and secretly Chris-
tian. Aiding in this “black propaganda,” Prabowo also enjoyed heavy promotion 
from media mogul Hary Tanoesoedibjo and Golkar head Aburizal Bakrie, who 
together controlled five major television channels. 45 Through these tactics and 
endorsements, Prabowo garnered growing support, primarily from the middle and 
upper classes. 
 Other media, particularly  Tempo , began challenging smears against Jokowi and 
reporting on Prabowo’s checkered past in a conscious attempt to break his momen-
tum. 46 Then in June 2014, a month before the election, an anonymous source leaked 
a military investigation’s findings that Prabowo, as commander of the Kopassus 
special forces back in 1998, had ordered the abduction and torture of student activ-
ists. As social media and news outlets seized upon the report, it quickly escalated 
into a national scandal. By reviving one of the most traumatic episodes of the 1998 
transition, the source, believed to be a military general, used the media to damage 
Prabowo. 47 Pro-Jokowi media outlets, in turn, used the leak to increase audiences and 
counter the rise of a candidate potentially hostile to freedom of speech. 48 
 While Prabowo’s past left him vulnerable to such attacks, for some it also 
increased his strongman appeal, and his popularity continued to rise. 49 This develop-
ment triggered alarm among human rights organizations and other observers, who 
saw it as an indication of the country’s continued susceptibility to authoritarian rever-
sal and mobilized to monitor electoral fraud. 50 On the day of the ballot, this monitor-
ing showed Jokowi winning by over 6 percent. Prabowo nevertheless declared victory 
based on manipulated quick counts, and his allies in the media, particularly outlets 
owned by Tanoesoedibjo and Bakrie, reported this victory as fact. In response, a group 
called Guard the Elections (Kawal Pemilu) organized seven hundred volunteers via 
Facebook to allow the public to compare official vote tallies with original data from 
polling stations, an initiative crucial to discrediting Prabowo’s declaration of triumph. 
Three days after Jokowi was sworn in as Indonesia’s next president in October 2014, 
Prabowo finally conceded. 
 Media and Civil Society 149
 Despite the support for Prabowo from major news outlets owned by his allies, 
the election of Jokowi represented a hard-fought victory by the same alliance 
of reformist media actors and civil society that has been central to Indonesia’s 
democratization struggle for the past twenty years. For many, this outcome served 
as confirmation of the country’s successful consolidation. 51 Prodemocracy forces 
had come together to overcome the continued power of a reactionary, old-guard 
coalition and discredit resurgent authoritarian ideals. This win by an outsider who 
rose without personal wealth or elite connections also produced meaningful cir-
culation of leadership. Corruption scandals—fueled by leaks, investigations, and 
partisan vendetta—facilitated this circulation of leadership, inflicting substantial 
damage on the ruling party, Partai Demokrat, and frustrating President Yudho-
yono’s dynastic ambitions. 52 Other “new-wave politicians” with clean reputations 
committed to fighting graft were also rising to high office at this time, notably 
Jakarta’s new governor, Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama and Bandung’s governor, 
Ridwan Kamil. 53 
 Only weeks after his inauguration, however, the new president’s limitations 
became clear as legislators from Prabowo’s campaign coalition, who controlled 60 per-
cent of parliament, and others from Jokowi’s own PDIP party began collaborating to 
undermine reform initiatives. Significantly, to avoid conflict, Jokowi did not defend 
the KPK during his first year in office. 54 Yet the agency continued its investigations, 
jailing or driving from office some of the most powerful in Indonesian politics, nota-
bly the DPR Speaker, Setya Novanto. Only three months after Donald Trump called 
him “a great man” at a campaign rally in New York, Novanto was forced to resign as 
Speaker in December 2015, following public protests and intense media coverage of 
his attempts to extort $4 billion from a mining company. 55 Commenting on the public 
pressure, Natalia Soebagjo, the executive director of the Center for the Study of Gov-
ernance at University of Indonesia noted, “Corruption cases are spoken about openly 
in the media, and in social media, corruption issues often go viral.” 56 
 Comparing Novanto’s fall to Watergate, observers viewed it as a “turning point” 
in Indonesia’s fraught political history. 57 However, Novanto again earned his title, 
“Mr. Teflon,” when Golkar elected him chair in 2016 and subsequently reappointed 
him Speaker of the DPR. 58 
 The PDIP chair and former president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, also repeatedly put 
Jokowi in a difficult position with her own maneuvering, pushing cabinet appoint-
ments on him that were heavily criticized by his supporters. In early 2015, a KPK inves-
tigation revealed wrongdoing by Jokowi’s nominee for police chief, Budi Gunawan. 
Public pressure, amplified by mainstream and social media, forced the president to 
withdraw the nomination, prompting retaliation from the police, who declared two 
KPK commissioners suspects on dubious charges. In March, an organization called 
the Indonesian Grassroot Society Movement, known for its crowds-for-hire intim-
idation, reported  Tempo to the police for allegedly libelous coverage of Gunawan’s 
bank accounts. 59 Then in July, an aspiring politician, Maruli Hendra Utama, filed suit 
against  Tempo for defaming PDIP through its reporting on police actions against KPK 
commissioners. 60 
 These actions, seen as “criminalizing” anti-corruption efforts, sparked a new pub-
lic outcry, covered heavily by the media, that forced Jokowi to order his attorney gen-
eral to drop both cases. 61 Finally, in 2016, seven out of ten parliamentary factions, 
led by PDIP, lobbied intensely to revise the 2002 law that had established the KPK 
by stripping the agency of key powers. But once again, sustained media attention and 
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activist mobilization via social media generated sufficient public pressure to induce 
politicians to reverse course. 62 
 Commentators who wrote on these attacks on the KPK tended to be pessimistic, 
seeing in them evidence of the agency’s vulnerability to eventual co-optation or col-
lapse. Yet each time, mainstream and social media mobilized civil society interven-
tion, and the KPK survived as the institutionalization of  reformasi ’s original demands 
for transparency. Backed by the public’s support, even protectiveness, KPK investi-
gators persevered, angering targets and inviting more attacks. Yet in mid-2016, the 
agency announced plans to expand its jurisdiction to the private sector. In December 
2016, President Jokowi finally declared his “full support” for strengthening the KPK at 
a national conference on eradicating corruption. 63 Nonetheless, parliament launched 
another of its attempts to curb the KPK with an inquiry into its purported overreach, 
sparking “public condemnation” so strong that even Prabowo’s party was forced to 
withdraw its support for the investigation. 64 
 Weathering lawsuits and other threats, news outlets also continued to report 
KPK findings supplemented by their own investigations, setting in motion scan-
dals that exposed corruption and often led to policy change, resignations, or prison. 
By mid-2017, the KPK was again investigating Speaker Novanto, this time for his 
involvement in a $244-million identity card scam called eKTPgate. 65 After months 
of dramatic developments in the case, the Jakarta Corruption Court found Novanto 
guilty of complicity in the scam and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment 
with a subsequent five-year ban on any political activity—a stinging rebuke for a man 
who personified the power and corruption that the Golkar party had acquired during 
the three decades of the Suharto dictatorship. The former DPR Speaker and Golkar 
chair now sits in prison in the Sukamiskin Penitentiary in Bandung. 66 
 In the aftermath of the Speaker’s spectacular downfall, members of the DPR 
approved a new bill (RUU KUHP) further curtailing the KPK’s powers, the latest 
and perhaps the most strategic attempt to curb the autonomy of this independent 
investigative body. 67 Whatever fate might await the KPK, both the eKTP scandal and 
the attacks on the commission were manifestations of the “agitation, change, and 
danger” that are, as Alexis de Tocqueville once said, inescapable in maintaining demo-
cratic freedom. 68 The outcomes of such contests are ephemeral, but conflict itself is a 
constant. 
 The Process of Democratic Consolidation 
 Throughout Indonesia’s twenty-year transition, synergies between public mobi-
lization and self-serving political maneuvering helped ward off  authoritarian rever-
sal. Although each crisis seemed intensely individual in the historical moment, these 
recurring battles reveal an emerging pattern that lends them greater signifi cance, rep-
resented in  fi gure 1 . 
 At the outset of each incident, media players, such as journalists and their respec-
tive news outlets, reported intraelite conflict and revelations of wrongdoing, some-
times triggering scandals, and then provided platforms for critical debate and political 
attack. In any transition, this sequence, even those elements that may seem detrimen-
tal to healthy public discourse, can perform numerous functions that facilitate contin-
ued democratic consolidation, or at a minimum, slow a slide into pseudodemocracy 
or electoral authoritarianism. By increasing information available to the public, the 
media can induce civil society mobilization. When citizens receive new information, 
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their voting preferences may change, which increases uncertainty over election out-
comes. Revelations of malfeasance can also trigger partisan vendetta and reciprocal 
incrimination, further increasing transparency and breaking up collusive pacts. The 
sum of these functions can strengthen accountability and help maintain the flux of 
open political contestation, facilitating the circulation of leadership. The perennial 
instinct to avoid accountability and uncertainty may inspire players to form new col-
lusive pacts. But the ensuing corruption is likely to fuel new media-driven scandals, 
creating conditions that can set the cycle in motion all over again. 
 During Indonesia’s key years of democratic consolidation, 2004 to 2014, commen-
tators periodically worried that media focus on scandal and partisan conflict would 
produce apathy, cynicism, or simple “politics fatigue,” detrimental to the health of 
democracy. In 2013, however, a national survey revealed that, despite a widespread 
perception that corruption was rife in all levels of government and business, the vast 
majority of Indonesians still preferred democracy over authoritarianism. Indeed, 76 
percent reported that if “parliamentary elections were held today,” they would “defi-
nitely vote.” Only 5 percent said they would not. 69 
 Despite valid concerns about divisive politics as a key threat to democratic con-
solidation and stability, one could argue that in any democracy, the greater threat is 
not divisive politics or irresponsible journalism but collusion. When prevalent among 
those with electoral, judicial, or economic power, collusion reduces public influence 
over policy and paralyzes the competition necessary to democracy’s functioning. The 
convergence in Indonesia among watchdog journalism, elite conflict (mediated by an 
imperfect yet competitive press), and an active civil society (newly empowered by 
social media) has helped break up the collusion endemic to the country’s politics. 
 Cross-national Comparisons 
 Indonesia’s comparatively successful transition has important implications for 
other emerging democracies worldwide. In the quarter century since the Cold War’s 
end, the once heady overthrow of authoritarian regimes has subsided into a generally 
dismal mix of pseudodemocracies, dictatorships, and failing states—all indicating the 
central importance of the far less dramatic process of democratic consolidation. 
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 Whether by sudden coup or slow accretion of collusive pacts, a democratic 
transition’s reversal can occur at virtually any point after the fall of an authoritar-
ian regime—immediately, with the reconstitution of an old guard coalition (military, 
cronies, or an alliance of both), or later, through a leader identified with the previous 
order who plays upon mass disappointment with democracy and sentimentality for 
the bygone era. Though the political response to such threats varies widely, successful 
opposition usually entails some combination of intraelite conflict, mass mobilization, 
and media exposé. Admittedly, such synergies operate in comparatively few countries. 
But these few also happen to be some of the world’s more democratic and dynamic 
nations—whether in Asia (Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea), Africa (Tunisia, 
South Africa), or Latin America (Brazil, Chile, Mexico). 
 Among these cases, three share notable similarities with Indonesia, particularly 
in the ways that major scandals and the media more broadly have influenced their 
trajectories toward democratization. After seven decades of one-party rule, Mexico 
experienced a recent democratic transition in which the media played a central role. 
In a detailed study of this volatile process, Chappell Lawson found that liberalization 
of the media was a powerful force. Of equal import, a series of government scandals 
that the media aired in a kind of “feeding frenzy” was critical to voters’ turn against 
the entrenched regime. 70 Not only did the scandals of the 1990s damage the regime’s 
legitimacy, but their “rapid succession,” instead of producing voter fatigue or cyni-
cism, appeared “to indict the system as a whole” and thereby generate demand for 
more fundamental change. Moreover, Lawson continues, “scandals signaled to politi-
cal elites that the rules of the game had changed and that certain older practices would 
now be exposed to public scrutiny. More aggressive media coverage thus created a 
new context for political decision making.” 71 
 The rising political uncertainty and these media-driven scandals finally pushed 
the ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party from the presidency in 2000, breaking 
the seventy-one-year lock on power that had made Mexico a one-party autocracy. The 
democratic transition that followed suffered from many of the problems that Indo-
nesia faced, particularly a steady pull toward reversal through corruption and skillful 
maneuvering by the old guard to retain power and position. The victorious opposition 
candidate, Vicente Fox, had campaigned on a promise to exterminate the “scorpions, 
vermin, and snakes” associated with the ruling party, but a continuing grip on state 
governorships preserved the nexus of patronage that had long been the foundation for 
its rule. After just twelve years out of power, the Institutional Revolutionary Party and 
its mediagenic candidate, Enrique Peña Nieto, built upon that local base to capture 
the presidency in 2012 and restore the party’s systemic corruption. 72 
 Reporting on this restoration in 2015, the economic analyst Rodrigo Aguilera 
presented a grim assessment of Mexico’s prospects, using the term “the Mexican dis-
ease” to describe the factors that have impeded democratic consolidation, including 
barriers to social mobility, entrenched rent seeking, cultural acceptance of corruption, 
and symbiotic relationships between politicians and drug cartels. 73 Aguilero offered 
little hope, observing that Peña Nieto, the ruling party, and the rest of the power 
structure appeared impervious to pressure for change, even in the face of spectacular 
breaking scandals, including revelations that a crony favored with billions in govern-
ment contracts had built a $4-million house for the first lady in the capital’s most 
exclusive neighborhood. 74 
 This assessment, however, appears to have been unduly pessimistic. In the face 
of this scandal and a succession of similar exposés, the president’s approval ratings 
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began to plummet, and his party suffered “stinging defeats” in the June 2016 state 
elections, losing six of the nine state governorships it had held some for decades. 75 
The results were particularly significant in Mexico City, where the insurgent Morena 
party, led by reformist Andrés Manuel López Obrador, led in the balloting for the 
capital’s constituent assembly. 76 In response to a mass citizens’ campaign, in 2017 
President Peña Nieto established a body akin to Indonesia’s KPK, the National Anti-
corruption System, and enshrined it in the constitution—a development observers 
called “a watershed moment.” 77 When the president tried to hobble the anticorrup-
tion drive by appointing his party’s campaign lawyer as attorney general, a media 
exposé of the nominee’s use of a fake address to avoid taxes on his Ferrari blocked 
the move. 78 In 2018, after months of continued protests over corruption, Peña Nieto’s 
party suffered a stunning defeat in the July presidential elections, bringing the opposi-
tion leader López Obrador to power. 79 
 The most promising democratic transition of the Arab Spring, that of Tunisia, 
also shows the potential power of media-driven scandal, set in motion by a fusion of 
civic-minded journalism and partisan maneuvering, to fend off authoritarian reversal. 
Throughout its first half century as an independent state, Tunisia had an entrenched 
authoritarian apparatus, headed in 1957–87 by Habib Bourgiba and then, after a palace 
coup in 1987, by his prime minister, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, who took office promis-
ing democratic reforms. By 1994, however, this would-be reformer’s rule had become 
marked by judicial corruption, torture, repression, and terror campaigns. By establish-
ing an overseas newspaper and a presence in the French mainstream media, exiled 
oppositionists cultivated democratic values and circulated exposés of the regime’s 
spreading corruption. 80 In the aftermath of the 2011 uprising that toppled Ben Ali, 
the new government embarked on reforms that included laws protecting freedom of 
speech and freedom of association. The democracy movement’s success in establish-
ing robust protections for the latter reflects serious attempts at reform after Ben Ali’s 
harsh repression of unions and other civil society organizations. 81 
 In the wave of change that accompanied this dictator’s downfall, media law reform 
led to a decree containing eighty articles pertaining to freedom of speech and informa-
tion that seemed to offer new protections for the media. But as in Indonesia, failure 
to eliminate older, contradictory articles in the penal code enabled the use of criminal 
libel laws to silence journalists and curb a watchdog media. 82 Nevertheless, Tunisia’s 
ranking on the World Press Freedom Index climbed by thirty places in 2015–16 to 
rank at 96 out of 180 countries. 83 When scandals have broken, moreover, they have 
followed a similar trajectory to that seen in Indonesia and other comparable cases, 
serving to break up collusive pacts that can lead to reversal. 
 The most dramatic of these scandals began in December 2012, when the freelance 
journalist Olfa Riahi posted documents on her blog implicating the minister of foreign 
affairs from the Islamist Ennahda Party in embezzlement and an extramarital affair. 
The documents contained receipts showing the minister’s use of both state coffers 
and a Chinese government slush fund to rent the Sheraton Hotel for his personal use. 
Although she obtained the documents from a partisan-motivated insider leak, Riahi 
spent six weeks verifying their contents by tracking the data back to original sources 
in China. While Salafist extremists sent her death threats and prosecutors filed crimi-
nal charges, observers debated whether the scandal signaled the “rise of investigative 
journalism” in Tunisia or was merely an example of political attack. 84 
 The resonance of this “Sheratongate” scandal was heightened as Tunisia plunged 
into a serious political crisis marked by the assassinations of two liberal leaders 
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and increasing opposition to perceived power grabs by the Islamist ruling party. In 
response to rising public pressure, the Ennahda Party was forced to leave power, and 
a caretaker government under the prime minister, Mehdi Jomaa, put the democratic 
transition back on track by presiding over the drafting of a new constitution that the 
US secretary of state, John Kerry, called a “model” for “the world.” 85 
 The firestorm that this scandal ignited followed a familiar pattern: a journalist 
airs documents obtained from a partisan-motivated source; through the dynamics of 
intraelite and intermedia competition, the story grows into a scandal sparking pub-
lic outrage; and the denouement helps defend the country’s democratic revolution 
from reversal, in this case, by aspiring Islamist authoritarianism. Without Riadhi, 
observed journalism professor Thomas Bass, Tunisia’s transition “might have come 
to a dead end.” 86 
 While a freelance journalist used a blog to spark reform in Tunisia, in South Korea 
the mainstream media—both television and the establishment newspapers—became 
central to a concerted, collective effort in 2016 to address the nation’s deepening cor-
ruption. For nearly thirty years since the end of authoritarian rule in 1988, scandal had 
already played a recurring role in disrupting collusion between the nation’s powerful 
executive and equally powerful conglomerates, or  chaebol . After liberation from the 
Japanese in 1946, South Korea developed as a state with a close, even collusive, alli-
ance with the  chaebol that would eventually control nearly 80 percent of the economy. 
Subsequent public pressure for democratization took two forms: violent uprisings 
against dictators in 1961 and 1987 and, since 1988, a combination of media-driven 
scandal and mass mobilization to check the corruption of legally elected presidents. 
Throughout the country’s more recent quarter century of electoral democracy, these 
dynamics succeeded in periodically breaking up collusive pacts between the  chaebol 
and the executive, allowing South Korea to develop a deeply rooted mass aspiration 
for greater political integrity. 87 
 These trends culminated in the largest corruption scandal in the country’s his-
tory, which began in 2016 and followed, to a significant degree, the political pat-
terns seen in Indonesia and Tunisia. Given the structural collusion between the 
country’s chief executive and the  chaebol for nearly forty years, every South Korean 
administration has taken office with an inclination toward deepening corruption 
that, in retrospect, has only been checked by media exposé and mass protest. The 
presidency of Park Geun-hye, the daughter of the country’s long-serving dictator, 
General Park Chung-hee, was no exception. From the time she took office in Feb-
ruary 2013, her entourage set in motion a typically corrupt relationship with the 
 chaebol , extracting $70 million over the next three years in personal bribes and dona-
tions to two foundations controlled by the president’s “shaman” adviser, Choi Soon-
sil, who gained her exceptional influence by purporting to speak with the ghost of 
the president’s murdered mother. 88 
 For nearly three years, presidential power quashed repeated media attempts to 
expose this increasingly sordid nexus of corruption. In 2014, the newspaper  Segye Ilbo 
reported on documents that implicated Choi’s family. But President Park turned on 
the paper, interrogating its journalists, threatening affiliated companies with an audit, 
and demanding the dismissal of its president. A police officer investigated as the 
source of the leak committed suicide after leaving a note saying, “Listen journalists! 
The people’s right to know is what you live and exist for. Please do your job.” 89 A year 
later, the conservative journal of record,  Chosun Ilbo , published an exposé charging the 
senior presidential secretary with extracting “donations” from thirty conglomerates 
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for the newly established Mir Foundation. Again the administration struck back, 
smearing the paper by charging that its chief correspondent had received free trips 
courtesy of the Daewoo shipping  chaebol . 90 
 A few months later, however, one of Choi’s personal assistants, Ko Young-tae, 
began leaking video footage of Choi’s undue influence over the president to  Chosun 
Ilbo ’s affiliate, TV Chosun. 91 Perhaps intimidated by pressure over the Daewoo revela-
tions, the station suppressed the information for over a year. 92 Meanwhile, the opposi-
tion Justice Party began raising questions about $71.8 million in  chaebol donations to 
Mir and another foundation, K-Sports, both believed to be controlled by Choi. 93 
 Then on October 24, 2016, a rival cable channel, JTBC, aired a blockbuster story 
about a tablet allegedly owned by Choi showing that she had edited at least forty-
four of the president’s speeches. Within a day, TV Chosun began releasing Ko’s vid-
eos, which showed Choi’s autocratic manner of ordering presidential aides about—an 
indication of her extraordinary authority. 94 In the media free-for-all that followed, 
news outlets released a growing body of evidence of the corrupt relationship between 
the  chaebol and Choi’s foundations, Mir and K-Sports. 
 Investigations also produced evidence that the Park government was engaging 
in practices that threatened a return to the country’s authoritarian past. One probe 
turned up a 2015 “black list” of more than nine thousand names, targeting promi-
nent filmmakers, actors, artists, and writers in ways that a special prosecutor found 
“seriously undermined the freedom of thought and expression.” Aides to President 
Park, including a former culture minister, engaged in systematic harassment of any 
prominent critic, “reviving a practice of past military dictators, like her father, Park 
Chung-hee.” 95 
 Public reaction to the emerging revelations was unprecedented. The largest mass 
demonstrations in the country’s history filled Seoul’s streets, while  chaebol execu-
tives began appearing before parliament to confess their “donations” to the Mir and 
K-Sports foundations, which many believed were fronts for the president. Empowered 
by this potent combination of media-driven scandal and popular protest, in December 
2016, South Korea’s three opposition parties pushed through a motion that led the 
parliament to impeach the president and send her case to the country’s constitutional 
court, forcing her to step aside. 96 
 In a country where, as one journalist put it, political scandals “are a dime a dozen,” 
and “most people tune out the news,” observers began asking how this scandal could 
snowball so quickly. 97 A commonly cited factor was the realization, as one citizen said, 
that the president, “who we thought was . . . a mentally stable person, has been rely-
ing on a damn shaman cult her whole life.” 98 Many were also troubled by the discovery 
that someone with no official position could be acting, behind the scenes, as the most 
powerful person in the country. There was a palpable “sense of betrayal” for Koreans 
who had seen Park as “a corruption-free version of her father.” 99 
 All these factors seemed at first to center on Park. If the scandal had played out 
like those in the past, her impeachment and removal from office in March 2017 would 
have satisfied the crowds, and she would have joined a procession of presidents dis-
graced at the ends of their terms, allowing politics to continue as usual. But ongoing 
revelations instead drew scrutiny to broader issues, particularly the pay-to-play rela-
tionships that had developed between the government and the  chaebol . When inves-
tigation into Choi family privilege revealed that special admission had been granted 
to Choi’s daughter by an otherwise highly competitive elite university, the anger was 
visceral. 100 
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 With each new development, outrage broadened, moving from an initial focus on 
influence peddling in the executive to anger at a larger system of patronage that left 
many feeling shut out, with few ways to advance. The national protests grew from 
calls for the president’s removal to wider demands for structural change, producing a 
potentially important break from the past. Instead of focusing solely on the president, 
investigations culminated in the unprecedented arrest of Samsung’s de facto leader, 
Lee Jae-yong, in February on charges of paying $36 million to the shaman adviser. 
“What we need is a great national cleanup,” said Moon Jae-in, the opposition leader 
who succeeded Park as president in the May 2017 elections. “We must sternly punish 
politics-business collusion, a legacy of the dictatorial era, and take this as an opportu-
nity to reform chaebol.” 101 
 Democratic Consolidation in Global Context 
 The cases from Indonesia, Mexico, Tunisia, and South Korea share a com-
monality relevant to the core problem of this study: democratization’s inherent 
inclination toward reversal. Each country’s transition seems chronically precari-
ous, poised to slide back to authoritarianism or sink into a permanent state of 
pseudodemocracy. In each case, a nexus of collusion that facilitated corruption and 
protected leaders from accountability became a major factor slowing democratic 
consolidation. Each new spiral into deeper corruption and collusion, each layer 
of insulation protecting entrenched interests, further weakened the mechanisms 
of accountability and reduced opportunities to eff ect circulation of leadership. In 
three of these countries—Indonesia, Mexico, and South Korea—the danger posed 
by these trends was less reversion to authoritarianism than a potential slide into 
pseudodemocracy. At diff erent moments, however, all four faced a risk of state 
capture by antidemocratic forces that threatened a point of no return—rising 
Islamists in Tunisia, moneyed drug cartels in Mexico, a budding autocrat in South 
Korea, and an aspiring strongman in Indonesia. 
 In all these countries, however, civic-minded actors—journalists, students, watch-
dog organizations, and human rights groups—made sustained attempts to impose 
accountability. The resulting revelations increased public awareness that corruption 
and malfeasance remained at untenable levels, despite democratization’s promises of 
reform. Such awareness by itself was not necessarily progress. For years, media schol-
ars have debated over the potential effect of “scandal fatigue,” or “politics fatigue,” on 
democratic publics. In their 2004 global survey of political scandal, Howard Tumber 
and Silvio Waisbord argue, as noted above, that “democracies are inherently prone to 
be regularly shaken by scandals,” and the media, particularly in mature democracies, 
have “short-lived attention” that “makes scandals prone to have a brief existence,” 
inducing a “a numb public opinion” and little substantive change. 102 The concern that 
too much news of scandal will alienate people from the political process and promote 
apathy calls into question this study’s underlying premise that watchdog reporting is 
good for democracy. 
 However, findings from closer examination of this phenomenon, sometimes 
referred to as “media malaise,” suggest that greater consumption of news in general, 
including negative stories, may foster increased civic engagement. Waisbord describes 
a fatigue reaction to heavy political scandal reporting in Latin American countries but 
also notes that public engagement tends to increase when scandals expose offenses 
directly affecting ordinary citizens. 103 In her own study testing the media malaise 
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theory, Pippa Norris also presents evidence of this positive correlation between news 
consumption and civic engagement. 104 
 A more comprehensive survey of findings on “watchdog journalism” in democra-
tization by Sheila Coronel reveals a mixed picture indicating both the potential and 
limitations for all such journalism, including scandal reporting, in furthering democ-
ratization. 105 In a public lecture in 2008, Coronel argued that Philippine investigative 
journalists kept showing the public how bad corruption was, reporting scandal after 
scandal, but this awareness rarely went anywhere. People who were guilty were not 
thrown out of office because the constitutional mechanisms for rotation of officehold-
ers were not well connected to public opinion. It was this disconnect, this lack of rota-
tion, that produced “politics fatigue.” As fatigue set in, she explained, the market for 
“critical” reporting would shrink, setting in motion a vicious cycle. 106 
 Yet in all the cases examined above, a mixture of motives—cynical, self-serving, 
and civic-minded—converged to break up collusion and maintain the fluid political 
contestation essential to democracy. The periodic emergence of major scandals has 
overcome this disconnect between press exposé and political reform, showing the 
power of media attention to force a changing of the guard. Scandals that alter the 
course of history have a key distinction: Revelations issue from, and enter into, a 
volatile matrix of competing forces and actors, driven by varying and sometimes con-
flicting motives. It is the often unexpected combination of revelations and motiva-
tions that produces the  grande scandale d’État that can arrest, even if only temporarily, 
authoritarian reversal. 
 In the ensuing political dramas, fueled by media competition, public outrage, civil 
society mobilization, partisan rivalries, and personal vendetta, intraelite conflicts spill 
out into the open. In the glare of publicity from traditional and social media, would-be 
conspirators turn on each other, and public figures move opportunistically to survive 
or even capitalize on the uproar. These chain reactions can break up collusive pacts 
and spur turnover in leadership as politicians and their parties gain or lose public 
favor. 
 In all four of these postauthoritarian countries, scandals contributed to a general 
flux in the balance of power, maintaining uncertainty in the contests between the 
contests—that is, the battles in courtrooms and the court of public opinion playing 
out on a daily basis between elections. The rise and fall of political fortunes between 
elections is also part of the necessary institutionalization of the regular, rule-bound 
rotation of leadership in democratic consolidation. 
 Clearly the watchdog role of the media, including scandal reporting that demands 
resolution, has its limits as an extrainstitutional force for change, even if aided by 
mobilized publics and independent anticorruption agencies, such as Indonesia’s Cor-
ruption Eradication Commission. But in democratizing nations beset by a recurring 
pull toward reversal, such journalism remains a vehicle for consistently loosening col-
lusive pacts and reintroducing uncertainty into democratic contestation. 
 Such reporting, moreover, is arguably integral to consolidation of the conditions 
that make democracy self-perpetuating—fostering what Pippa Norris calls “a virtuous 
circle,” which in turn furthers a process that Samuel Valenzuela refers to as “virtu-
ous institutionalization.” 107 The media contribute to such developments by imposing 
transparency that makes the recapture of the state by antidemocratic forces more dif-
ficult and by helping create an informed citizenry able to express preferences not just 
in periodic and carefully controlled elections but on a regular basis via multiple ven-
ues open to public interaction, input, and influence. Reporting practices focused on 
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scandal and partisan conflict, though often divisive, can also deepen democracy’s hold 
simply by normalizing its perpetual state of contestation. At a minimum, constant 
exposure to the idea of politics as a contest helps reinforce the values associated with 
open contests—most critically, the necessity of unfixed outcomes and fair play. But 
over time, contest frames and the regular showcasing of scandal can also accomplish 
a more fundamental change by making rigged contestation seem unnatural, a viola-
tion of peoples’ individual values and, ideally, the values of a broader national culture. 
 In Indonesia, the media’s embrace of a watchdog role and shift to the regular air-
ing of political conflict were changes essentially incompatible with, even subversive 
of, the integralist doctrine of relations between state and society that it replaced. More 
broadly, in any emerging democracy, the media’s reinforcement of public demand for 
open contestation and transparency not only helps ward off reversal but is, at many 
levels, antithetical to the return of authoritarianism. 
 In the relentless interplay between democracy and collusion, between transpar-
ency and stasis, scandals and the alliances between media and the public that amplify 
them are possibly a weak tool. But in systems compromised by endemic collusion 
and intractable corruption, they remain one of the only tools available. If the inher-
ent inclination of democratization is toward reversal, then the tendency of the media, 
and democracy itself, to pit people against each other may be the best defense. As the 
Indonesian case indicates, by serving as both a public watchdog and, perhaps coun-
terintuitively, a platform for intraelite conflict, partisan vendetta and political scandal, 
the news media can serve as a country’s front line and, possibly, last defense against 
democratic reversal. The airing of scandals and a larger watchdog role may not be 
a cure-all, but media failure to play this role, and thereby impose transparency, can 
facilitate the return of authoritarian rule. 
 Once democratic procedures consolidate, however, all parties in the process 
can play more conventional roles. The routinization of democracy, its rituals and 
rules, tends over time to reduce the need for heroic interventions by all players, 
including the media, thus obviating the more positive role of political scandal. More 
conventional scandal emerges almost endlessly from its eternal sources of sex and 
money. But  grande scandale d’État should slowly disappear, arising only when forces 
of reversal threaten radical change that will effectively rig the system and block the 
circulation of contending parties. At such moments, scandal once again can serve a 
critical function. 
 The media’s centrality in the process of consolidation makes them vulnerable to 
attack by atavistic forces. Conversely, overt attacks on the media can become a potent 
symbol for resistance to the return of autocratic rule, inspiring public protests to 
discourage further abuses or force an autocratic leader out of power. Defense of free 
speech can become powerfully symbolic for antiauthoritarian forces, inspiring further 
struggles for democratic consolidation. 108 Actions to control or intimidate the Indone-
sian media have, since Suharto’s fall, provoked backlash—often sparked by a flood of 
condemnation from news outlets themselves. 
 From the perspective of journalism itself, the lingering idealism of an antiauthori-
tarian struggle, particularly when shared by working journalists, also promotes the 
ideal of a critical distance from power holders. Much of Indonesia’s media community, 
like many Philippine reporters during the post-Marcos period, cut their teeth on the 
political drama of overthrowing an autocratic regime while immersed in prodemo-
cracy rhetoric. Within this community, watchdog journalism, and the investigative 
reporting associated with it, are valued for more than their profit potential. Journalists 
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who have fought to rid a country of a corrupt dictatorship are less likely to let the logic 
of commercial profit be the sole arbiter of value. And even when commercial news 
outlets stop funding investigative journalism, societies emerging from authoritarian-
ism tend to have dedicated individuals who establish nonprofit programs, funded by 
both domestic and international donors, to help the country maintain high-quality 
journalism—organizations like the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, or 
in Jakarta, the Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information. 
 Even after a decade of postauthoritarian publishing success,  Tempo ’s chief editor, 
Bambang Harymurti, was critical of readers who placed too much faith in a commer-
cial model of journalism to ensure their continued access to independent reporting. 
Since such journalism is not, he said, free, as Americans assume water should be, 
both strong sales and support from nonprofit organizations, including watchdog 
groups, are critical in a news outlet’s adherence to high professional standards. But 
he also emphasized the importance of  Tempo ’s economic independence, in contrast 
to the compromises necessary for outlets owned by major conglomerates. 109 
 The central role of the media is necessitated by another unstated aspect of demo-
cratic transitions: leaders in emerging democracies almost inevitably disappoint. Indo-
nesia has so far weathered profound disillusion with all five post-Suharto presidencies. 
But beneath that visible failing, the system of checks and balances changed, quite 
fundamentally, with the country’s rejection of Pancasila democracy and its embrace of 
a liberal democracy, including a free media, with all its flaws and contentiousness. As 
 Tempo founder Goenawan Mohamad once suggested, this better democracy we all keep 
hoping for may not exist. 110 In reality, perhaps the best we can hope for is a rule-based 
game that does not promise good governance but facilitates the circulation of leaders 
who aspire to good governance and are held accountable by a mix of the best and the 
worst in human nature. 
 
 Comparisons among the democratic transitions in Indonesia and nations in Asia, 
Africa, and Latin America return us to the question raised at the outset: How does 
democratic consolidation, or democracy itself, become self-perpetuating? For democ-
racy advocates, the fi ndings from this study are likely to be both discouraging and 
heartening. 
 One point these cases highlight is that consolidation does not proceed solely 
from the good intentions of political actors, whether journalists, politicians, 
business leaders, or foreign powers. In an ideal world, the media would perform 
their watchdog functions as an objective tribune of the fourth estate, identifying 
problems for solution by responsible elected leaders and informing civil society 
groups. These groups would, in turn, pressure leaders to fulfill their obligations 
to the democratic process, thereby allowing the free flow of political contestation. 
 In reality, media organizations are owned by actors with conflicts of interest, jour-
nalists face competing pressures, and politicians are frequently compromised or cor-
rupt. Yet in Indonesia and the comparable transitions discussed above, civic-minded 
journalists made use of self-serving sources often pursuing un-civic-minded agendas, 
including partisan maneuvering, political ambition, and personal vendetta. In each 
context, moreover, intraelite conflict and intermedia competition were critical forces 
in compelling news outlets to air information damaging to those in power, overcom-
ing caution and efforts at suppression. 
 In any democracy, the recurring pull of collusion can, if unchecked, move toward 
oligarchy, autocracy, even authoritarianism. Among societies transitioning from 
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authoritarian rule, these tendencies are manifest in the pressures for a return to the 
old order and continued control sought by oligarchs over material resources and polit-
ical power. 111 In the absence of countervailing forces, such pressures would likely lead 
to a reconstitution of the collusion and corruption of the original regimes. For both 
established and emerging democracies, there often needs to be some force, apart from 
the formalities of court and constitution, to check these trends and strengthen trans-
parency and open contestation. In most cases, effective checks come from some com-
bination of intraelite competition, civil society mobilization, and media investigation. 
 Amid an untidy spectacle of electoral fraud, political compromise, or parliamen-
tary paralysis, members of the media, whether intentionally or inadvertently, can 
play a pivotal role in breaking up collusive pacts and restoring the fluidity of uncer-
tain outcomes so fundamental to democratic contestation. In Indonesia, oligarchic 
elites continue to dominate the nation’s economy. Following this trend, media own-
ership has grown increasingly concentrated in the post-Suharto era, a development 
accelerated by digitalization. 112 Within this new landscape, oligarchs, taking advan-
tage of the media’s freedom, have only grown more powerful. But ownership is still 
not monolithic. 113 Independent players wield influence, and oligarchs use the media 
not only to protect their interests but also to compete with rivals, thereby opening 
up political space that allows democratic consolidation to continue. As they pursue 
multiple agendas within this space, the media remind us once again that democracy is 
not a fixed and final product but rather a process of endless contestation. The system 
may seem volatile, the media spectacles dispiriting, and the future perpetually uncer-
tain. But this ungainly combination can check collusion and promote the circulation 
of leadership, the essential attribute of any democracy. 
 Without discounting the importance of economic and judicial reforms, the most 
complex and contradictory aspect of change in Indonesia, from the perspective of this 
analysis, has been in the political arena, with a succession of corruption scandals that 
have exposed endemic graft among the nation’s highest officials. By airing these scan-
dals and imposing transparency on intraelite conflict, the media have played a central 
role in dissolving the authoritarian stasis fortified for over forty years by corruption 
and collusive pacts. Played out in the public sphere in these decades of transition, 
such contestation has rejuvenated the pluralist competition that is the core of democ-




 Note on the Collection of Headlines 
 In selecting sample headlines to show the changing tenor of press content cover-
ing the years 1985  (appendix 1) and 1990  (appendix 2) from holdings at University 
of Wisconsin–Madison’s Memorial Library, I avoided months with a single, dominant 
news event. During my own fi eldwork in 1998–99  (appendix 3) , I made parallel col-
lection eff orts from Jakarta street vendors, following the pattern of the earlier eff ort. 
As publications closed from insolvency or repression and new ones opened, changes 
in the print market over the fourteen-year span of these three tables made it impos-
sible to sample the same set of publications for each year. Despite the idiosyncrasies 
of collection, these three “ordinary” months are reasonably representative of their 
respective eras’ news tabloid and magazine street vendor fare. 
 Appendix 1 
 Tabloid and news magazine headlines, Jakarta, September 1985 
 Headline  Source  Date 
 “Chris Kanter: ‘Small Is Beautiful’” 
 “Chris Kanter: “‘Kecil Itu Indah’” 
 Eksekutif  Sept. 1985 
 “Market and Business Opportunities 
Search for Open Niche” 
 “Pasar dan Peluang Bisnis Mencari Segmen 
Terbuka” 
 Promosi Ekonomi  Sept. 1985 
 “Excess Liquidity: Who’s at Fault?” 
 “Ekses Likuiditas . . . Salah Siapa?” 
 Infobank  Sept. 1985 
 “Will Economic Recession Spread 
Again?” 
 “Resesi Ekonomi Akan Berjangkit Kembali?” 
 Keuangan  Sept. 1985 
 “Moerdiono: To China No 
Recommendation Needed” 
 “Moerdiono: Ke Cina Tak Perlu Rekomendasi” 
 SWA Sembada  Sept. 1985 
 “Fire: Able to Be Controlled?” 
 “Kebakaran: Mampukah Diatasi?” 
 Topik  Sept. 4, 1985 
 “Shifting Palapa [satellite], Oh, Shifting 
Palapa” 
 “Palapa Bergeser, Oh, Palapa Bergeser” 
 Tempo  Sept. 7, 1985 
 “Who Needs Indonesia’s Products?” 
 “Siapa Butuh Buatan RI?” 
 Wahyu  Sept. 10–24, 1985 
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 Headline  Source  Date 
 “Poverty in the Islamic World” 
 “Kemiskinan di Dunia Islam” 
 Panji Masyarakat  Sept. 11, 1985 
 “How to Choose a Governor? A Story 
from Riau” 
 “Bagaimana Memilih Gubernur? Sebuah Cerita 
dari Riau” 
 Tempo  Sept. 14, 1985 
 “National Games Week XI: United, 
Accomplished, Profl igate” 
 “PON XI: Bersatu, Berprestasi, Berhura-hura” 
 Panji Masyarakat  Sept. 21, 1985 
 “Where Will They Go after PHK 
[layoff s]?” 
 “Ke Mana Mereka Setelah PHK?” 
 Tempo  Sept. 21, 1985 
 “Nurcholis Madjid: Concept of Islamic 
Community Weak” 
 “Nurcholis Madjid: Wawasan Umat Islam Lembek” 
 Wahyu  Sept. 25–Oct. 10, 
1985 
 “Seizing the SE-Asia Medal” [image of 
Bob Hasan on cover] 
 “Berebut Medali SE-Asia” 
 Tempo  Sept. 28, 1985 
 Appendix 2 
 Tabloid and news magazine headlines, Jakarta, May 1990 
 Headline  Source  Date 
 “Critiquing the Capital Market” 
 “Menggugat Pasar Modal” 
 Forum Keadilan  May 1990 
 “Idul Fitri and the Populist Spirit” 
 “Idulfi tri dan Semangat Kerakyatan” 
 Media Dakwah  May 1990 
 “Air Base Safeguards” 
 “Pengaman Pangkalan Udara” 
 TSM: Teknologi & 
Strategi Militer 
 May 1990 
 “Struggle for Lots: Thamrin-Sudirman-Kuningan” 
 “Rebutan Kapling: Thamrin-Sudirman-Kuningan” 
 SWA Sembada  May 1990 
 “Clerics, Politicians, Offi  cials, Artists Analyze Idul 
Fitri” 
 “Ulama, Politisi, Pejabat, Artis Mengurai Idul Fitri” 
 Panji Masyarakat  May 1–10, 1990 
 “[Japanese prime minister] Kaifu Comes Carrying 
Money?” 
 “Kaifu Datang Bawa Uang?” 
 Tempo  May 5, 1990 
 “Who Do Followers of Islam Support?” 
 “Umat Islam Dukung Siapa?” 
 Panji Masyarakat  May 11–20, 1900 
 “Housing Credit Fever” 
 “Deman Rumah Kredit” 
 Editor  May 12, 1990 
 “Cleansing Oneself from PKI” 
 “Bersih Diri tentang PKI” 
 Tempo  May 12, 1990 
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 Headline  Source  Date 
 “Look Out! Mafi a [rising from the] Ground” 
 “Awas! Mafi a Tanah!” 
 Jakarta-Jakarta  May 12–18, 1990 
 “Women Slayer in Your Midst” 
 “Perempuan Pembunuh di Sekitar Anda” 
 Editor  May 17, 1990 
 “Flood of Boat Refugees” 
 “Banjir Manusia Perahu” 
 Tempo  May 19, 1990 
 “Women Clerics in Australia” 
 “Ustadzah Kita di Australia” 
 Panji Masyarakat  May 21–30, 1990 
 “‘Total Support’ Debate” [illustrated with a crowd 
holding Suharto’s picture] 
 “Debat Kebulatan Tekad” 
 Tempo  May 26, 1990 
 “Presidential Candidate, ABRI, and Islam: ‘Total 
Support’” 
 “Calon Presiden, ABRI, dan Islam: Kebulatan Tekad” 
 Editor  May 26, 1990 
 Appendix 3 
 Tabloid and news magazine headlines, Jakarta, February 1999 
 Headline  Source  Date 
 “Debtor’s Tricks of the Elephant Class” 
 “Trik Pengutang Kelas Gajah” 
 SWA Sembada  Jan. 28–Feb. 10, 
1999 
 “Beware of the Provocateur” [illustrated with a 
photograph of Yorries Raweyai] 
 “Awas Provokator” 
 D&R  Feb. 1–6, 1999 
 “East Timor: ‘Thank You, Good Bye’” 
 “Timor Timur: ‘Thank You, Good Bye’” 
 Forum Keadilan  Feb. 8, 1999 
 “East Timor Time Bomb” 
 “Bom Waktu Timor Timur” 
 D&R  Feb. 8–13, 1999 
 “Suharto in the Election” 
 “Soeharto di Pemilu” 
 Tempo  Feb. 9–15, 1999 
 “Executive Turnover as Top Crumbles” 
 “Giliran Eksekutif Puncak Tumbang” 
 SWA Sembada  Feb. 11–24, 1999 
 “Political Choice of Ethnic Chinese” 
 “Pilihan Politik Keturunan Cina” 
 Tempo  Feb. 14–22, 1999 
 “Pounding Hearts [in] Chinese Community” 
 “Dag Dig Dug Masyarakat Cina” 
 D&R  Feb. 15–20, 1999 
 “Shoot on Sight BANG!!!” 
 “Tembak di Tempat DOR!!!” 
 Sumber  Feb. 16–22, 1999 
 “Watching Wiranto” 
 “Cermati Wiranto” 
 Dë TAK  Feb. 16–22, 1999 
 “Cendana Family Fractured” 
 “Keluarga Cendana Pecah” 
 Sinar Reformasi  Feb. 17–23, 1999 
 “8 People to Be Charged by Suharto” 
 “8 Orang Bakal Dituntut Soeharto” 
 Berita Keadilan  Feb. 17–23, 1999 
(continued)
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 Headline  Source  Date 
 “Pertamina [oil company] Dissolved” 
 Pertamina Dibubarkan 
 Perspektif  Feb. 18, 1999 
 “Controversy over $200 Million Flight Overseas” 
 “Kontroversi Exodus US$200 Miliar ke Luar Negeri” 
 Realitas  Feb. 18–24, 1999 
 “Enjoying BDN’s Free Credit” 
 “Nikmatnya Kredit Gratis BDN” 
 Kontan  Feb. 19, 1999 
 “120 Prabowo Loyalist Offi  cers Soon to Be 
Replaced” 
 “120 Perwira ‘Orang2’ Prabowo Segera Diganti” 
 Aksi  Feb. 19–25, 1999 
 “Riady-Habibie New Duet Sweeps Away Suharto-
Uncle Liem” 
 “Riady-Habibie Duet Baru Gusur Soeharto-Om Liem” 
 Siaga  Feb. 19–25, 1999 
 “Freedom [now] or Later” [illustrated with an 
image of Xanana Gusmão] 
 “Merdeka atau Nanti” 
 Tempo  Feb. 28, 1999 
 “Habibie Crushed” 
 “Habibie Hancur” 
 Megapos  Feb. 21–27, 1999 
 “PRD Comeback” 
 “PRD Comeback” 
 Tokoh  Feb. 22–28, 1999 
 “The Prabowo Problem: Habibie Takes Up 
Challenge” 
 “Soal Prabowo: Habibie Menantang” 
 Sinar  Feb. 22–28, 1999 
 “Suharto Threatens Amien Rais—Hunt Down 
the Wiretapper” 
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